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       Introduction---Overview
       This is the second phase of a sequential national study of 
federalism focused on identifying, evaluating, and ordering the 
current state standards for admitting convictions to impeach.  It 
employs as the fulcrum for this analysis the standards during this 
study period of the current federal rule on this issue.  This study 
like the first examines pertinent authority for a fifteen year 
period, 1990-2004.  Studies in patterns of federalism  can be done 
at various levels of authority.  State legislative standards 
regulating the same issue can be compared and contrasted based on 
pertinent policy concerns.  State legislative rules can also be 
compared and contrasted, employing as the point of departure for 
the evaluation how the states' standards compare to the standards 
of the federal rule, that served to some significant degree as a 
source for the states to reconsider their rules.  The first of 
these two studies in federalism focused on those issues. [1]
The next level of comparative evaluation is the 
interpretation of each states' rule's standards by that state's 
supreme court, and the comparative effect of those interpretations 
on the rankings of the state standards from most to least liberal 
in admitting convictions to impeach.  This is the focus of this 
article.
       Part one of this article summarizes the findings of the 
first of these two sequential studies of how our federal system 
regulates the admission of convictions to impeach. [2] Part two of 
this article identifies and evaluates the decisions of the state 
supreme courts interpreting rules which admitted convictions to 
impeach on the same standards as the current federal rule. [3]
Part three identifies and evaluates the decisions of the state 
supreme courts interpreting rules whose standards overall admitted 
convictions to impeach more restrictively than the federal rule. 
[4]  Part four of this article identifies and evaluates the 
decisions of the state supreme courts interpreting rules whose 
standards overall admitted convictions to impeach more liberally 
than the federal rule. [5]
Each of these three parts of the article tracking the 
outcomes of the three sets of state supreme court decisions during 
the study period is organized to track the following major points 
of analysis.  First, basic demographic outcome data from the 
2decisions in each of the three types of rule states is identified 
and sequenced. [6]  Next, in each section, the data's significance 
is identified and analyzed. [7]
       The decision data is analyzed to determine the degree to 
which state supreme courts in each category referred to and relied 
upon the federal rule and the standards proscribed by that rule. 
[8]  Second and third, the decision data is assessed to determine 
the degree to which state supreme courts in each category examined 
the trial record to determine if the trial judge had made the 
appropriate rule standard evaluation, and to determine the degree 
to which each state supreme court in each category themselves 
properly employed the standard(s) of their rules to determine the 
admissibility of convictions to impeach. [9]  Fourth, the case data 
is assessed to determine how the three sets of courts defined and 
evaluated for admission to impeach, convictions for crimes of 
"dishonesty" or "false statement", and similar limiting concepts. 
[10]  Fifth, the case data is assessed to determine how the three 
sets of courts defined and evaluated for admission to impeach, 
convictions for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison 
when that punishment term was the basis for at least preliminarily 
qualifying a conviction for possible admission to impeach. [11]
Finally, each of these sections assesses the opinions of the three 
sets of state supreme courts to evaluate how each set of courts 
identified, defined, and evaluated the admissibility significance 
of exclusionary policies, particularly unfair prejudice. [12]
       The article concludes with a comparative evaluation of the 
crucial findings from parts 2-4, and provides policy perspectives 
concerning those findings. [13]  Finally, in light of its findings, 
the article recommends, as did the first study, wholesale changes 
in the standards for admitting convictions to impeach. [14]
Changes which if implemented would create a single national 
standard that barred use of conviction records to impeach.  A 
standard that the article documents is more consistent with related 
constitutional doctrines and the existing body of evidence, 
particularly empirical evidence on the impact of admitting 
conviction records to impeach.  This is  particularly true in light 
of what this article documents is the overwhelming reality in most 
of our state courts - wholesale and standardless admission of 
convictions records ostensibly only to impeach, especially 
defendants in criminal cases, which cause significant unfair 
prejudice, and which in all but the rarest of cases are irrelevant 
to prove propensity to lie, and in those rare instances are still 
unnecessary to admit for that purpose. 
       2.1.1  Part 1 - Summary of Article 1 - The Federal
              and State Rules Regulating The Admissibility
3              of Convictions to Impeach
The first article began with an analysis of the origins and 
evolution of the standards of the federal rule regulating the 
admission of convictions to impeach - a change in that rule in 1990 
prompted beginning the study period in that year. [15] The article 
found that only nine states' rules mimic the current federal rule's 
standards, despite the fact that the federal rule was touted as a 
possible basis for reaching consensus on this issue. [16]
       The article next focused in Part two on its primary research 
and analysis findings.  It identified and ranked each state's 
evidence rule regulating the admission of convictions to impeach 
during the fifteen year period, 1990-2004.   The conceptual 
premises of the rankings were explained. [17]  The comparison was 
organized by placing each states' rule in one of three categories-
identical to the federal rule, more restrictive than the federal 
rule in admitting convictions to impeach, or more liberal than the 
federal rule.   
       The most significant and somewhat startling finding of that 
article was that there were currently twenty-eight different 
standards in the fifty states with regard to admitting convictions 
to impeach.  The article also found that despite the diversity in 
the states' standards, nine of every ten of the fifty states' rules 
at the beginning of 2005 still authorized the possible admission to 
impeach most witnesses, including the accused, with a record of 
conviction for crimes which by element analysis were irrelevant as 
proof of a propensity to lie. [18] The second most significant 
overall finding of this part of the article was that even when 
state rules expressly or implicitedly recognize that conviction 
records must be relevant to prove propensity to lie to be 
admissible on that issue, almost all of them, like the federal 
rule, negate that recognition by failing to define such limiting 
concepts as "dishonesty" or "false statement". [19]  Failure  to 
define such terms, opens the door to the possibility of broad 
interpretations of the terms---eliminating any rational argument 
that conviction records for crimes qualified by these 
characterizations constitute logical proof of propensity to lie. 
[20]  Blame for this fundamental failure must be shared by the 
drafters of the federal rule - who in the official commentary 
discussed and expressed a preference for a narrow and policy based 
meanings of these concepts, yet failed to so define the concepts in 
the federal rule. [21]  
       Part three of that article began by identifying two major 
consequences of twenty-eight different state rule standards 
regulating the issue of admitting conviction records to impeach.  
Both of these consequences impact most heavily the behavior of 
members of the legal profession.  First, even evidence experts 
4don't necessary know the current national state of the law on this 
important issue, and second and more importantly, the practicing 
bar is faced with the possibility of further variance in these 
standards by state supreme courts' interpretations, and ultimately 
the possibility of hundreds of variants at the trial judge level. 
[22]  Part three found that ultimately these consequences fall most 
heavily on the rights, including constitutional rights, of 
testifying party litigants, particularly the accused in criminal 
cases. [23]
       The article concluded that this was not a desirable 
federalism pattern/outcome, especially since the federal rule's 
enactment was viewed as a national opportunity for policy 
reflection and perhaps consensus on this issue.  This conclusion 
was qualified by an acknowledgement that there could be a plausible 
policy reason that could justify in a mature federal system this 
much diversity.  The article identified and evaluated the five 
possible and four plausible policy reasons for this pattern. [24]
       The article offered proof that none of these reasons were 
supported by empirical or any form of reality based evidence, and 
therefore could not serve as legitimate policy justifications for 
this pattern of federalism. [25]  An element of this finding was 
disproof of the hypotheses that no constitutional rights are 
implicated by any or only a few of the current twenty-eight state 
standards, authorizing the possible or mandating the admission of 
convictions to impeach. [26]  Injury to the accused specific 
constitutional right to an impartial jury and the right of the 
accused and at least parties who testify in civil cases to minimal 
substantive due process protection, are both threatened by most of 
the states' standards. [27]
       An element of this overall finding was disproof of the 
hypotheses that there is empirical or any form of reality based 
evidence that a record of criminal conviction is relevant(makes it 
logically more likely) to prove propensity to lie. [28]  No 
credible evidence supports this hypotheses, the existing empirical 
evidence supports the conclusion that the hypothesized reason is 
false, and their is widespread admission by lawyers and other 
experts that a record of conviction is not relevant to prove 
propensity to lie. [29]  Admitting irrelevant evidence violates the 
most basic evidence admissibility principal, and risks violating 
the most basic substantive constitutional protection. [30]
       An element of this overall finding was disproof of the 
hypotheses that most or all of these twenty-eight current state 
standards authorizing the possible or mandating the admission of 
convictions to impeach were consistent with current major evidence 
trends such as the "Daubert" doctrine. [31]  The article concluded 
5that most of these standards are inconsistent with Daubert's and 
its progeny's call for critical evaluation and even reexamination 
of the basis for admission of expert testimony.  The article argued 
that Daubert's premise that reliance on hunch and heuristics by 
experts in other fields is subject to judicial scrutiny and 
evaluation, in fairness, should be seen as a general call for a 
reality check on the basis of admission of all evidence, even those 
justified solely by the hunch and heuristics of the legal 
profession. [32]  As such, Daubert's basic concerns are a subset 
and supportive of the basic evidence admissibility requirement of 
relevance. [33]  There is more than just the appearance of 
intellectual hubris on the part of lawyers and judges participating 
in drafting and interpreting evidence rules in continuing to rely 
on an unproven historical heuristic, while at the same time 
ignoring empirical research supporting the conclusions that 
conviction records while irrelevant to prove propensity to lie do 
cause partial jurors and juries. [34]
An element of this overall finding was disproof of the 
hypotheses that most or all of these twenty-eight current state 
standards which do authorize the possible or mandate the admission 
of convictions to impeach are consistent with the reality that 
there is no or inadequate empirical or other evidence that 
admitting conviction records ostensibly only to impeach testimony 
will result in, or create a substantial risk of partial juror(s) 
and juries. [35]  The article identified multiple empirical studies 
and their consistent and consensus findings were reported.  Those 
findings were that jurors and juries are prejudiced in deciding the 
merits of cases by misusing conviction evidence for that purpose, 
while disdaining use of such conviction records ostensibly for its 
only authorized use as impeachment evidence. [36]
       Finally, the article identified the crucial consequence of 
disproof of all identified plausible reasons for the twenty-eight 
state standards.  Currently, nine of every ten of these state rules 
regulating admission of convictions to impeach by opening the door 
to the potential admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial 
information, violates or threaten to violate national and state 
constitutional rights to substantive due process and the right of 
an accused to an impartial jury. [37]
The article proposed reform. [38]  It proposed that all 
fifty states and the federal rule should abolish admission of 
conviction records to impeach, especially where the unfair 
prejudice that results is likely to be greatest-when the accused or 
civil parties take the stand as witnesses.  Hence all reference to 
conviction records as a basis for impeachment should be  
eliminated.  Montana has adopted this ban for all witnesses, and 
that ban demonstrates that such a ban can be implemented now. [39] 
6 In fairness, enhancing the likelihood of convicting persons with 
records, and taking their property in civil cases are not adequate 
counterweights to the admission of irrelevant evidence which 
injures these persons constitutional rights.  Nothing in substance 
will be injured by the ban when the focus is upon the primary goal 
of trials - the search for truth, because jurors will always be 
skeptical of the veracity of the accused, civil parties, and any 
witness who stands to gain or lose as a result of the outcome of 
the trial. [40]  Furthermore, when it is appropriate and necessary, 
i.e. when a witness refuses to admit that he has previously lied 
under oath, and their is a judicial determination that he has so 
lied, the trial judge can instruct the jury of the fact that the 
person has previously lied under oath.  There is never a 
justification for reference to a record of criminal conviction, and 
such a conviction record need not necessarily be the only basis for 
a judicial determination that the witness has previously lied under 
oath. [41]  The article concluded that "Our federalism is one of 
the greatest strengths of our system, it is not, however, an excuse 
for ignoring our most basic constitutional and evidence law 
policies".   
       We turn now to the focus of this article --- the impact of 
the state supreme courts' interpretations of these rules over the 
same very recent fifteen year period.  Potentially the collective 
impact of the work of these most important state courts could 
ameliorate or exacerbate the current pattern of federalism gone 
astray.  What the article uncovers is a pattern of judicial anarchy 
that greatly exacerbates the flaws in our federalism on this issue. 
 The one hundred and fifty state supreme courts decisions analyzed 
in this article collectively have the effect of further opening the 
door in the substantial majority of states to the wholesale 
admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence, while also 
creating the wide spread potential for drastic and unprincipled 
discrepancies in the application of most of these states' standards 
by the hundreds of state trial judges.
       3.1.1
       Part 2 - State Supreme Court Decisions 1990-2004 of 
                Standards to Impeach that Mimicked the Federal
                Rules's Standards
8  of the 9  state supreme courts whose evidence rules were 
identical to the federal rule, made eighteen pertinent admission of 
conviction to impeach decisions during the period of this study, 
1990-2004, and in sixteen of those decisions they affirmed lower 
court admission decisions. [42] 7 of 8 of these state supreme 
courts in 15 of these eighteen decisions(83%) sanctioned or 
authorized the admission of one or more convictions ostensibly only 
to impeach at least one trial witness. [43]  2  of these  8  state 
7supreme courts in  3  of the 18 decisions(22%) sanctioned or ruled 
that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach at 
least one trial witness was or should have been properly excluded. 
[44]  
       6 of these 8 state supreme courts in 12 of these eighteen
decisions sanctioned the admission of one or more convictions to 
impeach the accused. [45]  1 of these eight state supreme courts 
sanctioned or ruled in 1 case that two "felony" convictions 
proffered to impeach the accused should have been excluded. [46]  5 
of these eight state supreme courts in  8 of the eighteen decisions 
sanctioned the admission of multiple convictions to impeach the 
accused or that would have been admitted to impeach the accused 
should he have decided to testify, and only one of these courts in 
one decision decided to exclude multiple convictions of the 
accused. [47]  
2 of these eight state supreme courts in 3 of the eighteen  
decisions between 1990-2004, the period under study in this 
article, sanctioned or authorized the admission of one or more 
convictions to impeach witnesses other than the accused.[48] 2  of 
these eight state supreme courts in 2  of the eighteen decisions 
during the period, 1990-2004, under study in this article, 
sanctioned or ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly 
proffered to impeach a witness other than the accused, including a 
key agent of a civil party, should have been or were properly 
excluded. [49]
To recap, in three of five decisions when the witness was 
not the accused against whom prior convictions were offered to 
impeach, state supreme courts interpreting standards identical to 
those of the federal rule, sanctioned the admission of one or more 
convictions proffered to impeach.  In two  of the three decisions 
sanctioning admission, the witness impeached was a prosecution 
witness, while in one of the two cases in which one of these state 
supreme courts sanctioned exclusion of a conviction to impeach, 
when the witness was not the accused, the witness was also a 
prosecution witness.   On the other hand, when the accused was the 
witness against whom convictions were offered to impeach, these 
state supreme courts affirmed trial judges, and sanctioned the 
admission of convictions to impeach in twelve of thirteen 
decisions. 
7  of 8 of these state supreme courts, in  13  of these 18 
decisions(72%) either sanctioned a trial attorney's failure to 
raise or rely on the argument that a conviction proffered to 
impeach one of his witnesses was irrelevant, or the trial judge's 
failure to even attempt to articulate why the conviction was 
relevant to prove propensity to lie, or failed to make their own 
8independent assessment of relevance, or  substituted its 
characterization of the charge as meeting its criteria of 
"dishonesty" or "false statement", or resorted to the historical 
heuristic that all felonies per se were relevant and had some 
probative value to prove propensity to lie. [50]  As a result, 
these 7 supreme courts collectively sanctioned the admission of all 
of the following irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie 
convictions as impeachment evidence: armed robbery(multiple cases), 
assault with intent to do bodily harm, attempted robbery, breaking 
into a vehicle, burglary, carrying a concealed weapon, felony riot, 
involuntary manslaughter, manslaughter, murder, rape, receipt of 
stolen property, reckless endangerment, robbery, shooting with 
intent to kill, shoplifting, theft, theft by check, unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle, and unlawful possession of a firearm. [51]
 By rule in these states whose rule mimicked the federal rule, 
irrelevant, and even marginally relevant convictions must be 
excluded.
       These state supreme courts for the most part ultimately 
failed in most of these decisions to competently apply the 
appropriate standard required by their identical rule, including 
when applicable the correct balancing evaluation.  The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals strayed even further from basic evidence 
principals and policies and the Oklahoma rule by not only admitting 
irrelevant convictions to impeach the accused, but also sanctioning 
in three of four cases the admission to impeach the accused with a 
conviction for a crime similar to one or more of the charges 
currently being tried. [52]
3.1.2
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rule Mimicked the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 -
       Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in 
       Interpreting The State's Rule
       Four of these eight state supreme courts expressly asserted 
in at least one of their decisions during the period under study in 
this article, 1990-2004, an intention to adopt the policy that the 
interpretation of their rule authorizing the possible admission of 
convictions to impeach may be guided by the official commentary, 
definitions, and interpretations of the federal rule which their 
rule mimics. [53]  Two of these courts, for example, relied on 
federal precedent or expressly asserted that its definition of 
crimes of "dishonesty" and "false statement" would be guided by the 
definitions of those concepts suggested in the official commentary 
to the federal rule. [54] One of the state supreme courts making 
this assertion actually adhered to this reliance on the federal 
rule interpretive guideline as a significant element in its basis 
9of decision. [55]  On the other hand, both the Oklahoma and South 
Carolina Supreme Courts' reliance on the federal rule in one case 
was inconsistent with a holding of those courts on this issue in 
other decisions within just a few years of the decisions 
acknowledging the propriety of relying on the federal rule. [56]
3.1.3 & 3.1.4
State Supreme Courts Whose Rule Mimicked the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach -
       Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 2 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Likelihood
       that these Courts Examined the trial record to determine 
       if trial judge had made the appropriate Rule standard
       Evaluation  & Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard 
       to Evaluate and Determine the Admissibility of 
       Convictions to Impeach
       In only  3 of these eighteen decisions(17%), did a state 
supreme courts hold that the trial judge's admissibility decision 
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected 
error. [57]  In 16 of these 18 decisions(89%), all eight federal 
rule mimicking state supreme courts failed to competently perform 
the evaluation required by the appropriate standard(s) of its rule 
as the basis for review of the trial judge's decision, or to guide 
its own decision making. [58]  Most egregiously, as already 
discussed, seven of these courts failed in 74% of these decisions 
to require trial judges or themselves to consistently adhere to the 
most basic admissibility rule requirement, that evidence must be 
relevant on the issue for which it was offered, here as proof of a 
propensity to lie. [59]  This was true despite the fact that in 
several of the cases, the courts did make reference to and even 
restated their states' rule standards. [60]
       3.1.5
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach -
       Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 3 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Whether & 
       How These Courts Defined and Evaluated for Admission
       Convictions for Crimes of "Dishonesty" or "False 
       Statement"  
The rules in these jurisdictions authorize per se admission 
of convictions characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false 
statement".  [61]  Yet neither the federal rule or the rules of 
these states included specific definitions of these concepts, 
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although commentary to the federal rule suggested a narrow 
definition of these concepts designed to make convictions which 
qualified for per se admission logically relevant as proof of 
propensity to lie. [62]  Hence the state supreme courts were left 
with the obligation and the opportunity to define these terms for 
the purpose of providing policy guidance to trial judges and lower 
appellate courts.  Yet none of these eight state supreme courts 
during the fifteen year period of this study expressly acknowledged 
the failure of the federal rule and their state rules mimicking the 
federal rule to define "dishonesty" or "false statement".   Nor did 
any of these state supreme courts expressly generally define or 
even attempt to define during the study period "dishonesty" or 
"false statement".  In fact in only 6 of these eighteen decisions 
did five of these eight state supreme courts focus on this issue. 
[63]
Three of these state supreme courts held that convictions 
for burglary, theft related crimes, and even robbery were 
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty", thereby sanctioning the per 
se admission of the convictions at issue, and signalling to trial 
judges that these concepts should be broadly defined as a basis for 
per se impeachment of any witness. [64]  On the other hand, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that a trial judge had discretion to 
exclude a prosecution witness' juvenile adjudication for what it 
characterized as a crime of dishonesty or false statement, by 
sanctioning evaluation of admissibility by resort to the evidence 
code's residuary policy balancing exclusionary rule. [65]  The Iowa 
Supreme Court similarly, but based on an obvious conceptual error 
in interpreting the standards of its rule, departed from the per se 
admission of convictions characterized as involving dishonesty or 
false statement by requiring a balancing evaluation to determine 
admissibility, even after a conviction was so cast, thereby giving 
unwarranted protection to an accused. [66]
       3.1.6  
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach -
       Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 4 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
       Were Courts to Rule Standards When the Basis for 
       Admission of Conviction to Impeach was Preliminarily
       that The Potential maximum punishment exceeded a year
       in Prison
State Supreme Courts with an evidence rule that mimics the 
federal rule, when the conviction is not for a crime of dishonesty
or false statement, and the alleged error is a cognizable issue on 
appeal, by rule are required to review a trial judge's decision to 
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assure that the conviction preliminarily qualifies as one for a 
crime punishable by more than a year in prison, and that the 
appropriate balancing test was employed and the appropriate 
evaluation was done. [67]  Six of these eight state supreme courts 
in 12 of these eighteen decisions in which the admission to impeach 
on this basis was at issue, almost never thoroughly examined the 
record to determine if the trial judge had performed, nor evaluated 
the quality of the trial judge's performance of the appropriate 
balancing evaluation. [68]  Even more significantly, the courts 
failed to undertake such an evaluation themselves.  
       First, as previously discussed, these courts in 11 of these 
decisions failed to perform competently the first step in both 
balancing evaluations, a minimally competent assessment of whether 
the conviction at issue was even relevant to prove propensity to 
lie. [69]  The North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, presumed, 
in direct conflict with the implications of its rule's standards, 
that all "felonies" were relevant to prove propensity to lie, and 
therefore the court did not make its own assessment of the 
relevance of the crimes that were the basis of each of the three 
convictions it sanctioned to impeach the accused. [70]  More 
significantly, the decision signalled to all trial judges in North 
Dakota that they too could forego the rule required evaluation of 
relevance of a "felony" conviction as proof of a propensity to lie, 
and simply assume not only relevance but probative value.  The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals went even further in nullifying 
the rule imposed need to find that a conviction was relevant to 
prove propensity to lie by holding that anytime the accused takes 
the stand in his own defense, the prosecution may automatically 
admit the number of times the accused was previously convicted of a 
"felony", but not necessarily the name/nature of those convictions. 
[71]
       Additionally these two state supreme courts were joined by 
the New Mexico Supreme Court in eschewing the policy analysis 
required by their rules' balancing standards, and instead empowered 
themselves to remake the rule, by resort to heuristic hunches that 
the court had created. [72] The North Dakota Supreme Court, for 
example, asserted that if the conviction is for a crime similar to 
a crime currently being prosecuted that is a reason to exclude, but 
if a conviction is for a dissimilar crime it favors admission. [73]
This is a significant conceptual error because while similarity 
may increase the unfair prejudice that will result if it is 
admitted to impeach, significant unfair prejudice results when even 
a dissimilar conviction is admitted to impeach. [74]  The New 
Mexico Supreme Court in evaluating the admissibility of a felony 
conviction, not involving dishonesty or false statement, asserted 
it had developed a six factor evaluation - (1) nature of crime in 
relation to its impeachment value as well as its inflammatory 
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impact, (2) date of the conviction and witness's subsequent 
history, (3) similarities, and the effect thereof, between the 
conviction and current crime charged, (4) a correlation of 
standards expressed in rule 404, (5) the importance of the 
"defendant's" testimony, and (6) centrality of the credibility 
issue. [75]
       These state supreme courts then compounded the risk that 
trial judges now faced with the rule and its standards, and these 
court created heuristics were more likely to reach disparate 
results, by failing to establish uniform state-wide standards 
adequately defining each of these factors, the significance of each 
of these factors, nor the interrelationship and hierarchy among 
these factors.  Significantly, for example, none of these supreme 
courts adopting this multi-factor analysis, have recognized that 
neither the importance of the witness' testimony nor the importance 
of the credibility issue are factors which add an iota to the 
relevance---probative value of a conviction to prove propensity to 
lie, but both independently and collectively increase the danger 
that unfair prejudice will result from the admission of the 
conviction. [76]  Nor did they recognize that these two factors 
were per se slanted towards favoring admission of convictions 
against any party witness, particularly the accused, who chooses to 
testify in a criminal case. [77]
       State Supreme Court decisions in which review of the trial 
judge's evaluation, and/or an independent evaluation of the factors 
are made by definition provide better guidance to trial judges and 
other lawyers.  For example the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
at the beginning of this study's period of evaluation, 1990, 
expressly found that it was error for the trial judge in admitting 
only two of six convictions of the accused in a criminal case 
ostensibly to impeach him, to choose to admit the only two 
convictions which were for crimes similar to the crime currently 
being prosecuted. [78]  The court expressly found that such similar 
crime convictions are more likely to result in the jury convicting 
the accused based on a substantive propensity inference. [79]
       3.1.7 
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules Mimicked the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach -
       Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 5 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine The Quality of      
    These Courts Identification and Evaluation of Pertinent
       Exclusionary Concerns/Particularly Unfair Prejudice
       In these eighteen decisions, the state supreme courts almost 
never examined the trial record to determine if the trial judge had 
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followed the component of their rule required balancing evaluation 
that mandated the identification and evaluation of the rule 
identified exclusionary concerns implicated by the facts of the 
case.  Nor in these decisions did the courts as required by their
rule identify and evaluate themselves the rule identified 
exclusionary concerns implicated by the facts of the case.  Instead 
of the systematic evaluation required by the rule, these courts for 
example relied on more court created junk science heuristics to 
denigrate the significance of implicated exclusionary concerns. 
[80]  In summary these eight supreme courts in these eighteen 
cases, proved that the adoption of the intended significantly more 
restrictive than the common law current federal rule standards with 
regard to impeachment via convictions, did not necessarily matter. 
 State Supreme Court Justices in these jurisdictions systematically 
failed to review the trial record to determine if the trial judge 
had identified and employed the correct one of three available 
standards of the rule, and failed to independently identify and 
apply these standards in their own evaluations.   
       Part 3  Substantive Points & Perspectives --- Studies
               in Federalism Part 2 - 24 Jurisdictions with
               Overall More Restrictive than Federal Rule Admission
               Standards re Convictions to Impeach - State Supreme
               Courts's Decisions - 1990-2004
       4.1.1  Studies in Federalism - Overall More Restrictive
              Rules than Federal Rule 24 States' Supreme 
              Courts Decisions 1990-2004 - Basic 
              Case Demographics & Outcomes
       There were potentially twenty-four state supreme courts who 
could have during the period of this study,1990-2004, interpreted 
an evidence rule that overall more restrictively than the current 
federal rule, admitted convictions to impeach. [81] 20  of the 
twenty-four state supreme courts made seventy-one pertinent 
admission of conviction to impeach decisions during the period of 
this study, 1990-2004. [82]   15  of these twenty state supreme 
courts in  39  of these  71 decisions(56%) authorized or sanctioned 
the admission of one or more convictions ostensibly to impeach at 
least one trial witness. [83] 15 of these twenty state supreme 
courts in 32 of these  71  decisions(44%) sanctioned or held that 
under their respective standards, one or more convictions proffered 
to impeach at least one trial witness was properly excluded or 
should have been or arguably should have been excluded. [84]
14  of these twenty of these state supreme courts in  31  of 
these 71 decisions sanctioned the admission or authorized the 
possible admission of one or more convictions to impeach the 
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accused. [85]  11 of these twenty state supreme courts, including 
seven courts which had also sanctioned the admission of convictions 
to impeach the accused, in  14  of these  71  decisions sanctioned 
the exclusion or authorized the possible exclusion of one or more 
convictions to impeach the accused. [86]  9 of these twenty state 
supreme courts in  17  of these  71 decisions sanctioned the 
admission or authorized the possible admission of multiple 
convictions to impeach the accused. [87] 4  of these twenty state 
supreme courts in 4 of these 71 decisions sanctioned the exclusion 
or authorized the possible exclusion of multiple convictions to 
impeach the accused. [88]
5 of these twenty state supreme courts in 8  of these  71
decisions sanctioned a trial judge's admission of a conviction, or 
ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach 
a witness other than the accused, including civil parties, was or 
should have been properly admitted for that purpose. [89] 9 of 
these twenty state supreme courts in  18  of these 71 decisions 
sanctioned a trial judge's exclusion of a conviction, or ruled that 
one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach a witness 
other than the accused, including civil parties, should have been 
excluded. [90]
To recap, in 18 of 26 (69%) decisions when the witness was 
not the accused against whom convictions were offered to impeach, 
state supreme courts interpreting standards which overall 
authorized admission of convictions for this purpose more 
restrictively than the federal rule, sanctioned the exclusion of 
one or more convictions proffered to impeach.  When the witness to 
be impeached was a prosecution witness, these state supreme courts 
sanctioned the exclusion of convictions to impeach in 12 of 17(71%) 
of those decisions.  On the other hand, when the accused was the 
witness against whom convictions were offered to impeach, these 
state supreme courts sanctioned or authorized exclusion of 
convictions to impeach in only 14 of 45(31%) of those decisions. 
Despite the fact that these 20 state supreme courts were 
interpreting rules with overall more restrictive standards than the 
federal rule, in 31 of the 71 decisions(45%) included in this 
study, 14 of these courts sanctioned the admission of one or more 
irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie convictions to impeach a 
witness by ignoring the trial judge's failure to even attempt to 
articulate why the conviction was relevant to prove propensity to 
lie, or failing to make their own independent assessment of 
relevance, or by substituting their characterization of the charge 
as meeting its criteria for involving "dishonesty" or "false 
statement", or by reliance on the historical heuristic that all 
felonies per se were relevant and had some probative value to prove 
propensity to lie, or by reliance upon the even more illogical and 
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unfairly prejudicial heuristic that if the accused claims he is 
innocent at trial, evidence of a prior conviction for the same or 
similar crime is relevant to prove the falsity of that claim. [91]
 Included in the irrelevant to prove propensity to lie convictions 
admitted by these courts were: aggravated battery, aggravated 
assault, aggravated robbery, armed robbery, arson, assault with a 
deadly weapon, attempted murder, attempted robbery, 
burglary(multiple times by multiple supreme courts), check 
kiting/felony theft, confinement, conspiracy to commit murder, 
conspiracy to commit robbery, criminal sexual 
assault/conduct(multiple times), delivery and distribution of 
cocaine(multiple times), drug distribution, escape(multiple times), 
immoral acts with a child, kidnapping, larceny, lewd conduct with a 
minor(against the accused), misdemeanor theft, murder, possession 
of a contraband substance(in multiple cases), possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a 
firearm, rape(multiple times by multiple courts), receipt of stolen 
property, robbery(multiple times), sexual battery, sexual contact 
with a minor, shoplifting, theft(by multiple courts), unlawful use 
of a weapon by a felon, and use of an automobile for purpose of 
sale of drugs. [92]
The Connecticut Supreme Court went even further.  The court 
endorsed the tactic of "sanitizing" convictions not directly 
probative" of dishonesty; ostensibly to mitigate unfair prejudice 
to the witness, but in fact keeping from the jury the irrelevancy 
of these convictions as proof of a propensity to lie. [93]
Furthermore, avoiding unfair prejudice to a witness as opposed to a 
party is not one of the policy goals of the Connecticut or any 
other state impeachment with convictions rule.  There is evidence 
in these cases that the only pertinent unfair prejudice, that to 
the parties, is not mitigated by first telling the jury that an 
irrelevant to prove propensity to lie "felony" convictions is 
relevant only for that purpose, and then provide the jury with the 
opportunity to speculate as to the nature of the crime which was 
punishable by more than one year in prison. [94]  Jurors are 
thereby freed by the court's doublespeak to draw, which they did in 
these cases, and act upon the relatively obvious and logical 
inference, that they are to use their common sense, and use the 
fact that the witness is a convicted felon, currently accused of a 
felony(perhaps the same "felony"), as a factor favoring his 
conviction. [95]
      Despite the fact that these twenty state supreme courts were 
interpreting rules which were overall more restrictive than the 
federal rule, did not prevent 11 of these courts in 19 decisions, 
from sanctioning the admission of crimes to impeach the accused 
which were identical or very similar to one or more of the charges 
currently being tried. [96]  On the other hand, 8 of these 
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courts(including four of the same courts which had admitted such 
similar crime convictions) in 10 decisions during the study period, 
held that similar crime convictions of the accused should have been 
excluded as impeachment evidence. [97] 
State supreme courts sanctioned such same crime convictions 
even when the record proved the accused declined to testify, and 
had expressly argued that the admission of such a conviction would 
or did force him to forego testifying, even in instances when the 
accused alleged that this result violated his constitutional 
rights. [98]  The Minnesota Supreme Court sanctioned this outcome, 
even when a lower appellate court had ruled that admitting such a 
same crime conviction, which would prevent the accused from 
testifying, violated both the national and state constitutions 
right to testify in his own defense. [99]  One of these courts 
sanctioned the admission of multiple similar crime convictions in 
part on the theory that the trial judge prohibited reference to the 
specific names of the convictions. [100]  One of these courts did 
hold that the admission of a similar crime conviction ostensibly 
only to impeach was likely to increase the risk that the resulting 
unfair prejudice would influence the merits to the point that 
justified the exclusion of the conviction. [101]  The defense in 
this case presented sufficient evidence to raise a serious factual 
dispute of whether the accused was guilty of the current charge of 
sexual battery. [102]
       4.1.2
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Restrictive than the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 -
       Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in 
       Interpreting Their States' Rules
       These state supreme courts did not consistently acknowledge 
and identify how at least one or more of their standards for 
admitting convictions to impeach was different than the federal 
rule's standards, although on occasion, a court did expressly 
assert that the standard by design rejected the standards of the 
federal rule. [103]  On the other hand, five of these state supreme 
courts did compare and contrast their standards for admitting
convictions to impeach with the federal rule, and expressly 
asserted an intent to rely on the federal rule and its legislative 
history as guidance. [104]  At least two of these five courts 
expressly adopted the policy of being guided by the federal rule 
with regard to the definitions of categories of crimes qualifying 
for possible admission to impeach, or with regard to the balancing 
evaluation that its rule and the federal rule required before a 
"felony" conviction could be admitted to impeach a witness. [105]  
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One of these courts, however, failed to cite to the federal rule's 
commentary which evaluated theft and found it was not a crime of 
dishonesty and therefore lacked probative value to prove propensity 
to lie. [106]  Instead, the Maryland Court of Appeals, earlier in 
the same opinion, had characterized theft as the embodiment of 
deceit. [107]
       4.1.3 & 4.1.4
State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Restrictive than the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 2 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Number & 
       Percentage of the Cases in Which the Courts Examined 
       the trial record to determine if trial judge had made 
       the appropriate Rule standard Evaluation  & The Number 
       & Percentage of the Decisions in Which the Courts  
       Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard to Evaluate and
       Determine the Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
In 24 of these 72 decisions(36%), one of these twenty state 
supreme courts held that the trial judge's admissibility decision 
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected 
error. [108] These twenty state supreme courts, only in a small 
minority of the pertinent decisions during the study period took 
the first analytic step in adhering to the restrictions in their 
rules which were greater than those found in the federal rule, by 
expressly reviewing the trial record to determine if the trial 
judge was faithful to those restrictions. [109]  Even more 
importantly, these courts in most of these decisions failed to 
perform competent evaluations of their own rules, especially the 
restrictions in their rules that made their rules less liberal 
overall than the federal rule in admitting convictions to impeach. 
[110]  Most egregiously, as already discussed, seventy-five percent 
of these courts in forty-five percent of these seventy-five cases, 
failed to require trial judges or themselves to consistently adhere 
to the most basic admissibility requirement, that evidence must be 
relevant on the issue proffered, here as proof of a propensity to 
lie. [111]
       In perhaps the most startling example, of ignoring more 
stringent exclusionary standards, the Georgia Supreme Court was 
forced to acknowledge, but did not explain why it had erroneously 
sanctioned in 1998 the admission of a felony conviction to impeach 
the accused, despite the fact that its rule standard required 
blanket exclusion of such convictions to impeach the accused unless 
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he first placed his character at issue. [112]  Even this 
acknowledgement of error, however, did not make reference to the 
fact that in the interim the court had sanctioned prosecutorial 
introduction of same crime conviction evidence against the accused 
by merely resorting to the illegal and specious tactic of asking on 
cross-examination if the accused had a character for the trait 
reflected in the same crime conviction, and when the accused denied 
the trait, admitting the conviction to impeach the denial. [113]
     There were exceptions.  The outstanding exception was the 
strong policy advocacy of its rule prohibiting the use of 
convictions to impeach by the Montana Supreme Court. [114]  In 
addition, multiple times the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the 
performance of trial judges in admitting convictions to impeach. 
[115]  Most of these reviews, however, were triggered by flagrant 
failures of trial judges to follow the standards of the rule, which 
were the standards originally developed in decisions of the state 
supreme court. [116]  Review, however, did not necessarily mean 
reversal for flagrant failures to follow those standards. [117]
    In addition, 6 other of these twenty supreme courts, joined 
the Illinois Supreme Court by ostensibly providing guidance for 
their trial judges by restating the sequential evaluation protocol 
required by its rule, or by expressly allocating the burden of 
proof on this issue, or expressly requiring that every trial judge 
place their rule evaluation on the record, or less effectively by 
adding the court's own guidelines, or a combination of these 
actions. [118]  Four of these state supreme courts detailing their 
standards and identifying and using protocols to apply/enforce 
accurate application of their rule's standards, were among the six 
 of the twenty state supreme courts interpreting overall more 
restrictive, than the federal standards, rules making decisions 
during the study period, which did not admit a conviction clearly 
irrelevant to impeach. [119]  The fifth and sixth state supreme 
courts not admitting irrelevant convictions during the study period 
were those of Kansas and Montana. [120]
       In the other three state supreme courts, review of whether 
trial judges had adhered to the standard, and even express 
articulation and employment of the standard by the supreme court to 
guide its own review, did not assure, however, that a minimally
competent substantive evaluation/application of the standard would 
be undertaken by the court or required of trial judges. [121]  The 
Washington Supreme Court nullified its own substantive standards 
and procedural protocols simply by broadly characterizing crimes 
for which an accused had been convicted as involving "dishonesty", 
and therefore per se admissible to impeach. [122]  
At times during the study period, the Connecticut Supreme 
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Court seemed to completely abandon its standard in favor of a 
sequence of rough heuristics.  First, the court took the position 
that convictions generally were inadmissible to impeach at least 
the accused, but that felony convictions for crimes such as 
larceny, that it thought implicated lack of veracity, were almost 
per se admissible, and any felony conviction which were not, were 
still admissible, but the name of the offense should be withheld 
from the jury. [123]  The court seemed to be operating on a 
sequence of not necessarily consistent hunches.  First, if a 
witness has committed a serious crime that is not logically 
probative of lying, the witness is a person of general bad 
character, and therefore more likely to lie during testimony.  The 
jury should therefore learn of this conviction, but the jury should 
not hear the name of the crime of which the witness was convicted, 
because if they do, they will believe the witness is a specific 
type of bad person, and focus on that, and this is unfair to the 
witness, even if the witness is not the accused in a criminal case. 
[124]  This court's real standard thereby jettisoned both the state 
rules' focus on logical relevance as a minimal admission 
requirement, and an evaluation of unfair prejudice to the litigants 
because the admission of convictions increases the likelihood of 
non-merit based decision making by the jury.  The court also 
endorsed employment by trial judges of unproven, heuristic-hunch 
based factors in addition to rule factors for use in the evaluation 
of whether a conviction should be admitted for impeachment 
purposes. [125]  Connecticut Supreme Court Justices, as was true 
during the study period of justices on state supreme courts 
interpreting overall more liberal standards than the federal rule, 
endorsed the idea that the significance of the testimony of a 
witness, increases the probative value of a conviction offered to 
impeach. [126]  Of course as a matter of logic, this is patently a 
false inference to draw.  Instead, the logical inferences are that 
the introduction of the conviction will, given the significance of 
the testimony, heighten the potential for unfair prejudice as the 
basis for deciding the merits of the case, while leaving completely 
unchanged the relevance/probative value of the conviction as proof 
of propensity to lie. The Connecticut Supreme Court in its rule 
required assessment of unfair prejudice eyeballed, minimized, and 
underestimated the significance of unfair prejudice that results 
when convictions are admitted to impeach. [127]   The court also 
relied on another unproven heuristic, that all prosecution 
witnesses with regard to this issue should be lumped together, 
including the alleged victim of the crime, and that generally it is 
unlikely that the introduction of a conviction of any prosecution 
witness will result in any unfair prejudice to the government's one 
fair opportunity to convict. [128]
       The Illinois Supreme Court in several decisions during the 
study period abandoned its rule standard's required balancing 
20
evaluation, and upheld the admission of multiple felony convictions 
to impeach the testimony of the accused, despite the fact that all 
of these convictions were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie. 
[129]  The court multiple times acknowledged that the record failed 
to prove that the judge had expressly undertaken the sequential 
evaluations required by its balancing standard, and failed to make 
its own crime specific relevance/probative value assessment 
required by its rule. [130]  Instead the court asserted or merely 
assumed that any felony conviction per se had some unspecified 
quantity of probative value to prove propensity to lie,  because 
they were evidence of propensity to be of general bad character. 
[131]  Of course no empirical or any other real evidence was 
referred to in support of this totally specious conclusion.   
       The Illinois Supreme Court further departed from the 
balancing evaluation required by its rule, by taking positions that 
denigrated or eliminated the significance of exclusionary concerns. 
 First the court failed to make an assessment of the unfair 
prejudice likely to have resulted when these convictions were 
admitted.  The court compounded this error of omission by an error 
of commission-assuming that the unspecified unfair prejudice could 
be mitigated by the fiction that a limiting instruction is likely 
to dissipate that prejudice. [132]  Third, the court simply 
abandoned even a semblance of following its own rule of law, by 
endorsing the fundamentally specious heuristics that similar crime 
convictions should be admitted to impeach when the accused claims 
to be innocent at this trial, when he in fact was previously 
convicted of the same crime, and that naming the offense underlying 
that conviction reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. [133]
Obviously both assertions are conceptually flawed, and are 
tantamount to negating the evidence rule barring propensity 
evidence to prove substantive guilt.  As a result, the court 
sanctioned in several decisions the admission of convictions for 
crimes identical or very similar to crimes for which the accused 
was currently standing trial. [134]
4.1.5
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Restrictive than the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 3 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Whether & 
       How These Courts Defined and Evaluated for Admission
       Convictions for Crimes of "Dishonesty" or "False 
       Statement"   
       Fourteen(14) of the twenty state supreme courts who made 
pertinent decisions during the fifteen year period of this study, 
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were interpreting ten rule standards which were not only overall 
more restrictive than the federal rule, but were also more 
restrictive than that rule for all witnesses(8 standards and twelve 
states) or the accused(two standards - one in each of two states), 
with regard to admission of convictions to impeach on the basis 
that the crime underlying the conviction was characterized as 
involving "dishonesty", "false statement", or similar concepts. 
[135]  These states either excluded admission of such convictions 
to impeach the accused or required exclusion or a balancing 
evaluation before such convictions could be admitted against any 
witness. [136]  The rules in ten of these fourteen states included 
express reference to the concepts of "dishonesty" and/or false 
statement", and in the case of Vermont, the seemingly narrower 
concepts of "untruthfulness" and "falsification". [137]  In the 
fifteen year period of this study, 1990-2004, none of these ten 
courts expressly acknowledged that their rule which was enacted or 
amended in most of these states after the federal rule's enactment, 
like that rule, failed to define the concepts "dishonesty" and 
"false statement".  Even more significantly, none of these courts 
undertook to generally define these concepts, despite the fact that 
even in these states these concepts were often liberally employed 
by these courts as important factors favoring the admission of 
convictions to impeach. 
       The Montana Supreme Court enforced its rule's ban on use of 
any conviction to impeach any witness, including even convictions 
for crimes properly characterized as involving dishonesty or false 
statement. [138]  The Montana Supreme Court, in the context of both 
civil and criminal cases, made an express reference to that ban, 
and asserted a policy preference to strictly enforce it. [139]  The 
Montana Supreme Court as well as the Hawaii Supreme Court which 
excluded such convictions to impeach the accused, also held 
however, during the period of this study, 1990-2004, that while a 
witness cannot be impeached with a conviction, the witness can be 
confronted with the underlying conduct when it is relevant to 
proving a greater likelihood of lying. [140]
       Six of the remaining thirteen state supreme courts which 
were interpreting rule standards which were overall more 
restrictive than the federal rule, and with regard to admitting 
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement" to 
impeach, but whose standards were less restrictive than the blanket 
exclusionary standard of Montana, made pertinent decisions on this 
issue during the study period. [141]  Four of these six supreme 
courts intermittently honored the more restrictive standard(s) of 
their rules. [142]  Another of the six state supreme courts 
conclusionarily characterized convictions as within its rule's 
terms chosen as surrogates for an evaluation of relevance as proof 
of a propensity to lie. [143]
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      In addition, three of these six courts, despite being 
required by rule to identify and balance exclusionary concerns, 
failed in some decisions to even attempt to employ a principled 
protocol to identify and evaluate exclusionary policies implicated 
by the admission of convictions characterized as involving 
"dishonesty" or "false statement". [144]  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court, for example, even though it ultimately decided that the
convictions for crimes similar to current trial charges should have 
been excluded, did not attempt to assess the potential cumulative 
unfair prejudice of the prosecution's impeachment of the accused 
and subsequent closing argument commentary focusing on that 
impeachment.[145]
       There were also decisions during the study period made by 
the six state supreme courts interpreting rules which overall were 
more restrictive than the federal rule in admitting convictions to 
impeach, but which were as liberal as the federal rule(per se 
admission to impeach) with regard to the admissibility to impeach 
with convictions fairly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or 
"false statement". [146]  One of these courts made reference to its 
precedent which is asserted had crafted a general definition of 
"dishonesty" and/or "false statement." [147]
       This shared standard which authorized per se admission to 
impeach of all convictions so characterized, therefore gave these 
six state supreme courts a significant incentive, if they wanted to 
sanction the admission of convictions to impeach, to be extremely 
inclusive in determining which crimes were crimes of "dishonesty", 
"false statement" and similar concepts.  4 of the 6 supreme courts 
interpreting this standard during the period of this study, 1990-
2004, did just that. [148]  These four courts sanctioned 
characterizing attempted robbery, burglary, "check kiting", 
misdemeanor shoplifting, receipt of stolen property, robbery, and  
theft, as convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false 
statement". [149]  None bothered to, but on the other hand in 
reality none could, provide a rational explanation of how such 
offenses were logically related to proof of greater propensity to 
lie. [150]
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court for example which banned 
admission of convictions to impeach based solely on the length of 
the maximum period of imprisonment, characterized an accused's 
conviction for theft of a bike as a conviction of a crime crimi 
falsi, therefore dishonesty, and therefore admissible to prove 
propensity to lie. [151]  The court's decision thus almost 
completely circumvented the rule's closing of the door on the 
admission of any felony conviction, by resort to a third level 
specious inference that resulted in the forbidden admission of 
23
irrelevant evidence.  The Delaware and Washington Supreme Courts 
went so far as to declare all theft crimes to be crimes of 
dishonesty, and therefore relevant to prove propensity to lie, 
without even attempting to support this assertion with evidence or 
logic. [152]
       On the other hand, the Delaware, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington Supreme Courts, sometimes even in the same case when one 
of these courts had yielded to the temptation, concluded that an 
array of convictions for such offenses as drug trafficking, felony 
marijuana possession, kidnapping, misdemeanor criminal mischief, 
and possession of weapons were not eligible for per se admission 
because they did not qualify as based upon offenses involving 
"dishonesty" of "false Statement". [153]  The Washington Supreme 
Court expressly took the presumptive policy position that few 
crimes which could not be characterized as within its broad 
definition of involving "dishonesty" or "false statement" were 
relevant-probative of veracity. [154]
4.1.6
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Restrictive than the Federal 
       Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 4 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
       Were These Twenty State Supreme Courts to 
       Their Rule Standards When the Basis for Admission 
       of Conviction to Impeach was Preliminarily that The
       Potential maximum punishment exceeded 1 year in Prison  
       Eighteen of the twenty state supreme courts making decisions 
during the study period which were interpreting rules which were 
overall more restrictive than the federal rule with regard to 
admitting convictions to impeach, also had a more restrictive 
standard when the conviction offered to impeach qualified at least 
for consideration for admission based on the fact that the maximum 
sentence for such a conviction exceeded a year in prison, i.e. was 
a "felony". [155]  The evidence rules of these states either 
required exclusion of such convictions or employed a balancing 
standard for at least one category of witnesses which was tilted 
more towards exclusion then the federal rule's standard for such 
witnesses. [156]  The article next evaluates how faithful to these 
restrictions were these eighteen state supreme courts in their 
almost seventy study period decisions which determined the 
admissibility of such convictions to impeach. [157]
       There is strong circumstantial evidence that a substantial 
majority of these courts were not faithful to their more 
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restrictive standards.  The strongest such evidence which this 
article has already disclosed, is that 14 of these 18 state supreme 
courts in 27 decisions during the fifteen year period of this study 
admitted, based solely or significantly on the fact that the 
underlying crime was punishable by more than a year in prison, 
scores of irrelevant to prove propensity to lie convictions, as 
compared to 12 of the same 14  courts excluding such irrelevant 
convictions in 16 cases. [158]  The overwhelming majority of the 
admission of such convictions sanctioned or authorized by these 
courts were admissions to impeach the accused in criminal cases, 
while the majority of the sanctioned exclusions prevented 
impeachment of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. [159]  
Irrelevant convictions were admitted in these cases even when the 
appeal record provided a basis for concluding that the physical and 
eyewitness evidence did not clearly establish guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. [160]  Ironically, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
who did not have a more restrictive rule than the federal rule 
regulating the admission of "felony" convictions to impeach, in the 
context of a factually disputed case in which the prosecutor 
repeatedly made reference to the similar crime conviction during 
closing argument, did inferentially find sufficient unfair 
prejudice to reverse the conviction. [161]  The court ruled that 
the trial judge committed error by admitting a sexual battery 
conviction to impeach the accused witness who was currently charged 
with sexual battery, attempted rape, and attempted incest. [162]
The Texas, Arkansas, and Delaware Supreme Courts were 
particularly flagrant in ignoring the most basic admission 
requirement, and the first mandatory step in their rule required 
balancing evaluation - that the evidence must be relevant to the 
issue for which it is offered.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
wrote an opinion in which it made the most egregious conceptual 
error of asserting that a felony conviction need not be relevant to 
prove propensity to lie in order to impeach a witness. [163]  The 
Arkansas and Delaware Supreme courts simply sanctioned the use of 
substantive propensity evidence ostensibly on the theory that a 
person previously convicted of the same crime who now claims he did 
not commit that crime this time must be lying--he did it before, he 
therefore must by lying if he claims or wishes to claim that he did 
not do it again during the current prosecution. [164]  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court recently signalled its endorsement of its right 
simply not to follow its rule standard.  Instead, the court made 
reference to its own decisions which had held that the prosecution 
has a right to impeach any accused who chooses to testify with any 
felony conviction, including convictions which are similar to those 
currently being tried, even if the conviction signals(apparently to 
the jury) a unique perversion. [165]
       8 of the eighteen supreme courts in 14 decisions were not 
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even remotely faithful to their greater restrictions on admitting 
"felony" convictions to impeach, often failing to state or giving 
no more than the most perfunctory of lip service to the balancing 
evaluation required by the more restrictive standard or its 
implications for their interpretation task. [166]  These state 
supreme courts evaluating the admission to impeach of "felony" 
convictions, failed to identify, despite being required by rule, or 
poorly evaluated the exclusionary concerns implicated by the 
admission of such convictions to impeach, most importantly the 
existence and magnitude of the unfair prejudice that was caused or 
would have been caused by the admission of the conviction(s). [167] 
Exclusionary concerns were ignored to the point that several of 
these state supreme courts by fiat sanctioned de facto restoration 
of the historical dominant common law rule which admitted almost 
any felony conviction to impeach any witness. [168]  Failure to 
consider exclusionary concerns set the stage for all 8 of these 
courts in 11 decisions to sanction the admission of "felonies" to 
impeach the accused which were identical or very similar to one or 
more of the charges currently being tried. [169]
       In the few instances when these state supreme courts did 
make policy driven evaluations of the relevance of a proffered 
"felony" conviction as proof of propensity to lie, and of 
countervailing exclusionary concerns as required by their rule 
standards, it made an outcome determinative difference. [170]  The 
Washington Supreme Court was the only supreme court to make express 
reference to the pertinent empirical evidence that proves the great 
likelihood of inherent unfair prejudice of the merits anytime a 
"felony" conviction record is admitted ostensibly only to impeach a 
criminal defendant who opts to testify at his own trial. [171]
4.1.7  State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
              Overall More Restrictive than the Federal 
              Rule's Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
              Assessing The Case Outcomes Data -- Part 5 - Summary
       First, several of these twenty state supreme courts 
signalled the hundreds of trial judges in their respective states, 
that they would not carefully evaluate, correct, or set standards 
to facilitate uniform interpretation and obedience to the overall 
more restrictive than the federal rule admission of convictions to 
impeach standards of their rules. [172]  Second, despite the fact 
these state supreme courts were interpreting evidence rules overall 
more stringent than the federal rule they nevertheless admitted at 
least two dozen different felonies, for which there is not a
scintilla of evidence, particularly empirical evidence, to support 
the conclusion that a conviction for any one of them was relevant 
to prove that the particular witness had a propensity to lie. [173]
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 The more restrictive standards also did not prevent these state 
supreme courts from sanctioning admission of similar or identical 
crime convictions almost always ostensibly to only impeach the 
testimony of the accused should he testify. [174]
      More troubling is evidence, that the more restrictive 
standards were not interpreted in an evenhanded fashion by these 
state supreme courts.  First, two of these courts, employing a rule 
standard that favored the accused or was neutral, within the study 
period, sanctioned exclusion of convictions to impeach a 
prosecution witness, while sanctioning the admission of convictions 
for the same crime when offered to impeach the accused. [175]  In 
1993 and 1998, just two years before and three years after its 
decision sanctioning exclusion to impeach of all of the felony 
convictions of a crucial prosecution witness, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court sanctioned the admission of felony sexual misconduct 
convictions to impeach two defendants charged with sexual 
misconduct crimes, finding that they had probative value on the 
issue of credibility because they gave the jury a basis to make a 
determination of the appellant's credibility. [176]  The Minnesota 
Court in sanctioning the exclusion of the prosecution's witness' 
convictions to impeach held that the admission of the convictions 
could have led the jury to believe that the witness was a bad 
person who deserved to be a victim, which amounts to influencing 
the jury to make its decision on an improper basis. [177]  This
obviously important policy consideration which is highly relevant 
to an assessment of the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice 
which would result from admission of a conviction(s) to impeach was 
never mentioned by the court in its decisions which sanctioned the 
trial court's admission of an array of felony convictions to 
impeach the accused.  The court also employed several other 
heuristics to justify exclusion of the prosecution witness 
convictions.  Heuristics which were not employed in the cases 
admitting felony convictions to impeach the accused. [178]
       In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court compounded this 
departure from its rule and standards it employed in evaluating the 
admissions of convictions to impeach other witnesses by holding 
that prior convictions could be admitted against an accused despite 
the fact that the conviction and the current charges were for the 
same crime, only differing in the degree of the crime. [179]  The 
court admitted the conviction ostensibly only to impeach on the 
basis that the facts underlying the conviction differed from the 
facts underlying the current charges. [180]  In 1995, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, as was true for almost every state supreme court 
which decided this issue, expressly recognized that the proper 
normative approach was excluding reference to any underlying facts 
when a conviction was admitted for impeachment purposes. [181]  By 
the end of the fifteen year period of this study, half(ten) of the 
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states, whose state supreme courts made at least one pertinent 
decision during the study period, and whose rules were overall more 
restrictive in admitting convictions to impeach than the federal 
rule, had their state supreme courts convert their state standard 
to one which more liberally, than the federal rule, admitted 
convictions to impeach. [182]
       Part  4 
       5.1  
       State Supreme Courts and the Use of Convictions to 
       Impeach - Studies in Federalism Part 3 - 17 States 
       with Overall More Liberal Rules re Admission 
       of Convictions to Impeach-State Supreme 
       Court Interpretations     
       5.1.1  Studies in Federalism - Overall More Liberal
              Rules than Federal Rule - 17 States' Supreme 
              Courts' Decisions 1990-2004 - Basic 
              Case Demographics & Outcomes
Seventeen state supreme courts during the period 1990-2004 
were potentially to interpret an evidence rule that overall, more 
liberally than the current federal rule, admitted convictions to 
impeach. [183] 16 of the 17 state supreme courts with an evidence 
rule that overall more liberally than the current federal rule, 
admitted convictions to impeach, made 61 pertinent admission of 
conviction to impeach decisions during the period of this study, 
1990-2004. [184] 12  of these  16  state supreme courts in  50 of 
these 61 decisions(82%) sanctioned the admission of one or more 
convictions ostensibly to impeach at least one trial witness. [185] 
 7 of these 16  state supreme courts held in  11  of these 61 
decisions(18%) sanctioned or held that under their respective 
standards, one or more convictions proffered to impeach at least 
one trial witness was properly excluded or should have been 
excluded. [186]
11  of these 16  state supreme courts in  46  of these  61
decisions sanctioned the admission or authorized the possible 
admission of one or more convictions to impeach the accused. [187]
3  of these  16  state supreme courts in  4  of these 61 decisions 
sanctioned the exclusion, authorized the possible exclusion, or 
held a conviction should have been excluded as a basis to impeach 
the accused. [188]  9  of these  16  of these state supreme courts 
in  23 of these  61  decisions sanctioned the admission or 
authorized the possible admission of multiple convictions to 
impeach the accused. [189]
       3  of these  16  state supreme courts in  4  of these  61
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decisions sanctioned a trial judge's admission of a conviction, or 
ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly proffered to impeach 
a witness other than the accused, including civil parties, was 
admissible. [190] 6  of these  16  state supreme courts in  7  of 
these  61 decisions sanctioned a trial judge's exclusion of a 
conviction, or ruled that one or more convictions ostensibly 
proffered to impeach a witness other than the accused, including 
civil parties, was properly excluded or should have been excluded. 
[191]
       To recap, in only 4 of 11 (36%) decisions when the witness 
was not the accused against whom convictions were offered to 
impeach, did the state supreme courts interpreting standards which 
overall more liberally than the federal rule admitted convictions 
for this purpose, sanctioned the admission of one or more 
convictions proffered to impeach.  In six of seven of the cases 
sanctioning exclusion, the witness protected was a prosecution 
witness, while in two of the four cases in which a state supreme 
court sanctioned the admission of a conviction to impeach, when the 
witness was not the accused, the witness was a criminal defense 
witness, and never a prosecution witness.  On the other hand, when 
the accused was the witness against whom convictions were offered 
to impeach, these state supreme courts sanctioned the admission of 
convictions to impeach in 46 of 50(92%) of their decisions. 
Unlike with some of the states with overall more 
restrictive rules than the current federal rule regulating 
admission of convictions to impeach, all but two of these sixteen 
state supreme courts were interpreting rules which authorized the 
admission of irrelevant "misdemeanor" convictions, irrelevant 
"felony" convictions, or both as a basis for impeaching all or a 
category of witnesses. [192]  It is therefore not surprising that 
in 39 of these 61 decisions(64%), 11 of these 16 state supreme 
courts sanctioned the admission of just more than 60 different 
crime convictions, many of them multiple times by multiple courts, 
to impeach one or more witnesses, all of which were irrelevant as 
proof of propensity to lie. [193]  While intellectually 
inconsistent with basic evidence admission standards, it is not 
even shocking that two of these courts sanctioned trial judges 
admission to impeach any witness, including the accused in a 
criminal case, with convictions that these courts expressly 
acknowledged were not relevant or at best only slightly probative 
of "dishonesty"/propensity to lie. [194]  Included in the 
irrelevant convictions admitted ostensibly only to impeach were 
convictions for: aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, 
aggravated kidnapping, armed burglary, armed robbery, 
assault(multiple courts), assault and battery, assaults with 
dangerous weapons(multiple times by multiple courts against the 
accused), assault with a deadly weapon-a knife, assault with a 
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dangerous weapon-a sharp instrument, assault with intent to commit 
murder, including with a sharp instrument(multiple times), assault 
with intent to rape(multiple times by multiple courts), assault 
with intent to rob(multiple times), attempted burglary, attempted 
rape, breaking and entering(multiple times by multiple courts), 
breaking and entering, breaking and entering a home with a knife 
with the intent to commit armed-robbery, burglary(multiple times), 
car theft, conspiracy to commit murder,  cocaine trafficking, 
criminal contempt, defacing a firearm, escape, delivery of cocaine, 
delivery of a controlled substance, disorderly conduct, domestic 
abuse-assault, driving to endanger, death resulting, driving under 
the influence, entry into a building with the intent to commit a 
felony(multiple times), illegal possession of a knife, illegal 
possession of a sawed off shotgun, kidnapping, larceny(multiple 
times), larceny of a motor vehicle, leaving the scene of an 
accident, malicious wounding, misdemeanor trespass, misdemeanor use 
of a weapon, seventeen unspecified misdemeanors, murder(multiple 
times by multiple state supreme courts), narcotics, obstruction of 
a police officer, personal and two corporate pollution related 
convictions, possession of burglary tools, possession of a 
controlled substance(multiple times by multiple courts), possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute(multiple times 
by multiple courts), possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, receipt of stolen property(multiple times), rape, 
robbery(multiple times against the accused), sale and delivery of 
cocaine, sexual abuse(multiple times), sexual assault, 
theft(multiple times), threatening phone calls, trespass, unlawful 
possession of ammunition, unlawful possession of a firearm, and 
uttering a check. [195] 9  of these 16  state supreme courts in 23 
of these 61 decisions sanctioned not only the admission of 
convictions of crimes to impeach the accused which were irrelevant 
as proof of propensity to lie, but which were also identical or 
similar to one or more of the charges currently being tried. [196]
       5.1.2
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's 
       Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
--- Assessing The Case Outcome Data---Part 1 -
       Reliance on The Federal Rule as an Element in 
       Interpreting Their States' Rules
Two of these sixteen state supreme courts expressly adopted 
the general policy of using the federal evidence rules as guidance 
in determining if a conviction should be admitted to impeach, but 
at the same time reserving to themselves ultimate authority to 
determine their state's approach to this issue. [197]  The Rhode 
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Island Supreme Court, on the other hand, expressly asserted that 
their rule was substantively different from the federal rule, 
usually as a partial justification for admitting a conviction(s) 
against the accused. [198]
       5.1.3 & 5.1.4
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's 
       Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 2 - Study 
Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine Number & 
       Percentage of the Cases in Which the Courts Examined 
       the trial record to determine if trial judge had made 
       the appropriate Rule standard Evaluation  & The Number 
       & Percentage of the Decisions in Which the Courts  
       Employed The Appropriate Rule Standard to Evaluate and
       Determine the Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
In 5 of these 61 decisions(8%), four of these sixteen state 
supreme courts held that the trial judge's admissibility decision 
with regard to one or more convictions to impeach was uncorrected 
error. [199]  In most of their decisions during the period of this 
study, 1990-2004, these sixteen state supreme courts failed to 
review the trial record to determine if the trial judge did more 
than merely assert, but in fact had conducted the appropriate rule 
/rule as interpreted by that court evaluation of whether a 
conviction should have been admitted to impeach.[200]  In most of 
their decisions during the period of this study, 1990-2004, these 
sixteen state supreme courts were not faithful to the standards of 
their rules, and failed to competently  conduct their own 
independent evaluation  of whether under the standards of their 
rules a conviction should have been admitted to impeach. [201]  
Most egregiously, as already discussed, sixty-nine percent(11 of 
16) of these supreme courts in sixty-four percent(39 of 61) of 
these sixty-one cases, failed to require trial judges or themselves 
to consistently adhere to the minimum admissibility requirement, 
that evidence must be relevant on the issue for which it is 
proffered, here as proof of propensity to lie. [202]
       5.1.5
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's 
       Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 3 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine To what 
       Degree these courts Were Faithful to their More
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       Liberal Standards for the Admission of 
       Convictions for "Misdemeanor" Not Properly 
       Characterized as involving  "dishonesty" or  
       "false statement"
The federal rule prohibits the use of misdemeanor convictions 
to impeach when those misdemeanor convictions are not properly 
characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false statement". [203]
Ten of seventeen of these state supreme courts(and nine of sixteen 
courts which made decisions during the period under study in this 
article, 1990-2004), however, were interpreting rules which 
authorized the potential admission of some such convictions against 
at least a category of witnesses. [204]  This meant that seven 
states, with overall more liberal than the federal rule admission 
of convictions to impeach rules, were not more liberal with regard 
to these irrelevant misdemeanor convictions. [205]
       There were very few decisions by these sixteen state supreme 
courts addressing this issue.  The Louisiana Supreme Court and the 
New York Court of Appeals did impose a balancing evaluation to 
potentially limit their rules' per se admission to impeach of even 
irrelevant "misdemeanor" convictions. [206]  The imposition of the 
balancing evaluation, however, did not prevent the New York Court 
of Appeals, from subsequently sanctioning the admission of 
seventeen unspecified misdemeanor convictions to impeach the 
accused. [207]  Nor did the fact that their evidence rules' 
mandated balancing evaluation, prevent the Rhode Island and 
Wisconsin Supreme Courts from sanctioning the admission of multiple 
irrelevant misdemeanor convictions to impeach the accused, by 
placing reliance on the junk science heuristic that any and all 
criminal convictions were relevant to prove propensity to lie. 
[208]  The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently chose to deliberately 
ignore the fact that the trial judge made no genuine attempt to 
perform the rule required balancing evaluation, including failing 
to even mention the court's own array of balancing factors.  The 
court also failed to conduct a minimally competent evaluation 
itself, and ultimately sanctioned the admission of multiple 
misdemeanor convictions which were a quarter of century old and 
irrelevant as proof of propensity to lie. [209]  The court 
sanctioned continued adherence to the purely junk science and 
meritless heuristic that any person with any criminal record is 
more likely to lie when called as a witness. [210]  Finally, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, joined the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
defacto substituting for the identification of exclusionary 
concerns required by its rule's balancing evaluation, the illogical 
inference that giving of a limiting instruction by the trial judge 
was evidence that the trial judge did conduct the balancing 
evaluation. [211]  A limiting instruction logically cannot 
constitute evidence of a judge's conducting such an evaluation, and 
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by itself only signals the possibility that the judge equated and 
therefore substituted the limiting instruction for that evaluation.
       Of the seven states interpreting rule standards at least as 
stringent as the federal rule with regard to admitting 
"misdemeanors" to impeach three of these state supreme courts 
interpreting rules identical to the federal rule on this issue. 
None of their rules defined "dishonesty" or "false statement", and 
none of these supreme courts generally defined these concepts 
during the period of this study. [212]  During the study period, 
however, one of the state supreme courts, without an express policy 
evaluation, concluded that a guilty plea to the misdemeanor of 
giving a false statement to a police officer was within the 
definition of the rule's reference to crimes of "dishonesty" or 
"false statement". [213]  Another of these three courts, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, conclusionarily asserted that the two 
misdemeanor offenses of reckless conduct and simple assault were 
not crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement", and therefore were 
inadmissible to impeach a prosecution witness. [214]
Finally, the California Supreme Court, one of four of these 
sixteen states whose rule barred admission of all "misdemeanor" 
convictions to impeach, appeared to remain faithful to this 
standard, by asserting that a misdemeanor conviction record was 
irrelevant to impeach. [215]  The California Supreme Court, 
however, resorted to a junk science heuristic of eyeballing the 
conduct underlying the misdemeanor theft in the case, characterized 
it as morally depraved, and therefore by sheer hunch, concluded it 
was per se relevant proof of propensity to lie. [216]  Of course 
the court cited to no evidence, and no evidence exist to support 
this heuristic. Apparently the court consciously or unconsciously 
recognized this reality, because it subsequently, in the very same 
decision, qualified its reliance on this heuristic by 
characterizing it as in inference that is not so irrational that a 
jury in a specific case may not draw it. [217]
5.1.6
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's 
       Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data---Part 4 - Study 
       Period Decisions Evaluated to Determine How Faithful
       Were These Sixteen State Supreme Courts to 
       Their Rule Standards When their Rules Also
       More Liberally than the Federal Rule admitted 
       Convictions for "felonies"(Punishable by more 
       than one year in prison)  Not Properly Characterized 
       as Involving "Dishonesty" or "False Statement" 
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All sixteen of these state supreme courts interpreting 
overall more liberal than the federal rule standards regulating the 
admission of convictions to impeach during the study period, were 
also interpreting a standard that more liberally than the federal 
rule admitted or authorized the possible admission of convictions 
to impeach solely because the underlying crime was punishable by a 
maximum period of imprisonment of more that one year. [218]
Thirteen of these sixteen state supreme courts were interpreting 
rules which authorized per se admission of even those felonies not 
properly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false 
statement" to impeach all witnesses in both civil and criminal 
cases, or in one of these states all witnesses in criminal cases, 
and in a second state all witnesses, other than the accused. [219]
 This means three states, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin 
were interpreting rules whose standards imposed some form of 
balancing evaluation, but in all three, a balancing evaluation 
tilted more towards admission than at least one of the federal 
rule's two balancing standards for such convictions. [220]  The 
article next evaluates how these state supreme courts in over fifty 
of these sixty-one decisions evaluated the admissibility of 
convictions to impeach based on the punishment for the underlying 
crime exceeding one year. [221]
       The three state supreme courts interpreting rules which 
required some form of balancing were rhetorically faithful to their 
rules by expressly acknowledging that the rules did require that 
such a balancing evaluation be undertaken by trial judges. [222]  A 
majority of the other thirteen state supreme courts, seven, were 
not at least rhetorically true to their states' rule standard(s) 
because they adopted or continued to impose a balancing evaluation 
in assessing if a "felony" convictions should be admitted to 
impeach when the only basis for qualifying the conviction for such 
admission was that the underlying crime was punishable by a maximum 
term of more than one year in prison. [223]  This means that a 
total of ten of these sixteen state supreme courts were at least 
rhetorically committed to requiring trial judges to conduct a 
balancing evaluation before admitting "felony" convictions to 
impeach.  It also means that six of these state supreme courts were 
expressly rhetorically faithful to their per se admission of any 
"felony" conviction to impeach standard. [224]
       The most basic reason for imposing a balancing evaluation 
asserted by these state supreme courts was that a conviction should 
not be admitted to impeach unless it is relevant---has probative 
value as proof of a propensity to lie. [225]  While relevance was 
noted by these courts, it almost never was assessed directly as a 
matter of logical nexus to the theory of its admission or its 
correct definition as a fundamental evidence admissions standard.  
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Instead, heuristics were substituted, or no analysis was undertaken 
at all. [226]  Among the other policy reasons offered by the courts 
for imposing a balancing evaluation was that if felony convictions 
which have little or no relevance as proof of propensity to lie are 
automatically admitted to impeach, it risk causing unjust results, 
and that the avoidance of unjust results was one of the overall 
policy goals the evidence rules as a whole sought to achieve. [227]
     Six of the ten state supreme courts which at least paid lip 
service to the policy of evaluating admission and exclusion policy 
factors, continued or adopted during the period of this study their 
own multi-factor, heuristic balancing evaluation guidelines, both 
with regard to the definition of such convictions as well as the 
factors to be considered, and sometimes the priority to be given 
the identified factors. [228]  Among those factors were: the nature 
of the crime-relevance to credibility, whether the crime involved 
dishonesty or false statement, the date and hence the age of the 
prior conviction and the witness's criminal record since the 
conviction, the similarity between the crime that was the basis of 
the conviction and any conduct underlying any of the current crimes 
for which the accused is on trial, the disposition of the 
conviction, how many times the prosecutor made reference to the 
conviction of the accused, the danger that the conviction would be 
used for substantive propensity purposes, the importance of the 
witness' testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. 
[229]
Despite adoption or adherence to a rule required balancing 
evaluation, and the identification of at least heuristics to guide 
that evaluation, the majority of these  10  state supreme courts 
simply abandoned this protocol substantively, and willy-nilly 
sanctioned the admission of scores of irrelevant "felony" 
convictions, multiple convictions, scores of similar crime and old 
"felony" convictions, and failed to substantively define or give 
any genuine consideration to exclusionary policies, especially the 
quantity and quality of unfair prejudice that would have or did 
result when these convictions were admitted to impeach. [230]  They 
accomplished this feat by a process which can be fairly 
characterized as abandonment of the balancing evaluation, conjuring 
up relevance, and disappearing exclusionary concerns.  
Documentation follows.
First, the three supreme courts required by rule to require 
trial judges to conduct balancing evaluations as the basis for 
authorizing the admission of "felony" convictions to impeach, 
failed to require or conduct themselves the balancing evaluation 
required by rule.  Since 1990, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
sanctioned the admission of every "felony" conviction, including 
every very old "felony" conviction and every similar or identical 
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"felony" conviction to impeach or potentially impeach the testimony 
of an accused in each of its decisions when asked to affirm a trial 
judge's decision to admit convictions on behalf of the prosecution. 
[231]  The New Jersey Supreme Court simply adopted related junk 
science heuristics that resulted in the assumption that all 
"felony" convictions were relevant to impeach, and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court asserted that its rule, which expressly required a 
balancing evaluation, nevertheless had language upon which the 
court based the conclusion that any and all such convictions were 
admissible to impeach any witness. [232]
       There was a multiplicity of reasons for these three and most 
of these other ten supreme courts to admit "felonies"  to impeach 
without any legitimate effort to adhere to the rule required or 
self-imposed balancing evaluation.  The New York Court of Appeals, 
for example, was quite schizophrenic with regard to using 
evaluation guidelines.  Multiple times the court credited itself 
for refusing to establish guidelines for its self-imposed balancing 
evaluation. [233]  The Kentucky Supreme Court more expressly 
encouraged anarchy by directly asserting that trial judges should 
have discretion to identify factors each trial judge believed 
pertinent to the determination of whether the admission of a 
conviction to impeach would unduly prejudice the case. [234] 
Unwittingly, therefore, the Kentucky court was increasing the 
likelihood of a lack of uniform identification and prioritization 
of the factors trial judges should employ in making the balancing 
evaluation to determine if a "felony"conviction should be admitted 
to impeach. [235]
        The most fundamental way these courts conjured up relevance 
to tilt the balancing evaluation towards admitting "felony" 
convictions, was endorsed by 4 of the ten state supreme courts.  
These four state supreme courts relied on the historical junk 
science heuristic, or a closely related junk science heuristic, 
that any criminal conviction proves willingness to disobey law or 
subordinate the interests of society to the person's own self-
interests, and therefore such a person is more likely to disregard 
the trial oath to tell the truth. [236]  Four of the ten state 
supreme courts, including two of the same courts, conjured up 
relevance by simply endorsing and relying  upon the closely related 
"junk science" presumption that every such conviction has probative 
value to prove propensity to lie. [237]  A closely related junk and 
anti-science heuristic employed by the California Supreme Court was 
that admitting a criminal conviction "strips" the false aura of 
veracity" from witnessess previously convicted of crime so that the 
jury is not misled by their air of respectability. [238]
       Of course no empirical evidence was offered by these courts 
to support these junk science heuristics, and the existing 
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empirical evidence suggests jurors are more skeptical, even without 
learning of prior convictions, of the veracity of witnesses with 
much to lose as a result of the outcome of the litigation. [239]
Even more significant, is the fact that studies have also found 
that when jurors learn that a witness was previously convicted of a 
crime their negative emotional reaction to that person, produces no 
significant lessening of their already skeptical view of his 
credibility, but does produce, particularly if that person is a 
party to the litigation, unfair prejudice, which causes the jury to 
regret less returning an outcome contra to the interests of the 
stigmatized witness. [240]
These courts also adopted a variety of meritless junk 
science heuristics which depended on categorizing "felony" 
convictions into a variety of subsets, which category label was 
used by these courts to justify their per se or presumptive 
admission to impeach.  The New Jersey and Rhode Island Supreme 
Courts endorsed the meritless junk science heuristic, that the more 
serious the crime underlying the conviction, the more probative of 
the accused credibility. [241]  Of course these views are 
tantamount to these state supreme courts endorsing use of 
irrelevant "felony" convictions to prove propensity to lie, for 
whatever use the jury chooses to employ them, including in almost 
all of these cases in which the accused was also the witness, 
significantly increasing the likelihood of a substantive verdict of 
guilty.  
       The California and Virginia Supreme Courts endorsed the 
closely related junk science heuristic that all crimes of "moral 
turpitude" were worthy of admission or at least presumptively 
admissible to impeach all witnesses, or all witnesses except the 
accused, even if their definition of that common law concept was 
vague and the meaning which could be discerned made the 
categorization irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie. [242]  
In four cases, the California Supreme Court relied on the junk 
science heuristic that a "felony" conviction properly characterized 
as one involving dishonesty, or any such theft conviction per se 
involves dishonesty, and therefore either characterization made a 
conviction per se relevant to prove propensity to lie. [243]
       The Kentucky Supreme Court also broadly characterized, 
without generally defining for this purpose, the concept of 
dishonesty, concluding that attempted burglary was a crime of 
dishonesty and therefore a conviction for this crime had plus 
probative value as proof of a lack of credibility. [244]  The 
Massachusetts' Supreme Court went even further when it asserted, in 
conflict with the intuitions of almost all other state supreme 
courts, that violent crimes are not only probative but especially 
probative to discredit a witness' credibility. [245]  These courts 
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of course did not cite and could not cite to any evidence, 
empirical or otherwise, to support the reality of these heuristics. 
[246]  Instead they simply repeated their own historical recitation 
of these heuristics. 
      Three of these ten state supreme courts made the age of the 
conviction a significant element of their balancing evaluation, 
because these courts embraced the faulty premise that assumed such 
a conviction per se had probative value as proof of propensity to 
lie which could for the most part only be lost with time, i.e. when 
the conviction became remote. [247]  The Kentucky Supreme Court 
asserted dual components of this heuristic.  First, the court held 
that the older the conviction the less probative was the conviction 
on credibility---but the court did not identify why any "felony" 
conviction was by definition relevant to prove propensity to lie. 
[248]  Second, the court asserted that the older the conviction the 
more unduly prejudicial it becomes, on the surmise that the undue 
prejudice it did cause becomes more difficult to dispel. [249]  No 
evidence was cited to support either element of this heuristic, and 
in fact the heuristic finds no support in most actual studies of 
jury behavior. [250]  Decisions of the California, Kentucky, and 
others among these ten state supreme courts, endorsing this 
balancing factor demonstrated the standardless nature of this 
consideration.  When given the opportunity, six of these courts 
sanctioned the admission to impeach of convictions which at the 
time of the trial were more than ten years old, and in several 
instances, decades old. [251]
These state supreme courts also conjured relevance by 
compounding the previously identified heuristics, and converting 
them into the heuristic that if one felony conviction was evidence 
of a propensity to lie, multiple felony convictions was independent 
relevant proof of the same character trait.  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court endorsed a junk science heuristic employed by trial 
judges that all multiple convictions should be admitted, because 
together the string of convictions over a period of years, 
signalled a crime commission pattern that provided a basis for 
inferring disobedience to law, that provided a basis to make a 
second level inference that each and all the convictions were 
therefore relevant to warrant admission to impeach. [252]  Two 
other of these ten state supreme courts took the opposite path down 
this same road to judicial anarchy, by intermittent resort to a 
junk science admission favoring heuristic that because the trial 
judge who had admitted one or more of these irrelevant "felony" 
convictions to impeach, had also excluded one or more convictions, 
and sometimes had also forbade cross-examination of the accused on 
the details of the conviction(s) admitted, the judge must have 
conducted a balancing evaluation/an adequate balancing evaluation. 
[253]  The California Supreme Court adopted another related, but 
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equally meritless heuristic that when one or more of these 
irrelevant "felony" convictions is properly admitted, the erroneous 
admission of other such convictions, even if similar or identical 
to the current charge(s), is harmless. [254]
Four of these ten supreme courts conjured up relevance of 
convictions to impeach, not by directly attributing a propensity to 
lie to the proffered "felony" conviction, but by instead placing 
reliance on the anti-science twin heuristics that the greater the 
importance of the testimony of the target witness, especially the 
accused, the more important was the credibility of that witness, 
and therefore the conviction should be admitted to impeach. [255]
As discussed previously, logically, these factors favor exclusion 
of such conviction evidence, and not admission. [256]
       Disappearing/Denigrating/Diminishing Exclusionary Concerns 
       Exclusionary interests were ignored or undervalued by these 
ten supreme courts. [257]  First, two of these courts resorted to a 
procedural fiction-the meritless junk science heuristic that a 
limiting instruction to the jury, with regard to the permissible 
and impermissible uses of the convictions during their 
deliberations, was a significant factor diminishing potential 
unfair prejudice  [258]  The Rhode Island Supreme Court went much 
further with this factor, however, sanctioning a trial judge's 
elimination of the sequential evaluations required by rule, and 
substituting a presumption that any and all convictions were per se 
admissible to impeach a witness provided that the judge gave a 
limiting instruction as to the use of the conviction. [259]  These 
courts failed to offer empirical or other evidence to support this 
heuristic.  Significantly, these courts ignored existing evidence 
which documents the likelihood that such limiting instructions are 
ineffective, and certainly cannot be asserted as a panacea to the 
risks created by the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice which 
is likely to result from the admission of one or more convictions 
to impeach. [260]
Second, the California Supreme Court was the only one of 
these ten state supreme courts to expressly endorse by reference to 
authority, other than the evidence rules, a laundry list of 
exclusionary policy concerns. [261]  On the other hand, that court 
was also the only one of these courts to hold that these 
exclusionary policies could be offset by the fact that the accused 
by testifying waived these concerns, since he testified usually 
after a trial judge ruling admitting his conviction to impeach. 
[262]  No explanation and no evidence was offered by the court to 
support this obviously post hoc and junk science heuristic.     
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Third, 4 of these ten state supreme courts, despite wide 
spread admission of similar convictions documented earlier, adopted 
a policy of using as a limiting or exclusionary balancing 
consideration the fact that the conviction(s) was similar or 
substantially similar to one of the current charges. [263]  Two of 
these courts expressly endorsed the policy concern that the 
admission of a conviction not involving or implicating lying, 
especially one similar to a crime currently being tried, would 
produce significant unfair prejudice because it could impermissibly 
impact the outcome of jury deliberations, since the jury was likely 
to convict the accused of the current crime, not because it was to 
convinced of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but because he was 
a bad man. [264]  Even three of the six state supreme courts whose 
evidence rules authorized either the per se admission of irrelevant 
to prove propensity to lie misdemeanors and/or felonies, approved 
use by trial judges of this exclusionary policy consideration.[265]
6 of these seven state supreme courts who recognized the 
potential for unfair prejudice if similar crime convictions were 
admitted to impeach, accommodated that concern by nevertheless 
sanctioning the admission of such convictions provided they were 
"sanitized". [266]  "Sanitized" meant that a conviction for a 
similar or identical crime could be referred to as a felony 
conviction, and the date of the conviction disclosed to the jury, 
but not the name, nature, or details of the felony. [267]  In 
contrasts to the prevalent reliance on junk science heuristics, the 
New Jersey Court made reference to and placed reliance upon 
empirical studies to support its adoption of "sanitizing" similar 
crime convictions. [268]
       The Kentucky Supreme Court sanctioned the broader employment 
of the tactic of sanitizing any admitted conviction by omitting 
reference to the name of the underlying crime. [269]  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court, however, reverted immediately to another junk 
science heuristic that whatever unfair prejudice that results from 
the admission of a conviction to impeach, it is less in civil cases 
than in criminal. [270]
       The remaining approximately one-half of these sixteen 
supreme courts, however, diminished exclusionary concerns, 
including concerns with unfair prejudice, by omitting any reference 
to or evaluation of the unfair prejudice that would result from the 
admission of such same-similar crime convictions, ostensibly only 
to impeach.  In addition, while the justices of the California 
Supreme Court acknowledged this exclusionary policy factor, they 
were willing to let the accused live(or literally die) with the 
consequences of subordinating that policy, and sanctioning the 
admission of such convictions, even in death penalty cases. [271]  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, despite interpreting a rule which 
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required it to balance exclusionary concerns against probative 
value to prove propensity to lie, nevertheless held that all a 
trial judge need do is state the conclusion that the unfair 
prejudice of a conviction(s) as a whole or individually did not 
outweigh their probative value with regard to credibility. [272]
       5.1.7
       State Supreme Courts Whose Rules's Standards were
       Overall More Liberal than the Federal Rule's 
       Standards on Admitting Convictions to Impeach 
       Assessing The Case Outcomes Data -- Summary
The most troubling finding just reported abut the sixteen 
supreme courts with overall more liberal rules than the federal 
rule with regard to standards for admitting convictions to impeach, 
is similar to the most troubling finding that was reported in the 
prior section with regard to the state supreme courts who were 
interpreting rules overall more restrictive than the federal rule. 
 There is evidence that these standards were not interpreted in an 
evenhanded fashion by these state supreme courts.  First, two of 
these courts sanctioned exclusion of convictions to impeach a 
prosecution witness, while ignoring the fact, or rejecting an 
express claim that it had sanctioned admission to impeach the 
accused with an identical or similar conviction, even under similar 
circumstances, such as the age of the conviction. [273]
       Second, some state supreme courts during the period of this 
study so broadly sanctioned the admission of convictions to impeach 
that they strayed far from the standards and policies of their 
rules, and in effect re-ranked the state's rule in relation to the 
federal and the standards of other states as interpreted by the 
respective supreme courts. [274]  For example, decisions by the 
Rhode Island and Wisconsin Supreme Courts during the study period, 
1990-2004, provide a basis for concluding that the two states which 
had the same rule standards, did not have the twelfth most liberal 
standard in admitting convictions to impeach, at least with respect 
to criminal defendants, but in fact were among a handful of the 
most liberal states in admitting convictions to impeach, even when 
those convictions are irrelevant and even when they are very likely 
to cause great unfair prejudice. [275]  
       Third, there are multiple cases decided by these courts in 
which the admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial 
convictions drove the accused from the stand, and thereby played a 
significant role in forcing the accused to forego exercise of his 
right to testify in his own defense. [276]  Significantly, the 
trial record indicated that there was evidence in one of these 
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cases, that admission of convictions ostensibly only to impeach was 
done in context of a close case as to whether there was proof to 
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [277]  Fourth and finally, 
these overall more liberal rule in admitting or authorizing 
convictions to impeach state supreme courts, were quick to dismiss 
any constitutional complaints the accused made about their liberal 
admission of his conviction(s) ostensibly only to impeach his 
actual or potential trial testimony. [278]
       6.1    Summary Comparisons of Outcomes(6.1.1)
                                     Outcome Assessments(6.1.2)
                                     Identifying The Most 
                                     Significant Effects of These
                                     Outcomes/Outcome
                         Assessments(6.1.3)
                                     Identifying The Most 
                                     Significant Causes of 
                                     These Outcomes/Outcome
    Assessments(6.1.4) 
                                   & Recommendations(6.1.5)
       6.1.1  Summary Comparisons of Outcomes 
Eight of the nine state supreme courts with rule standards 
on authorizing convictions to impeach that mimicked the current 
federal rules's standards sanctioned or authorized the admission of 
one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at least a trial 
witness in 83% of their eighteen(15) decisions during the fifteen 
year period of this study, 1990-2004. [279]  While twenty of the 
twenty-four state supreme courts with rule standards which were 
overall more restrictive than the federal rule in admitting 
convictions to impeach, sanctioned or authorized the admission of 
one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at least a trial 
witness in 55% of their seventy-one decisions during the study 
period. [280]  16 of the 17 state supreme courts with an evidence 
rule that overall more liberally than the current federal rule 
admitted convictions to impeach sanctioned or authorized the 
admission of one or more convictions ostensibly only to impeach at 
least a trial witness in 82% of their sixty-one decisions during 
the study period. [281]
       This outcome comparison is a gross indicator that a state's 
rule standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach may not be a 
good predictor of how trial judges will apply, or the rate at which 
its state supreme court will carefully evaluate, authorize, or 
sanction the use of convictions to impeach.  In this comparison, 
for example, the state supreme courts reviewing trial judge 
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decisions interpreting standards which mimicked the federal rule, 
standards which were actually closer to the standards of the more 
restrictive admission than the more liberal admission states, 
nevertheless, authorized or sanctioned the admission of convictions 
to impeach at a very high rate, and in fact at a rate equal to that 
of states with more liberal admission standards. This was true 
despite the fact that there was no significant difference in the 
crime convictions that were sanctioned for use to impeach, and 
despite the fact that most of the time in all three sets of state 
supreme courts, the convictions sanctioned were irrelevant as proof 
of a propensity to lie. [282]
When the accused was the witness to be impeached, state 
supreme courts with rule standards authorizing convictions to 
impeach that mimicked the current federal rule's standards 
sanctioned or authorized the admission of one or more convictions 
ostensibly to impeach in ninety-two percent(12 of 13) decisions 
during the fifteen year period of this study, 1990-2004. [283]  In 
the state supreme courts' decisions interpreting  rules whose 
standards were overall more restrictive than the federal rule in 
admitting convictions to impeach, the justices sanctioned or 
authorized the possible admission of one or more convictions to 
impeach the accused in 69% (31 of 45)of the cases. [284]  In the 
state supreme courts' decisions interpreting  rules whose standards 
were overall more liberal than the federal rule in admitting 
convictions to impeach, the justices sanctioned or authorized the 
possible admission of one or more convictions to impeach the 
accused in ninety-two percent(46 of 50) of the cases. [285]
      Hence all three sets of state supreme courts sanctioned or 
authorized the admission of convictions to impeach the accused at a 
very high rate, and at a much higher rate than when they reviewed 
cases involving the issue of the propriety of admitting convictions 
to impeach other witnesses.  When the issue on appeal was the 
propriety of admitting convictions to impeach other witnesses, the 
three sets of supreme courts rate of sanctioning or authorizing the 
admission of convictions to impeach was only sixty percent(3 of 5), 
thirty-one percent(8 of 26), and thirty-seven percent(4 of 11) 
respectively. [286]  An even more startling contrasting result is 
that in the twenty-six cases in which the issue was the propriety 
of impeaching a prosecution witness or witnesses with prior 
convictions, these same state supreme courts sanctioned or 
authorized the admission to impeach in only twenty-seven percent(7 
of 26) of the decisions. [287]
These outcomes in the eight state supreme courts 
interpreting rule standards on authorizing convictions to impeach 
that mimicked the current federal rules's standards was in apparent 
conflict with the fact that the shared standards, at least with 
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respect to qualifying convictions for possible admission solely 
upon the basis that the underlying crime was punishable by more 
than a year in prison, provided greater protection to the accused 
than other witnesses. [288]  These outcomes were also in apparent 
conflict with the fact that in the twenty states supreme courts 
interpreting rule standards overall more restrictive than the 
federal rule, four courts were interpreting standards which imposed 
greater  restrictions on admitting convictions to impeach the 
accused than other witnesses, and none  provided greater protection 
to other witnesses than to the accused. [289]  Only among the rules 
interpreted by the sixteen state supreme courts in states with 
overall more liberal standards than the federal rule regulating the 
admission of convictions to impeach, were there at least two states 
whose rule more liberally admitted convictions to impeach against 
some accused or all criminal witnesses. [290]  The rule of only one 
of these states more restrictively authorized possible admission of 
convictions to impeach only a sub-group of accused. [291]  There 
was even some evidence that state supreme courts would ignore the 
fact that in contemporaneous decisions, they sanctioned or 
authorized the exclusion to impeach a prosecution witness, with the 
same or similar crime conviction which they sanctioned the 
admission of to impeach the accused. [292]  Irrelevant "felony" 
convictions were admitted against the accused even when the appeal 
record provided a basis for concluding that the physical and 
eyewitness evidence did not clearly establish guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. [293]
      By rule, state supreme courts interpreting evidence rules 
identical to the federal rule or more restrictive than the federal 
rule were barred from admitting to impeach any witness, convictions 
for crimes which were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie.  
Despite this most fundamental evidence admissibility principle, 
seventy-eight and one-half percent of the state supreme courts in 
both sets of states who interpreted their rules' standards during 
the study period(22 of 28) admitted collectively scores of 
convictions which logically were irrelevant to prove propensity to 
lie. [294]  These state supreme courts turned a blind eye to 
incompetent representation, failed to consistently require trial 
judges to articulate why the conviction was relevant to prove 
propensity to lie, failed to make their own independent assessment 
of relevance, substituted their characterization of the crime as 
meeting their ill-defined or undefined criteria of "dishonesty" or 
"false statement", or embraced a variety of junk science heuristics 
to justify or excuse this failure to adhere to this most basic 
evidence admissibility requirement. [295]  On this same issue, the 
sixteen supreme courts interpreting rule standards which overall 
more liberally admitted convictions to impeach, also admitted 
scores of irrelevant convictions to impeach, but at least all but 
three of them were authorized by their rules to admit at least 
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certain categories of irrelevant convictions, at least against 
certain categories of witnesses. [296]  
       Added concern for the quantity and quality of unfair 
prejudice that will be caused by the admission of convictions 
ostensibly only to impeach, is implicated when the accused is the 
target witness, and the current trial charges include those which 
are identical or similar to the crimes underlying the proffered 
convictions. [297]  Despite this added concern, 21 of these forty-
four supreme courts when given the opportunity to sanction or 
authorize the admission  of similar crime convictions ostensibly 
only to impeach the accused, did so in 45 of 58(77.5%) the cases 
when this issue was presented. [298]  The admission of this high of 
a percentage of similar crime convictions is even more startling 
when by rule or in one state by decision of the same state supreme 
court, all but two of these twenty-six courts were either 
interpreting standards which required consideration of exclusionary 
concerns, or the court itself imposed such a consideration. [299]  
       Lack of academic or other models or perhaps sheer outcome 
driven determinations, are two plausible reasons for this almost 
universal ignoring or denigration of heightened concern for unfair 
prejudice, included the universal failure of these courts to 
precisely define unfair prejudice or develop protocols for 
measuring the quantity and quality of unfair prejudice risked by 
the admission of the similar crime conviction ostensibly only to 
impeach. [300]  In any event this mass ignoring or minimizing of 
exclusionary concerns by these courts, is a second gross indicator 
that a state's rule standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach 
may not be a good predictor of how trial judges will apply, or if a 
state supreme court will carefully evaluate, authorize, or sanction 
the use of a conviction to impeach.
       6.1.2  Summary Comparisons of Outcomes Assessments
              Comparing Key Assessment Findings from Three Sets
              of States' Supreme Courts --- Building Towards
         a Finding that the Effects of Demographics -
              is State Supreme Courts Anarchy-Result 
              oriented Anarchy--re Use of Convictions to Impeach
       6.1.2.1  Compare 3.1.2 with 4.1.2 & 5.1.2   
       The summary now focuses upon a comparative evaluation of the 
crucial assessment findings from parts two through four, and 
provides policy perspectives concerning those findings. First, it 
is fair to say that the federal rule's standards for admitting 
convictions to impeach, often thought of as a model for state 
evidence rules, was not a strong influence on the state supreme 
courts in any of the three groups of states herein studied, 
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including the eight supreme courts which were interpreting 
standards identical to those of the federal rule. [301]  Only 
eleven of the forty-four supreme courts, including four of the 
courts interpreting rules identical to the federal rule, expressly 
stated at some point during the fifteen year study period that 
their interpretations of their rules on admission to impeach would 
be guided by official commentary, interpretations, or history of 
the federal rule. [302]  Three of these eleven states, however, 
including two of the four courts interpreting rules identical to 
the federal rule, made decisions during the study period 
significantly inconsistent with the official commentary, 
interpretations, or history of the federal rule. [303]
       These departures from the federal rule's commentary or 
legislative history were always holdings by these courts, in 
contrasts to the federal rule's official commentary, broadly 
defining the qualifying terms "dishonesty" or "false statement" in 
order to sanction or authorize the admission of convictions for 
crimes such as theft or robbery to impeach. [304]  Hence the 
federalism policy goal of trying to encourage a uniform national 
standard on the admissibility of convictions to impeach, embraced 
by the uniform law commissioners when they amended the uniform rule 
to mimic the federal rules' standards was not achieved in the last 
quarter century, and not even modest progress towards achieving 
this goal as we reached the mid-point of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. [305]
       6.1.2.2  Compare 3.1.3 & 4 with 4.1.3 & 4 & 5.1.3 & 4
       Second, the decision data for each of the three categories 
of state supreme courts was assessed to determine the likelihood 
that the courts in each category would examine the trial record to 
determine if the trial judge had made the appropriate rule standard 
evaluation, and competently apply their rules' standards regulating 
the admissibility of convictions to impeach. [306]  In total, 
during the fifteen period of this study, the forty-four state 
supreme courts held that lower court decisions on the admission of 
convictions to impeach was uncorrected error in 32 of the 150(21%) 
cases, and reversed for a new trial based on that error(s) in 17 of 
those thirty-two cases(about 11% of the total cases. [307]  Studies 
have found that the  rate of reversal by state supreme courts has 
fluctuated over the decades, becoming progressively lower in more 
recent time(less than ten percent) with the increase in appellate 
litigation. [308]  The three groups of state supreme courts rate of 
finding such error was consistent with the relative scrutiny 
required by their states' collective rules - the rate of finding 
uncorrected error was almost five times as great in the group of 
states with overall more restrictive admission rules than the 
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federal rule, in comparison to those supreme courts with overall 
more liberal admission rules than the federal rule. [309]
       Twenty-seven of the thirty-two findings of uncorrected error 
benefitted an accused, either because these courts found that the 
accused(17) or a defense witness'(2) conviction(s) should have been 
excluded as impeachment evidence, or that a prosecution witness' 
conviction(8) should have been admitted to impeach. [310]  This 
finding when coupled with the previous finding of outcome 
difference favoring the prosecution in state supreme court 
decisions, provides a basis for an inference that in these 
relatively heatedly contested state litigations, trial judges 
tended to greatly favor prosecutors in making rulings on whether to 
sanction impeachment of the accused or a witness of the accused, in 
comparison to permitting the use of convictions to impeach a 
prosecution's witness.
       The next key finding based on the collective and comparative 
assemblage and evaluation of the data, is that for the most part, 
the forty-four state supreme courts took a sequence of related 
steps greatly encouraging judicial anarchy with regard to 
determining if a conviction should be admitted to impeach.  First, 
all three sets of states, despite a few exceptions that could have 
served as models, failed to require trial judge's to place their 
admission of convictions to impeach evaluations on the record, or 
failed to competently use the standards of its rules as the basis 
for review of the trial judge's decision. [311]  The vast majority 
of these courts in all three categories also failed to competently 
perform the evaluation required by the appropriate standard(s) of 
its rule to guide its own decision making. [312]  Most egregiously, 
hiding behind history and junk science heuristics, thirty-four of 
forty-four of these courts(77%) failed in over half of these one 
hundred fifty decisions(82/55%) to require trial judges or 
themselves to consistently adhere to the most basic admissibility 
standard, that evidence must be relevant on the issue, here as 
proof of a propensity to lie, for which it is offered. [313]  These 
significant failures are the third gross indicator the rule 
standards as enacted were not necessarily a good comparative basis 
for determining state supreme court decision making.  This is 
further driven home by the fact that a higher percentage of state 
supreme courts with identical or more restrictive admission of 
convictions to impeach standards than the federal rule, admitted 
irrelevant convictions than state supreme courts with more liberal 
standards than those of the federal rule. [314]
6.1.2.3  Compare 3.1.5 with 4.1.5 & 5.1.5
Third, twenty-seven of the forty-four supreme courts who 
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made pertinent decisions during the study period, were interpreting 
rules whose standards included a standard which made express 
reference to convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false 
statement".  Despite the fact that none of their rules expressly 
defined these concepts, none of these courts generally defined 
"dishonesty" or "false statement" in the decisions they made during 
the study period, and only a few of them made reference to 
precedent which they characterized as including such definitions. 
[315]  Nor did these courts adopt the narrow definition of these 
concepts recommended in the federal rule's commentary. [316]  
Instead, some courts in all three categories, without justification 
or policy analysis, broadly defined these concepts to include 
convictions for crimes which had no logical basis to serve as proof 
of a propensity to lie. [317]  Third, state supreme courts 
interpreting standards which employed a specific standard only for 
crimes of dishonesty or false statement, a standard which more 
liberally authorized admission of crimes so categorized, were 
likely once a conviction was so characterized, to forego a rule 
required balancing evaluation, and the identification and weighing 
of exclusionary concerns. [318]  These sequential failures to 
adhere or make clear standards with regard to "dishonesty" or 
"false statement" is a fourth gross indicator that a state's rule 
standard(s) on admitting convictions to impeach don't work and 
therefore may not be a poor predictor of how trial judges will 
apply, or whether the state supreme court will carefully evaluate, 
authorize, or sanction the use of convictions to impeach.
       6.1.2.4  Compare 3.1.6 with 4.1.6 & 5.1.6
No matter which of the three groups of state rules on 
convictions to impeach, the article confirmed that the standards of 
most of the rules in each group sanctioned at least qualifying for 
possible admission convictions based on their punishment, despite 
the fact that the legislative decision to provide for a maximum 
punishment of more than a year in jail is irrelevant to prove 
propensity to lie. [319]  Most of the state supreme courts in all 
three groups, provided a significant boost to judicial anarchy on 
this issue, when they were willing to ignore or excuse failure to 
comply with the universal minimal admissibility requirement, even 
though their state rules or the courts themselves recognized 
compliance with the relevance rule was at least the first necessary 
step to justify admission of any evidence, including admitting 
"felony" convictions to impeach. [320]
       In evaluating "felony" convictions for admission to impeach, 
these courts often gave short shift to their rules' required 
balancing evaluation and ignored or minimized exclusionary concerns 
that were supposed to be identified, evaluated, and weighed against 
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probative value during that balancing evaluation. [321]  Failure to 
appropriately evaluate and value exclusionary concerns set the 
stage for about twenty of these forty-four state supreme courts in 
thirty-five decisions to sanction the admission of "felonies" to 
impeach the accused which were identical or very similar to one or 
more of the charges currently being tried. [322]
       6.1.3  Identifying Significant Effects on The 
              Justice System of The Comparative
              Outcome & Outcome Assessment Findings of this 
                             Study
       6.1.3.1  Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
                Assessment Findings - Effect #1 
- Driving Accused from the Stand
There is some evidence derived from this case study that the 
overall lack of adherence to a variety of rule and self-imposed 
standards which limited the admission of irrelevant convictions, 
multiple convictions, and convictions similar to the current trial 
charges, ostensibly only to impeach the accused, have the effect of 
driving the accused from the witness stand. [323]  In as few as 
thirty (28%) and as many as thirty-nine(36%) of the one hundred 
eight cases in this study in which the accused was the witness to 
be impeached, the accused did not testify. [324]  A  much higher 
percentage of the accused, in the decisions of the state supreme 
courts interpreting rules more liberally admitting convictions to 
impeach than the federal rule, did not testify. [325]  Hence in 
these cases very often irrelevant evidence put the accused to the 
dilemma of protecting his constitutional right to an impartial 
trial, by foregoing his constitutional right to testify in his own 
behalf. [326]
     When the accused testimony is crucial to his theory of 
defense, as was true in some of these cases, and when some of these 
state supreme courts, following the meritless position of the 
United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United States[327], also 
employ a procedural rule which moots an appeal of denial of his 
constitutional claims to an impartial jury and right to testify if 
the accused fails to testify, the accused guilt or innocence may 
not be fairly determined. [328]
6.1.3.2  Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
                Assessment Findings - Effect # 2 -
                Resigning Lawyers to Conceded Admissibility
                of Irrelevant Convictions
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      When standards limiting admission of convictions to impeach 
are not consistently enforced or evaluated by state supreme courts, 
it is also likely to resign lawyers to assuming a conviction when 
offered will be admitted.  This happened in several state supreme 
court decisions from jurisdictions whose rules or statutes as 
interpreted by their state supreme courts admitted convictions to 
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. [329]  At other times 
the liberal admission rule may have contributed to an attorney 
failing to make an appropriate argument to exclude past matters 
that did not or should not have qualified even as a "conviction" in 
the state. [330]
       6.1.3.3  Effect of Comparative Outcomes & Outcomes
                Assessment Findings - Effect # 3 - Shifting the
                Most Restrictive to Least Restrictive Rankings
                of State Rules & the number of states whose
                rules rank as more or less liberal than the
                federal rule, but of course with caveat that
                at least federal courts of appeals'
                interpretations of the federal rule would 
                have to be evaluated before re-ranking based 
                on case law was fair comparison
The most significant effect of the comparative outcome and 
outcome assessment findings of this study is that they evidence a 
shift in the ranking of some of the states' admission of conviction 
to impeach standards.  In total, seventeen supreme courts made 
decisions significantly altering their rules' standards, and in 
every case the change made it more likely that one or more types of 
convictions would be more easily admitted to impeach at least one 
category of witness. [331]  Of the nine states sharing the same 
standards-those which mimicked the federal rule, three of the 
supreme courts, those of New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma 
authorized significantly more liberal admission standards, and 
standards which were not identical to each other. [332]  Decisions 
by the Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, and South Dakota Supreme Courts, and the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals during the last decade and a half had the 
effect of moving their overall more restrictive than the federal 
rule standards for admitting convictions to impeach, to standards 
which more liberally than the federal rule admitted convictions to 
impeach. [333]
       The Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, and Texas Courts, for 
example, decided that almost any "felony" conviction was 
universally admissible to impeach, or admissible to impeach even if 
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie, and the Arkansas Court 
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joined the Delaware Court in expressly sanctioning the admission of 
convictions as substantive evidence to prove guilt, in the guise of 
impeachment evidence. [334]  These courts thereby jettisoned any 
principled consideration of implicated exclusionary concerns, and 
they were joined by the Maine Supreme Court who simply abandoned 
its rule's balancing evaluation requirement to identify and 
evaluate exclusionary concerns. [335]
       Finally, decisions by the New Jersey, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin Supreme Courts already interpreting standards overall 
more liberally admitting convictions to impeach than the federal 
rule, made decisions greatly expanding the liberality of those 
rules - The Rhode Island and Wisconsin Courts demonstrating a 
willingness to admit almost any conceivable conviction to impeach 
the accused. [336]  This shift of thirteen states meant that at  
the beginning of 2005, that from a minority of sixteen of forty-
four((36%), in fact a majority (25 of 44/58%) of the states whose 
supreme courts made decisions during the study period in fact had 
sanctioned or authorized standards more liberal than the federal 
rule in admitting convictions to impeach. These shifts also had the 
effect of swelling the number of distinct admission standards in 
the states to well over thirty. 
6.1.4     Accounting for These Effects --- Especially
                 Pattern of Significant Departures from the
                 States' Rule Standards---Identifying Causes
       6.1.4.1
This article next identifies or reconfirms the identity of 
those factors that plausibly account for this pattern of outcomes, 
patterns identified by the assessment of those outcomes, and their 
key effects, especially the significant departures from their 
respective rules' standards by many of the state supreme courts.  
The article has documented that among the reasons for these 
patterns and effects are these courts; parochial decision making 
process, failure to define crucial rule standards' concepts,  
continue to rely upon history as policy, incessantly invoke an 
array of junk science heuristics as substitute for logical 
relevance, and finally simply seem hellbent on ignoring or 
minimizing exclusionary policy concerns to facilitate the 
government's ability to convict recidivists. [337]
       A final reason can be gleaned when the history of enactment 
of modern evidence codes is used to provide perspective about this 
fifteen year pattern of state supreme court decisions.  This factor 
many be characterized as the exercise of judicial power.  Modern 
state evidence codes while approved by state legislatures, were 
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documents often drafted by state supreme courts or drafted under 
the supervision of those courts. [338]  State supreme courts take 
therefore more of a proprietary stance in the interpretation of 
these rules. [339]  This proprietary posture can be seen most 
pervasively in the fact documented herein that state supreme courts 
with a wide range of admission of conviction to impeach standards 
have asserted their authority to employ or continue to employ 
guidelines they have created independent of the rules to supplant 
or supplement tho standards of their respective rules. [340]  
Unfortunately, these guidelines for the most part further fueled 
the risk of judicial anarchy on this issue because they were most 
often in the form of a non-exhaustive list of multiple factors for 
trial judges to consider in no particular order, and most of them 
were simply heuristics without evidential basis. [341]
These assertions of judicial rule making authority, even 
embraced endorsement and use of junk science and anti-science 
heuristics during the decade and one-half period of this study, as 
well as the Solomon like tactic of splitting the baby, by admitting 
irrelevant convictions to impeach, but "sanitizing" that admission. 
 [342]  These heuristics and tactic were made part of the legal 
standard by state supreme courts despite available evidence they 
were inconsistent with reality, and recognition by several of these 
courts that the tactic was ineffectual and unfair. [343]
       This proprietary interests in the rules, however, was 
abdicated by many of the state supreme courts by authorizing and 
sometimes even encouraging every state trial judge in their state 
to interpret the admission rule each using their own criteria - via 
the great deference to trial judge decision without requiring the 
trial judge to state the basis of that decision, reviewing those 
decisions to determine if they were moderately competent 
applications of the existing standards, and failing by their own
fiat to impose state wide evaluation criteria. [344]  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court's decisions were the quintessential example of 
such abdication. [345]
       6.1.5   Recommendations
       The basis of the following recommendations are the findings 
and commentary on those findings summarized to this point in this 
section of the article.  This final section of the article 
identifies and defends recommendations for national reform of the 
current process and substance of admitting convictions to impeach. 
 The procedural recommendations and the substantive reform 
recommendation are independent of each other.  
       6.1.5.1  Procedural 
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       The recommended procedural reforms are sequential.  First, 
in order to admit a conviction record as a basis for impeachment, 
all states should require the proponent to make a pretrial motion, 
which would trigger an admission hearing, if the witness against 
whom the admission is sought is a "party" witness.  In a criminal 
prosecution, the only prosecution witness within this definition of 
party witness is the victim(s) of the alleged crime. [346]  Second, 
the hearing judge would be required to put on the record the 
specific findings of fact that justify under each element of the 
state's rule standard(s), as interpreted by the state supreme 
court, their admission/exclusion decision.  [347]  No conviction 
should be sanctioned for admission to impeach by a state supreme 
court based on the intuitive-phantom balancing so often endorsed by 
these courts as documented in this article. [348]
       Third, the judge's decision should be followed, when the 
decision is to admit one or more convictions to impeach a party 
witness, with a required interlocutory appeal.  Fourth, the 
appellate court hearing that appeal would be required to determine 
de-novo - as a matter of law, if the trial judge competently 
performed the second procedural reform just described. [349]
At the state supreme court level the evaluation of the 
accuracy of the trial judge's interpretation of the state standard 
would also be reviewed as a matter of law.   Far too often, too 
many state supreme courts use the abuse of discretion standard to 
justify deference to a trial judges's decision even when that judge 
obviously failed to make even a good faith effort to employ the 
standards of the rule, and multiple times failed to refer to or 
place their interpretations of each sequential element of the 
standards set out in their rules on the record. [350]  Finally, the 
harmless error rule, when applied to the admission against a party 
of a similar crime conviction is inconsistent with the weight of 
empirical evidence that there is almost always significant unfair 
prejudice produced in a jury.  Therefore that doctrine should not 
be employed, or employed in only the most obvious of guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt established by non-tainted admitted trial evidence 
cases. [351] Otherwise twice protected specific national 
constitutional and state constitutional rights expressly 
guaranteeing an accused a right to an impartial jury, and the right 
to testify on his own behalf are subordinated to a deliberate state 
policy decision largely based on a court created, and frequently 
legislative endorsed irrelevant and highly unfairly prejudicial 
heuristic. [352]
6.1.5.2  Substantive Reform Recommendation
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Substantial reform of the standards for admitting 
convictions to impeach to succeed must be radical.  The crucial 
findings of this study, just reviewed and summarized, and those of 
the earlier rule focused article require no less than this level of 
reform  - all states must, as is currently true in the state of 
Montana, abolish the use of conviction records as a form of 
impeachment.   While it might be argued that a conviction record 
for perjury should be an exception to this ban, a perjury 
conviction record should only be admitted when there is a denial by 
the witness that he previously lied under oath.   The only arguably 
relevant conviction record therefore would serve its only 
appropriate impeachment function warranted by their only salient 
characteristic - as an excellent, yet unfairly prejudicial proof 
source.  Under this proposal, however, the party calling the 
witness can not complain about that unfair prejudice because the 
first option was to admit that the witness had previously lied  
under oath. 
Obviously, this ban on conviction records is easy to apply 
and therefore will not only produce the appropriate result, but 
uniform results in the trial courts of all of the states.  It 
eliminates all of the egregious major flaws in the current pattern 
of federalism documented in this article including: state supreme 
courts' focus on preservation and exercise of judicial power more 
than adherence to the rule of law or sound policy, the related 
failure of these courts to follow rule standards even when these 
courts articulated the standards of their rules, the conscious 
decision of some of these courts to admit convictions to convict in 
the current case if the accused dared take the stand and claim to 
be innocent, the wholesale admission of irrelevant conviction 
records, multiple irrelevant conviction records, identical or 
similar conviction records, ignoring or denigrating pertinent 
exclusionary policies and constitutional principals, skewed 
balancing attempts by trial and appellate courts, and qualifying 
for admission to impeach a broad subset of convictions by giving 
them a label as a flawed surrogate that the conviction is relevant 
proof of a propensity to lie.  It is long past time for state 
supreme courts, the courts with the greatest authority in the 
states and collectively nationally, to stop sanctioning and 
expanding the deliberate skewing of trial outcomes, and in criminal 
cases denying specific constitutional rights.  It is time to ban 
the use of conviction records as "impeachment" evidence. 
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testified at trial, with multiple juvenile adjudications including 
one for concealing identity-a misdemeanor.  After conclusionarily 
asserting that concealing identity is a crime of deceit or fraud, 
the court then asserted that the trial judge, despite the mandatory 
admission language of 11-609(A)(2), had discretion via its 403 rule 
to exclude the conviction.  It then sanctioned, in a highly 
conclusionary manner, the trial judge's exclusion, asserting it was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
66.  State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816(Iowa, 1997)
(Supreme Court erroneously asserted that trial judge must determine 
if the prior conviction is one of dishonesty or false statement, 
and even if she concludes that it was such a conviction, that the 
probative value of the conviction to prove propensity to lie 
outweighed its prejudicial effect; Id..  Accused on appeal conceded 
conviction was for a crime of dishonesty or false statement, and 
hence by rule, the conviction was admissible to impeach him.  Iowa 
Supreme Court simply failed to recognize that its rule, like the 
federal rule, embodied two independent standards for the accused)
67.  See Holley supra note 1, at notes 18-26, and 39, and 
accompanying text. 
68.  State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789(N.M., 1997); State v. Stewart, 646 
N.W.2d 712(N.D., 2002); State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439(N.D., 
2002); State v. Bryan, 804 N.E.2d 433(Ohio, 2004); State v. Taylor, 
676 N.E.2d 82, 93(Ohio, 1997); State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294(Okl. Cr. 
App., 2001); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414(Okl. Cr. App., 1995); 
Three "M" Investments, Inc. v. The Ahrend Co., 827 P.2d 1324(Okl., 
1992); Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 115(Okl. Cr. App., 1991); Hardiman 
v. State, 798 P.2d 222(Okl. Cr. App., 1990); State v. Colwell, 994 
P.2d 177(Utah, 2000); and Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970(Wyo., 
2000). 
69.  See supra note 51, and accompanying text.
70.  State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 715-716(N.D., 2002)
71.   Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222, 225(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)
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72.  State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)(six factor 
analysis); State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 716(N.D., 2002)(five 
factor analysis, omitting from the New Mexico list discussed infra 
in the next text sentence the correlation with substantive 404 
propensity rule policy factor); Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222, 
224(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)(identical five factor analysis as North 
Dakota Supreme Court, which Oklahoma court asserted it had 
established in an earlier case).     
73. State v. Stewart, 646 N.W.2d 712, 716(N.D., 2002). 
74.  See Holley, supra note 1, at notes 211 - 218, and accompanying 
text. 
75. State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997) 
76.   State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)(The New Mexico 
Supreme Court proceeded to uphold admission of a receipt of stolen 
property conviction to impeach, because the accused had recently 
pled guilty, the offense was not similar to the current charges, 
and credibility was a critical and central issue in this case.  In 
Turner v. State, 803 P.2d 1152, 1156(Okl. Cr. App., 1991), on the 
other hand, the court reasoned that because the two defendants 
testified they were innocent of the armed robbery charge, it was 
appropriate to admit two other robbery convictions against each 
accused.  See also State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 449(N.D., 
2002)(North Dakota Supreme Court makes similar conceptual error by 
asserting that the lack of other evidence to impeach, enhances 
probative value of each and every felony conviction of the witness 
to impeach the witness) 
77.  The record in these cases, and discussions with experienced 
prosecutors and defense lawyers support the conclusion that when 
defendants in criminal cases testify in their case-in-chief it is 
almost always because the person and defense counsel have concluded 
that among the most viable theories of defense, is one or more 
theories for which the accused testimony is crucial. 
78.  Hardiman v. State, 798 P.2d 222, 224(Okl. Cr. App., 1990)
79.  Id. 
80.  State v. Mora, 950 P.2d 789, 803(N.M., 1997)( Apparently the 
fact that the crime was not similar, was found by implication by 
the court to reduce the unfair prejudice --- but no attempt was 
made to articulate the remaining quantity and quality of the unfair 
prejudice that would result, especially given the express reference 
to a gun, as the item stolen); State v. Cheatham, 900 P.2d 414, 
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427(Okl. Cr. App., 1995).  See also State v. Hooks, 19 P.3d 294, 
318(Okl. Cr. App., 2001(court makes a highly conclusionary 
assessment of unfair prejudice) 
81.  These twenty-four jurisdictions were: Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, and West Virginia.  See Holley supra note 1 at 41 -
126, and accompanying text. 
82.  The four state supreme courts which did not make a pertinent 
decision with regard to determining the admissibility of a 
conviction to impeach during the period 1990-2004 were Alaska,
Michigan, Mississippi, and West Virginia.
83. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341(Ark., 2004); Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20 (Ark. 2002); 
Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544(Ark., 1993); Label Systems, Inc. v. 
Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703(Con. 2004); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 
36(Con., 1998); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con., 1992); Walker 
v. State, 790 A.2d 1214(Del., 2002); Archie v. State, 721 A.2d 
924(Del., 1998); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624(Del. 1997); Webb v. 
State, 663 A.2d 452, 461(Del., 1995); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 
821(Del., 1994); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740(Ga., 2000); Hudson 
v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810(Ga., 1999); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d 
462(Ga., 1999); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890(Idaho, 2001); State v. 
Thompson, 977 P.2d 890(Idaho, 1999); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d 
225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249(Idaho, 1997); People 
v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill., 2001); People v. Atkinson, 713 
N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638(Ill., 
1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316(Ill., 1990); Sphect v. State, 
734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000);  State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540(Me., 
2000); State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108(Me., 1998); State v. Wright, 
662 A.2d 198(Me., 1995); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108(Me. 1995);
Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8(Md., 1995); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 
870(Md., 1994); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581(Minn. 1998); State 
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 
293(Pa., 1999); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858(S.D., 1993); State 
v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 
428(Tx.Cr.App., 1995); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002); 
State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495(Wa., 1996); State v. Mckinsey, 810 
P.2d 907(Wa., 1991); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220(Wa., 1991) 
84.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271(Ariz., 2001)(felony sexual 
offenses);  State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033(Con., 2002); State v. 
Carter, 636 A.2d 821(Con., 1994)(manslaughter and carrying a pistol 
without a permit); State v. Sauris, 631 A.2d 238(Con., 
1993)(multiple larceny and breaking and entering convictions); 
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Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405(Del., 2004)(multiple felony 
convictions for unlawful sexual assault); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 
653(Del. 2002)(kidnapping); Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 42-
43(Del., 1997)(court sanctioned trial judge's exclusion of multiple 
convictions of three prosecution witnesses, including convictions 
for misdemeanor criminal mischief; two felony juvenile 
adjudications, and two felony drug trafficking offenses); McClure 
v. State, 603 S.E.2d 224(Ga., 2004)(misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645(Ga., 2001)(possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine); Ely v. State, 529 S.E.2d 886, 
889(Ga., 2000)(misdemeanors of simple battery and possession of 
marijuana); Hawes v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667(Ga., 1996)(criminal 
contempt for abuse of process for falsely swearing); O'Neal v. 
Kammin 430 S.E.2d 586, 587(Ga., 1993)(misdemeanor marijuana 
possession); Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga., 1991); State 
v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587 and 589(Haw.,2001)(shoplifting/theft);
Fuller v. Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho, 1991)(misdemeanor 
conviction for failure to file an income tax return); People v. 
Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001)(court held "mere evidence"(omitting 
the name of the underlying crimes) impeachment with multiple felony 
convictions for theft and burglary was reversible error); Martin v. 
State, 736 N.E.2d 1213, 1221(Ind., 2000)(juvenile adjudication for 
possession of stolen property); Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125, 
134(Ind., 2000)(juvenile adjudication for car jacking); State v. 
Diggs, 34 P.3d 63, 69(Kan., 2001)(aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child and aggravated sexual battery);  State v. Davis, 874 
P.2d 1156, 1162(Kan., 1994)(felony possession of cocaine); State v. 
Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635(Minn., 1995)(five felony convictions); 
In the Matter of the Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency, 905 
P.2d 148, 195(Mont, 1995)(sale of a controlled substance); State v. 
Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(destruction of property of 
another); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont.,1993)(burglary 
and theft convictions); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 
2000)(two possession of weapons and two drug trafficking 
convictions); State v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120(Ten., 
1999)(robbery); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten., 
1999)(convictions for burglary and larceny);  State v. Mixon, 983 
S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 
881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 987(Vt. 
1993); State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of 
a controlled substance);  State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa., 
1997)(felony drug conviction) 
85.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341(Ark., 2004)(accused did not 
testify, but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id. at 344); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 
1993)(accused did testify; but the court did not expressly recite 
its evidence rule's standards, Id.); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 
1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(accused did testify, but the court did 
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not expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); Archie v. 
State, 721 A.2d 924(Del., 1998)(accused did testify, and the court 
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 927); 
Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(accused did not 
testify; Id.); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 
1994)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly recite its 
evidence rule's standards, Id.); Hudson v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810, 
813-814(Ga., 1999)(accused did testify, but the court did not 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 816); State 
v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001)(accused did testify, and the 
court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.);
State v. Thompson, 977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(accused did 
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id., at  891 and 892); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d 
225(Idaho, 1998)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly 
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 
1249, 1257-1258(Idaho, 1997)(accused did not testify{inference}, 
but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); 
People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill., 2001)(accused did testify, 
and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, 
Id., at 880); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 
1999)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly recite its 
evidence rule's standards, Id., at 534 and 535);People v. Williams, 
670 N.E.2d 638(Ill., 1996)(accused did testify, and the court did 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 654, and 
654-655); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316(Ill., 1990)(accused did 
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id., at 326 and 349 - 350); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 
239(Ind., 2000)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly 
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 
540, 545(Me., 2000)(accused did not testify,  but court did 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. 
Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 1998)(accused did 
testify(inference), but the court did not expressly recite its 
evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me., 
1995)(accused did testify{inference}, and the court did expressly 
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 201); State v. Warren, 
661 A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(accused did testify, and the 
court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 
1111); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995)(accused did 
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id., at 10 and 11); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 
875(Md., 1994)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly 
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 870 and 872); State 
v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(accused did not testify, 
 but court did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, 
Id.); State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(accused 
did testify, but the court did not expressly recite its evidence 
rule's standards, Id.); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 
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1999)(accused did testify, but the court did not expressly recite 
its evidence rule's standards, Id.); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 
858, 860-861(S.D., 1993)(accused did not testify, and court did not 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 859 and 
860); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D., 1991)(accused did 
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id., at 40 and 41); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 
440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(accused did testify, but the court did not 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 439 and 
440); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002)(accused did not 
testify, but the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id. at 1137 and 1138); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 
498-499(Wa., 1996)(accused did testify, and the court did expressly 
recite its evidence rule's standards, Id., at 497 and 498); State 
v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(accused did testify, but 
the court did not expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, 
Id. at 907 and 908)
86.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 275-76(Ariz., 2001)(accused did 
testify, and the court did expressly recite its evidence rule's 
standards.  The court held that the admission of the accused's two 
fifteen year old convictions for felony sexually related offenses 
was uncorrected and reversible error); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 
653, 665 (Del. 2002)(accused did testify, Id. at 656, and the court 
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards.  The court held 
that the admission of the accused's conviction for kidnapping was 
uncorrected, but not reversible error); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 
645(Ga., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 648.  The court held 
that the admission of the accused's conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute was uncorrected, but harmless, and therefore 
not reversible error); State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587 and 
589(Haw., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 579, and the court did 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 578.  The 
court held that the admission of the accused's shoplifting 
conviction during his trial on public drunkenness and resisting 
arrest charges was uncorrected error, and revered the conviction 
based on this error and related issues); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 
166,167(Ill., 2001)(accused did testify, Id. at 169, and the court 
did expressly recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 169 -
170.  The court held that the admission of the accused's felony 
theft and burglary convictions even if not named was uncorrected 
and reversible error); State v. Davis, 874 P.2d 1156, 1162(Kan., 
1994)(accused did not testify, Id. at 1159, but the court did 
expressly recite its evidence rule's standards.  The court affirmed 
trial court decision that a conviction for the felony of possession 
of cocaine was not a conviction for a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement, and was therefore inadmissible to impeach the accused, 
but nevertheless affirmed the convictions of the accused in this 
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case for aggravated burglary and multiple serious crimes against 
the person); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(accused did 
not testify, Id. at 1103, and the court did expressly recite its 
evidence rule's standards. The court held that the defendant's 
trial attorney(accused on trial and convicted of capital murder and 
possession of an instrument of crime) provided ineffective 
assistance when he told the accused that if he testified he could 
be impeached with four convictions.  Court held error was grounds 
for reversal because by rule neither the two drug trafficking 
convictions or the two possession of weapons convictions met the 
only qualifying criteria that the underlying crime must implicate 
"dishonesty" or "false statement"); State v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 
120(Ten., 1999)(accused did not testify. The court held it was 
uncorrected, but not reversible error for the trial judge to have 
authorized the prosecution to impeach the accused should he 
testify, even if no reference to the name of the crime was 
permitted, with a conviction for robbery when the accused was 
currently on trial for robbery and other crimes); State v. Taylor, 
993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten., 1999)(accused did not testify, Id. at 34, 
and the court did not fully recite its evidence rule's standards.  
The court held it was uncorrected but harmless error for the trial 
judge to authorize prosecution impeach the accused should he 
testify with convictions for burglary and larceny at a trial of the 
accused for crimes of aggravated burglary and theft); State v. 
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, 674-675(Tenn., 1999)(accused did  
testify, Id. at 664, and the court did recite its evidence rule's 
standards, Id. at 673. The court held it was reversible error for 
the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused 
with sexual battery conviction.  The accused was currently on trial 
for sexual battery, attempted rape, and attempted incest); Theus v. 
State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(accused did testify, 
Id. at 877, but the court did not expressly recite its evidence 
rule's standards.  The court held that it was uncorrected error for 
the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach the 
accused's trial testimony by referring to and having admitted his 
arson conviction); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984,987(Vt. 
1993)(accused did  testify, Id. at 986, and the court did recite 
its evidence rule's standards. The court held it was reversible 
error for the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach 
the accused with sixteen prior convictions); State v. Calegar, 947 
P.2d 235, 240(Wa., 1997)(accused did  testify, Id. at 236, and the 
court did recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. at 237.  The 
court held the original trial judge's decision to authorize the 
prosecution to impeach the accused with a possession of a 
controlled substance conviction was reversible error; State v. 
Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa., 1997)(accused did  testify, Id. at 
1177, and the court did recite its evidence rule's standards, Id. 
at 1178.  The court held that it was uncorrected and reversible 
error for the trial judge to authorize the prosecution to impeach 
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the accused's trial testimony with a felony drug conviction). 
87.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343(Ark., 2004){aggravated 
robbery, kidnapping, and rape); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 
1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(State supreme court sanctioned the trial  
judge's decision to allow the state to impeach the accused with two 
of five convictions); Archie v. State, 721 A.2d 924(Del., 
1998)(unspecified convictions); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 
825(Del., 1994)(five convictions, including four felony convictions 
and a misdemeanor theft conviction); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 
864, 880(Ill., 2001)(escape and unlawful use of a weapon by a 
felon); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(two felony 
burglary convictions); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 
1990)(rape and attempted murder); State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540, 
545(Me., 2000)(fourteen convictions for forgery or unsworn 
falsification); State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 
1998)(escape, possession of a firearm, and theft); State v. Wright, 
662 A.2d 198(Me., 1995)(theft and burglary); State v. Warren, 661 
A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and 
armed robbery); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 11 and 12(Md., 
1995)(three theft convictions); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 
583(Minn. 1998)(burglary, controlled substance, and criminal sexual 
conduct); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft(a 
bike) and  theft by deception); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 
860-861(S.D., 1993)(aggravated assault and escape could be admitted 
if the accused testified); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D., 
1991)(two convictions for sexual contact with a chile); State v. 
Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(attempted robbery and 
robbery) 
88.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 272(Ariz., 2001)(two "sexual 
offenses"); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001)(reversible 
error to make even mere fact reference to multiple convictions for 
theft and burglary); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Ten., 
1999)(State Supreme Court ruled it was error for the trial judge to 
authorize state to impeach the accused with eight unspecified 
felony convictions, all of which the state was authorized to refer 
to as felonies of dishonesty.  Hence the court rejected the trial 
judge's apparent attempt to reach a policy compromise, by striking
the specific name of the convictions, which was similar or 
identical to the current charges(burglary convictions, burglary 
charge; larceny conviction, theft current charge); State v. Ashley, 
623 A.2d 984,986(Vt. 1993)(court ruled that the trial judge erred 
in admitting perhaps all sixteen convictions to impeach the 
accused, including convictions for burglary and thirteen 
convictions for false pretense.)
89.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 
S.W.3d 20, 26(Ark. 2002)(named civil plaintiff); Label Systems, 
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Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703(Con. 2004)(civil plaintiff 
CEO);  State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998)(prosecution witness-
victim); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con., 1992)(prosecution 
witness); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461 (Del., 1995)(prosecution 
witness); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at 742(Ga., 2000)(civil 
party witness); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d 462,463-465(Ga., 
1999)(prosecution witness); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 
1991)(prosecution witness) 
90.  State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033(Con., 2002)(prosecution 
witness); State v. Sauris, 631 A.2d 238, 248(Con., 
1993)(prosecution witness); State v. Carter, 636 A.2d 821,831(Con., 
1994)(prosecution witness); Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405(Del., 
2004)(prosecution witness-alleged victim); Harris v. State, 695 
A.2d 34, 42-43(Del., 1997)(three prosecution witnesses); McClure v. 
State, 603 S.E.2d 224, 227-228(Ga., 2004)(prosecution witness; Ely 
v. State, 529 S.E.2d 886, 889(Ga., 2000)(defense witnesses); Hawes 
v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667(Ga., 1996)(prosecution witness); 
O'Neal v. Kammin 430 S.E.2d 586, 587(Ga., 1993)(civil defendant); 
Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga., 1991)(civil party in a 
divorce proceeding); Fuller v. Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho, 
1991)(civil plaintiff); Martin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1213(Ind., 
2000)(prosecution witness); Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125, 
134(Ind., 2000)(prosecution witness); State v. Diggs, 34 P.3d 63, 
69(Kan., 2001)(prosecution witness); State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 
N.W.2d 635(Minn., 1995)(prosecution witness); In the Matter of the 
Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency, 905 P.2d 148, 195(Mont, 
1995)(co-claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding)); State v. 
Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(defense witness); State v. 
Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont.,1993)(prosecution witness)
91. Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343-344(Ark., 2004); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20 (Ark. 
2002); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993); State v. 
Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 
521(Con., 1992); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 
2002); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(propensity 
evidence admitted on theory that previously guilty now claiming 
innocence of the same crime, must by lying); Webb v. State, 663 
A.2d 452, 461(Del., 1995); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 
825(Del., 1994); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at 742(Ga., 2000); 
State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999); State v. Muraco, 968 P.2d 
225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257-1258(Idaho, 
1997); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams, 670 
N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 
324(Ill., 1990); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000); State 
v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 1998); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 
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1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me., 
1995); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995); State v. 
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993); Com. v. Pursell, 724 
A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860-
861(S.D., 1993); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991); Norris 
v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995);State v. Rivers, 
921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 
908(Wa., 1991); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991).  For 
documentation of why these convictions fail to satisfy even the 
basic relevance test see Holley, supra note 1 at notes 194-199, and 
accompanying text. 
92.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343(Ark., 2004){aggravated 
robbery, kidnapping, and rape); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions 
Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20, 26(Ark. 2002)(check 
kiting/felony theft); Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 
1993)(drug possession); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 37(Con., 
1998)(larceny); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521, 529(Con., 
1992)(conspiracy to commit murder); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 
1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(two drug distribution convictions); Fennell 
v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(delivery of a controlled 
substance); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461(Del., 
1995)(shoplifting); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 
1994)(five convictions, including a felony conviction for arson and 
a misdemeanor theft conviction); Pope v. Fields, 536 S.E.2d 740, at 
742(Ga., 2000)(sexual battery); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 
894(Idaho, 2001)(conspiracy to commit robbery); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(lewd and lascivious conduct); State 
v. Muraco, 968 P.2d 225(Idaho, 1998)(lewdness with a minor); State 
v. Bush, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257-1258(Idaho, 1997)(immoral acts with a 
child); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001)(escape 
and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon); People v. Atkinson, 713 
N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(two burglary convictions); People v. 
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(aggravated battery); 
People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 1990)(rape and attempted 
murder); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239(Ind., 2000)(confinement); 
State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108,110(Me., 1998)(theft, escape, and 
possession of the firearm); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198(Me., 
1995)(theft and burglary); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1110-
1111(Me. 1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and for armed 
robbery); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 12-15(Md., 1995)(thefts); 
State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(distribution of 
cocaine); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(burglary, 
possession of a controlled substance, and criminal sexual conduct);
State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(criminal sexual 
assault); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft(a 
bike) and  theft by deception); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 
860-861(S.D., 1993)(aggravated assault and escape); State v. Loop, 
477 N.W.2d 40,(S.D., 1991) (two convictions for sexual contact with 
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a minor); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 
1995)(murder); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 
1996)(attempted robbery and robbery); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 
907, 908(Wa., 1991)(receipt of stolen property); State v. Ray, 806 
P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991)(theft in this case and misdemeanor theft 
and shoplifting based on the overruling of a prior decision by the 
court)
93.  State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 40(n.13)(Con., 1998)(court makes 
reference to its own precedent to approve trial court tactic of 
admitting felony convictions(in this case arson) to impeach a 
prosecution witness, but prohibiting reference to the name of the 
underlying felony)
94.  Id. The judge's jury instructions expressly made reference to 
the admission of the accused felony conviction to impeach; followed 
by an admonition to use that fact only to evaluate the credibility 
of the accused as witness.  With regard to the case evidence see 
infra note 95, and accompanying text.  
95.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 272-273(Ariz., 2001)(trial judge 
authorized the prosecutor to only ask accused if he testified if he 
had been previously convicted of two felonies.  The judge's 
decision was caused by the fact that the two prior offenses were 
felony sexual offenses, and the accused was currently on trial for 
a felony sex offense.  The judge therefore felt a fair policy 
resolution was to "sanitize"(no reference by name) the convictions 
that he nevertheless thought remained relevant to impeach as 
unspecified felonies.  Immediately after the prosecution completed 
cross-examining the accused, two jurors passed notes asking about 
the specific name/nature of the two prior felony convictions, and 
one expressly asked were the convictions for sexual offenses.  
96.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 343-344(Ark., 2004)(court 
authorized state to impeach accused if he would have testified at 
his rape trial with a conviction for rape); Pryor v. State, 861 
S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993)(Accused prosecuted for drug dealing.  
Court held that a drug possession conviction was admissible by the 
prosecution to impeach the accused because he testified and claimed 
he was innocent of the current charge.); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 
624, 625(Del. 1997)(delivery of cocaine); Desmond v. State, 654 
A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994){accused on trial for and convicted of 
almost thirty crimes, including three theft charges.  Delaware 
Supreme Court sanctioned admission of a misdemeanor theft 
conviction to impeach the accused's trial testimony); Hudson v. 
State, 521 S.E.2d 810, 816(Ga., 1999)(court sanctioned admission of 
an aggravated assault conviction as impeachment evidence against 
the accused at a trial for murder); State v. Thompson, 977 P.2d 
73
890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(Accused convicted of sexual battery of a 
minor, and assault.  State supreme court sanctioned the admission 
to impeach the accused with the fact of but not the name of his 
conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct); State v. Muraco, 968 
P.2d 225,226(Idaho, 1998)(court sanctioned admission of a 
conviction for lewdness with a minor to impeach an accused on trial 
for lewd conduct with a minor child); State v. Bush, 951 P.2d 
1249,1258(Idaho, 1997)(court sanctioned admission of immoral acts 
with a child conviction, to impeach an accused currently standing 
trial for multiple sexual offenses, including lewd acts with a 
minor); People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(accused 
tried and convicted in the current trial of burglary, was impeached 
with his two prior convictions for the same crime); People v. 
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(accused tried and 
convicted in the current trial of murder, attempted murder, and 
aggravated battery with a firearm, was impeached with his prior 
conviction for aggravated battery); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 
324, 350(Ill., 1990)(accused tried and convicted of two counts of 
murder and two counts of rape in the current trial.  Trial judge 
authorized and state supreme court sanctioned use of prior 
convictions for attempted murder and rape); State v. Warren, 661 
A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 1995)(Accused convicted by jury of gross 
sexual assault.  Trial judge admitted and state supreme court 
affirmed the admission of accused's convictions for assault with a 
dangerous weapon and for armed robbery to impeach); Jackson v. 
State, 668 A.2d 8, 11 and 12(Md., 1995)(prosecutor characterized 
theft as crime of dishonesty, and Maryland Court of Appeals made 
deceit characterization.  Three theft convictions used to impeach 
the accused, currently being prosecuted for theft); State v. Ihnot, 
575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(Defense attorney expressly argued 
that admission of a felony conviction for criminal sexual conduct, 
in the current trial for the same charge, was so unfairly 
prejudicial that it would prevent accused from testifying.  Accused 
did not testify at trial, and presented no other evidence); State 
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993)(Accused prosecuted and 
convicted of first degree murder and rape of a fourteen year old 
girl.  State Supreme Court sanctioned the admission of a felony 
sexual assault conviction against the accused) State v. Loop, 477 
N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991)(Court sanctioned admission of sexual contact 
with a minor to impeach the accused in a case in which the accused 
was charged with sexual contact with a child.); Norris v. State, 
902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(murder conviction when the 
accused was on trial for capital murder); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 
495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(Accused charged with robbery. State Supreme 
court sanctioned trial judge's decision to admit attempted robbery 
and robbery convictions.  Trial court sought, and state supreme 
court sanctioned, attempt to temper the unfairly prejudicial impact 
of the admission of these identical to current charge crimes having 
prosecutor omit their names and generically characterize them as 
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felonies); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(receipt 
of stolen property prosecution.  Court sanctioned admission of a 
receipt of stolen property conviction to impeach the accused).  See 
also State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 40(Con., 1998)(Connecticut 
Supreme Court expressly restated without criticism trial judge's 
decision to sanction the impeachment of the accused with a robbery 
conviction when he testified in his own defense at his current 
robbery prosecution.  Jury was not told the name of the crime, but 
the accused admitted on direct examination of having been 
previously convicted of a felony.  Accused appeal attorney, 
apparently felt that there was no strong basis to appeal the 
admission of this identical crime conviction).  For documentation 
of why all convictions, and particularly similar crime convictions 
do in fact cause unfair prejudice see Holley, supra note 1 at 211 -
218, and accompanying text. 
97.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 275-76(Ariz., 2001)(current 
charges were for sexual assault and sexual abuse.  Two fifteen year 
old convictions of the accused that the state supreme court ruled 
should have been excluded, were for felony sexually related 
offenses); Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645,(Ga., 2001)(accused tried 
for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and court held 
that it was uncorrected but not reversible error for the prosecutor 
to make reference to a prior conviction for possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166,167(Ill., 
2001)(felony theft and burglary convictions even if not named 
should not have been admitted to impeach the accused currently 
charged with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle); Com. v. 
Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(accused trial charges included 
possession of an instrument of crime.  Court ruled that it was 
uncorrected error for the trial judge to authorize admission 
among other crimes of two possession of weapons convictions); State 
v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120(Ten., 1999)(court held it was error to 
authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused should he testify, 
even if no reference to the name of the crime was permitted, with a 
conviction for robbery when the accused was currently undergoing 
trial for robbery and other crimes); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 
33, 35(Ten., 1999)(court held it was error for trial judge to 
authorize admission to impeach with convictions for burglary and 
larceny at a trial of the accused for crimes including burglary and 
theft); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, 674-675(Tenn., 
1999)(court held it was error for trial judge to authorize 
admission to impeach the accused with sexual battery conviction.  
The accused was currently on trial for sexual battery, attempted 
rape, and attempted incest)); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 
881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(court ruled that the accused's arson 
conviction should have been excluded as a basis to impeach the 
accused on trial for possession and delivery of cocaine); State v. 
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Ashley, 623 A.2d 984,987(Vt. 1993){court ruled that perhaps all 
sixteen prior convictions were improperly admitted, and must be 
excluded at the retrial on serious sexual offenses); State v. 
Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of a controlled 
substance by prescription fraud, and state sought to admit a 
possession of a controlled substance conviction) 
98.  Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002); State v. 
Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(State supreme court 
sanctioned the admission of a criminal sexual conduct felony 
conviction to impeach the accused should he choose to testify 
during the trial of the current charge for criminal sexual conduct. 
Defendant's attorney did argue that the criminal sexual conduct 
charge was so unfairly prejudicial that it would prevent accused 
from testifying.  Trial judge ruled that conviction would be 
admitted to impeach.  Accused did not testify at trial. 
99. State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 583(Minn. 1998)(court reviewed 
trial judge's findings at hearing which resulted in trial judge's 
conclusion that he would admit the conviction to impeach the 
accused.  Trial judge reasoning so flawed that it arguably 
constituted violation of due process(note intermediate Minnesota 
appellate court ruled that trial judge's ruling violated state and 
national constitution's guarantees that the accused has a right to 
testify at her trial) 
100.  State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(State 
Supreme court sanctioned trial judge's decision to admit attempted 
robbery and robbery convictions on theory that the judge tempered 
the unfairly prejudicial impact of the per se admission of these 
convictions in the current robbery prosecution, by omitting their 
names. 
101.  State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, and 674-675(Tenn., 
1999)(sexual battery conviction approved by trial judge to impeach 
the accused witness who was currently charged with sexual battery, 
attempted rape, and attempted incest) 
102.  Id. 
103.   Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240(Ind., 2000) 
104.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 273-274(Ariz., 2001)(federal 
rule's legislative history relied upon in the context of evaluating 
admissibility considerations when a conviction which is offered to 
impeach is more than ten years old); State v. Sauris, 631 A.2d 238, 
248-249(n.14)(Con., 1993)(federal rule standard is rough bench mark 
for determining if a conviction is too old to be admitted); Archie 
v. State, 721 A.2d 924, 927(n.7)(Del., 1998)(reliance upon notes 
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from the federal congress, judiciary center, and the advisory 
committee to the effect that the federal rules should be considered 
as part of the comments prepared by the Delaware Study Committee on 
the Delaware Rules of Evidence); Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 
8,12(Md., 1995); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 879(Tx. Cr. App., 
1993)
105.   Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 13(Md., 1995); Theus v. State, 
845 S.W.2d 874, 879(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(Court expressly asserted 
that the federal courts interpretation of the federal rule will be 
some guidance to the court in interpreting the state evidence rules 
when the state evidence rule is similar, even if not identical in 
all respects to the prior enacted comparable federal rule). See 
also State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1050(n.30)(Con., 2002)(federal 
standard "not our own, but serves as a rough bench mark in 
evaluating whether the trial judge abused discretion in making 
admission of conviction to impeach evaluation) 
106.  Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 13(Md., 1995).  With regard to 
the federal rule commentary see discussion supra note 21, and 
accompanying text. 
107.  Id. at 12-13.
108.  See supra fourteen cases cited in footnote 86; Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 S.W.3d 20, 
26(Ark. 2002)(court reversed at least in substantial part based on 
this error); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36(Con., 1998)(court reversed 
based on this error); State v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521(Con., 
1992)(court did not reverse based on this error); Archie v. State, 
721 A.2d 924, 927(Del., 1998)(court held trial judge had committed 
error in limiting scope of prosecution's impeachment of the accused 
with prior convictions, by prohibiting reference to the name/nature 
of the offenses underlying those convictions.  Court did not 
reverse based on this error); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461 
(Del., 1995)(court reversed based on this error); Ely v. State, 529 
S.E.2d 886, 889(Ga., 2000)(court did not reverse based on this 
error); Sapp v. State, 520 S.E.2d 462,463-465(Ga., 1999)(court 
reversed based on this error); Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 
(Ga., 1991)(court reversed based on this error); State v. Bristow, 
882 P.2d 1041, 1044(Mont. 1994)(court reversed based on this 
error); State v. Ray, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228(Wa., 1991)(court had 
already reversed conviction on another grounds) 
109.  Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(court held 
that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to make the 
required balancing evaluation before strongly indicating that he 
thought a kidnapping conviction was admissible to impeach the 
accused); Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002);
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Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994); McClure v. State, 
603 S.E.2d 224, 227-228(Ga., 2004); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 
894(Idaho, 2001); State v. Lobozzo, 719 A.2d 108, 110(Me., 1998);
State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198, 200(Me., 1995); State v. Giddens, 
642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(see discussion infra note ___ and 
accompanying text) State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860-861(S.D., 
1993); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 860-861(S.D., 1993)(trial 
judge conclusionarily stated that he thought the name of the 
convictions of aggravated assault and escape should be admitted if 
the accused testified because he felt that the convictions are more 
probative than they are prejudicial. The South Dakota Supreme 
Court only required that this conclusion appear in the record.) 
State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 34(Tenn., 1999)(court noted but did 
not evaluate the reasons why the trial judge first ruled that seven 
identical crime convictions were inadmissible because of the danger 
of unfair prejudice, but subsequent prosecution research for some 
unstated reason convinced that judge to admit all seven burglary
convictions to impeach as crimes the jury could be told were crimes 
involving dishonesty).  The failure to assess the basis of the 
trial judge's change of heart, occurred despite the fact, that less 
than six months earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that 
it was good practice for trial judges to place on the record their 
reasons for finding that a conviction was relevant to impeach,
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661,674(Tenn., 1999); State v. Ashley, 
623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt. 1993)(court failed to identify where in the 
trial record the judge performed the analysis required by the rule 
to determine the admissibility of sixteen convictions it admitted 
to impeach the accused.  The Vermont rule expressly required the 
trial judge to make such findings on the record.); State v. 
Calegar, 947 P.2d 235, 237-240(Wa., 1997); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 
1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)
110. See the authority discussed in the text and notes immediately 
following this note, and see also infra notes 112 - 113, 123 - 134, 
143 - 146; 148 - 150, 158 - 169. For cases in which these state 
supreme courts did competently perform the evaluation required by 
their rules, or established procedures to encourage such reviews, 
or both, see infra. note 118 - 119, 138 - 139, 153 - 154, and 
accompanying text.
111.  See supra note 91, and accompanying text.  For state supreme 
court decisions from these courts recognizing that there was doubt 
about the relevance or no relevance to prove propensity to lie 
simply because a conviction was for a crime punishable by more than 
a year in jail, see infra notes 153 -154, and 170, and accompanying 
text. 
112.  Mann v. State, 541 S.E.2d 645, 648(Ga., 2001)(case overruled 
was Kyler v. State, 508 S.E.2d 152(Ga., 1998).  Court also 
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acknowledged that trial judge had authorized prosecution to admit 
in its case-in-chief, and the supreme court did not question, an 
identical crime conviction as a "similar transaction".  See also 
Francis v. State, 463 S.E.2d 859,861(Ga., 1995)(The court ruled it 
was harmless error for the trial judge to give the jury an 
instruction authorizing the jury to use a conviction of the 
accused, properly admitted to counter specific testimony given by 
the accused, as a basis to generally infer propensity to lie.  
Harmless error finding was based in part on the fact the judge did 
subsequently tell the jury the appropriate use of the conviction)
113.  Hudson v. State, 521 S.E.2d 810, 814-816(Ga., 1999)(by the 
court's own acknowledgement, the conviction, prior to the 
prosecution's question, was inadmissible for any purpose.  The 
Georgia impeachment rule required the accused to put his character 
at issue.  It is difficult to understand how multiple justices on 
the state's highest court could so badly misconstrue their own 
rule) 
114.  With regard to the Montana Supreme Court's policy advocacy, 
see infra notes 138 - 139, and accompanying text.  See also State 
v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1050(n.32)(Con., 2002)(contrary to appeal 
claim of accused, state supreme court found that trial judge at 
least asserted that he understood an element of his evaluation was 
to conduct a balancing evaluation) 
115.  People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181(Ill., 2004)(three 
consolidated cases); People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864(Ill., 
2001); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166(Ill., 2001); People v. 
Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)
116.  People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181, 191(Ill., 2004)(in these 
three consolidated cases, trial judges had deliberately ignored 
recent state supreme court rulings condemning avoiding the rule's 
balancing standard by per se admitting any felony conviction to 
impeach, but admitting only the "mere fact" of conviction without 
identifying the underlying crime); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 
166(Ill., 2001)
117. People v. Harvey, 813 N.E.2d 181, 191-192(Ill., 2004)(three 
consolidated cases, and state supreme court in all three cases, 
despite acknowledging that the trial judges defied the court's 
mandate to apply the rule standard and balance exclusionary 
concerns against probative value before a conviction was admitted 
to impeach, nevertheless found reasons to not reverse any of the 
current convictions on this basis) 
118.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 274(Ariz., 2001)(restating rule 
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standards, adding its multi-factor totality approach, and listing 
approximately nine specific factors from that approach); State v. 
Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033, 1049(Con., 2002); State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 
36, 41(Con., 1998)(inherent authority of trial courts is
particularly applicable to screen felony convictions by evaluating 
and balancing unfair prejudice against probative value before 
admitting to impeach.  But in a recent decision, Label Systems, 
Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 718(Con. 2004)the court 
asserted that with regard to this standard, the normative rule that 
the proponent of evidence has the burden of proving its 
admissibility, was reversed, and therefore the opponent of 
admitting a conviction to impeach, had the burden to prove there is 
sufficient unfair prejudice to justify its exclusion); State v. 
Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 578(n.7) and 588(Haw., 2001); People v. 
Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001)(restatement of balancing 
standard, and review of record to determine if trial judge followed 
it); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 169-171(Ill., 2001)(reviewing 
in detail the rule standard, its evolution, and policy basis); 
People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); State v. 
Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120,122(Ten., 1999)(balancing test must be made 
by focused on rule policies and not speculation about significance 
of the potential testimony of the accused); State v. Mixon, 983 
S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999)(the Tennessee Supreme Court cited, 
with apparent approval, a jurisdiction specific secondary source's 
assertions, that trial judges should state for the record their 
assessment of the relevance of the crime underlying the conviction 
to prove propensity to lie); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt. 
1993)(The court resorted to its own guidelines developed prior to 
the adoption of the current substantive rule as the basis for 
determining the admissibility of convictions to impeach.  The Court 
relied on the reporter's notes to the rule which expressly stated 
that its intent was not to displace the court's guidelines. The 
Court failed to recognize, however, that its former guidelines were 
inconsistent and far more imprecise that the analysis required by 
the rule.  These guidelines were developed in cases, including a 
1981 decision all prior to the 1989 rule.  At the same time, the 
court noted that the purpose of the amendment was to provide two 
different balancing standards, one applicable to convictions for
crimes of untruthfulness and falsification which was to ease 
admission, and the other to make the admission of other 
preliminarily qualifying convictions more difficult.  Court then 
proceeded to reach a decision that was contra to its own 
restatement of the purpose of the newly enacted rule.  The Vermont 
Supreme Court identified its guidelines as including consideration 
of the number of convictions, the age of the convictions, and the 
importance of the accused testifying and the prosecution's need to 
impeach that testimony with the convictions.  The court omitted 
policy evaluation of why these factors should be used instead of 
focus on policy factors and sequence of those factors found in the 
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current specific rule, and in other evidence rules, most 
pertinently rule 403.  Here for example rule content and structure 
would require the trial judge and subsequently the state supreme 
court to first focus on whether each crime qualified as a crime of 
untruthfulness or falsification.  Neither apparently performed even 
this first step.  Neither made the required assessment of the 
unfair prejudice that would result from the admission of each 
conviction to impeach.  Hence the state supreme court took a gross 
approach to determining admissibility or exclusion of all sixteen 
convictions on an all or nothing premise); State v. Calegar, 947 
P.2d 235, 237(Wa., 1997)(court cited with approval its own decision 
which added on to the analytical evaluation required by the 
standards of its rule, the court's six policy factors to be
evaluated in determining the admissibility to impeach of a "felony" 
conviction. This state supreme court decided upon the following 
apparently non-sequential and non-prioritized heuristics: length of 
defendant's criminal record, the remoteness of the prior 
conviction, the nature of the prior crime, the age and 
circumstances of the defendant, the centrality of the credibility 
issue, and the impeachment value of the prior conviction); State v. 
Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(State supreme court 
expressly held that proponent of conviction has burden of proof to 
satisfy standards of rule to gain admission of a conviction for 
purpose of impeachment.  Court cited with approval its earlier 
decision which required trial judges to state on the record the 
factors which favored the admission and the factors which favored 
exclusion of the conviction to impeach.  Court characterized 
adherence to this protocol as imperative to assure a proper record 
for appellate court review of the trial judge's decision.  Court 
also required that trial judges place on the record their 
evaluation of the next crucial step, balancing of exclusionary 
policy concerns against the probative value of the conviction as 
evidence of a propensity to lie.  This step was required when the 
basis of preliminary qualifying the conviction for admission to 
impeach was that it was punishable by a maximum term of more than a 
year in jail); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 499(Wa., 1996)(State 
supreme court faithful to standards for admission of convictions to 
impeach as established by its rule as evidenced by reference to 
sequential inquiries required by rule, and requiring trial courts 
in exercising their discretion to follow that sequence on the 
record including the ultimate balancing phase of the standard.  But 
see Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 879(n.6)(Tx. Cr. App., 
1993)(court refused an express defense attorney request that it 
correct this trial judge, and require all trial judges to put on 
the record the balancing evaluation required by rule.  The court 
reasoned that because the Texas rule did not expressly require such 
record making, it would not require it.) ]
119. The six  states not admitting any such convictions during the 
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study period were Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, Tennessee, and 
Vermont.  See supra note 91, and accompanying text. 
120.  With regard to the Kansas Supreme Court's rule and policy 
evaluations see supra note 86, and infra note 142.  With regard to 
the Montana Supreme Court's prohibition and the court's advocacy of 
the policy supporting the prohibition, see infra notes 138 - 139, 
and accompanying text.
121.   State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 41-46(Con., 1998);  People v. 
Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People v. Atkinson, 713 
N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-
499(Wa., 1996)
122.  State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996).  See 
discussion infra. notes 148 - 149, and accompanying text.
123.  State v. Dobson, 602 A.2d 977, 982-983(Con., 
1992)(sanctioning trial judge ruling that a prosecution witness' 
narcotics felony conviction could be used to impeach her, provided 
no reference was made to the name of the crime.  Court endorsed 
general resort to this tactic, whenever the felony conviction was 
for a crime not having direct relevance to credibility); State v. 
Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521, 529(Con., 1992)
124.  Id.; State v. Carter, 636 A.2d 821,831(n.21)(Con., 1994)
125.  State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 44-45(Con., 1998)  
126.   Id.  See discussion infra notes 229, 255 - 256, and 
accompanying text.
127.  Label Systems, Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 717(Con. 
2004)(court cited with approval its precedent sanctioning the 
admission to impeach the accused with a conviction for breaking and 
entering that was more than a decade old, endorsing the 
conclusionary characterization of minimal unfair prejudice that 
resulted from its admission) 
128.  State v. Askew, 716 A.2d 36, 42(Con., 1998)  
129.  People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v. 
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
130.  People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 880(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v. 
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Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
131.  People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,535-538(Ill., 1999); People v. 
Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 
N.E.2d 316, 350(Ill., 1990)
132.  People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,537(Ill., 1999); People v. Williams, 
670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 
324(Ill., 1990)
133.  People v. Casillas, 749 N.E.2d 864, 881(Ill., 2001); People 
v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532,537(Ill., 1999)(accused claim of 
innocence rested principally on his testimony and therefore his 
credibility.  Therefore the two prior burglary convictions were 
crucial to assessing that credibility.  Not a single justice on the 
Illinois Supreme Court gave an indication that they realized that 
this was an admission of use of the evidence for the prohibited 
substantive purpose of proving guilt, by proving lying about his 
current claim of innocence because he was guilty of the same crime 
twice before); People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996);
People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 1990)
134. People v. Atkinson, 713 N.E.2d 532(Ill., 1999)(accused tried 
and convicted in the current trial of burglary, was impeached with 
his two prior convictions for the same crime); People v. Williams, 
670 N.E.2d 638, 654(Ill., 1996)(accused tried and convicted in the 
current trial of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery 
with a firearm, was impeached with his prior conviction for 
aggravated battery); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 324(Ill., 
1990)(accused tried and convicted of two counts of murder and two 
counts of rape in the current trial.  Trial judge authorized and 
state supreme court sanctioned use of prior convictions for 
attempted murder and rape)  
135. The fourteen state rules being interpreted by the state 
supreme courts were those of Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Montana, *South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.  See discussion Holley, supra note 1 
at notes 42, 44, 48-49, 52, 74-78, 82, 88-90, 95-98, 100-102,     
105 - 110, and 120 - 121, and accompanying text.   
136.  See Holley supra note 1, at notes 42, 47 - 49, 52, 74, 83, 
89-90, 98, 102, 106, and 121, and accompanying text.
137.   The 10 states were Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont.  See discussion 
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Holley, supra note 1 at notes 44, 51, 74, 88, 105, 110, and 121, 
and accompanying text.
138.  See Holley supra note 1  at notes 42-43, and accompanying 
text. The four other states were Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, and West 
Virginia. 
139. In the Matter of the Seizure of $23,691.00 in U.S. Currency, 
905 P.2d 148, 153(Mont., 1995); State v. Bristow, 882 P.2d 1041, 
1044(Mont. 1994)(the admission of any conviction as "inherently 
prejudicial"); State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249, 259(Mont., 1993)
(court cited with approval in earlier decision in which it had 
asserted that with regard to eyewitnesses, evidence of previous 
misconduct of such a witness was wholly unrelated to the person's 
ability to observe, recall, or testify to the relevant occurrences. 
 Court also held that Gollehon's right to confrontation was not 
violated by the trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses' past criminal conduct.)  
140.  State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 587-589(Haw., 2001)(court made 
its own assessment, and asserted that petty theft is not per 
se(apparently reference to element analysis) a crime of 
"dishonesty".  Hence court eventually ruled only if specific 
circumstances of the theft, by their very nature, made conviction 
at least relevant and perhaps have added probative value may the 
conviction be admitted to impeach.  Court reviewed record and found 
no specific finding by trial judge that circumstances of theft were 
relevant to prove propensity to lie.  Court than made its own 
evaluation of the record and found that the only "evidence" at 
pretrial hearing was that theft involved shoplifting from a church. 
 Hence conviction should not have been admitted to impeach); State 
v. Maier, 977 P.2d 298, 308(Mont., 1998); State. v. Martin, 926 P2d 
1380 (Mont., 1996)(Court ruled that the trial court properly 
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the accused wife as to 
whether she had provided false alibi testimony, but by prohibiting 
it from inquiring whether she had been convicted of perjury).  See 
also State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 231, 249(Haw., 2001)(court ruled that 
conduct that was basis for a pending charge of forgery by making 
false identifications by the accused so that he could assume the 
name of another real person was admissible because its rule barring 
conviction evidence did not preclude its use) 
141.  State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572(Haw., 2001); Fuller v. Wolters, 
807 P.2d 633(Idaho, 1991); State v. Diggs, 34 P.3d 63(Kan., 2001); 
State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540(Me., 2000); State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 
33,35(Ten., 1999); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135(Vt., 2002)
142.  State v. Pacheco, 26 P.3d 572, 586 and 589(Haw., 
2001)(rejecting attempt to admit accused's theft/shoplifting 
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conviction as involving dishonesty or false statement); Fuller v. 
Wolters, 807 P.2d 633, 639(Idaho, 1991)(sanctioning exclusion of 
misdemeanor failure to file income tax return); State v. Diggs, 34 
P.3d 63, 69(Kan., 2001)(affirmed exclusion of a prosecution 
witness' convictions of aggravated indecent liberties with a child 
and aggravated sexual battery, when by rule only convictions 
involving crimes of dishonesty or false statement could be admitted 
to impeach.  Court did not undertake a policy analysis.  Instead it 
referred to one of its earlier decisions in which it had held that 
these convictions did not involve dishonesty or false statement); 
State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33,35(Ten., 1999)(court ruled it was 
error for the trial judge to authorize the state to impeach the 
accused with eight unspecified felony convictions, all of which the 
state referred to as felonies of dishonesty.  The court rejected 
the trial judge's apparent attempt to reach what that judge viewed 
as an appropriate policy compromise which on the one hand admitted 
all of the convictions to impeach, but on the other required 
striking the specific names of the convictions which was similar or 
identical to the current charges(burglary and theft convictions and 
current charge).
143.  State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 1135, 1137(Vt., 2002)(Accused 
convicted after jury trial of three crimes, larceny from the 
person, attempted assault, and robbery.  Vermont Supreme Court 
sanctioned admission to impeach the accused with convictions for 
attempted fraud and false pretense.  Court made no reference to the 
elements of either crime, or to the facts in the particular case 
that were proof of those elements as the basis to justify its 
characterizations of these crimes); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 
986(Vt. 1993). 
144.  State v. Gray, 755 A.2d 540, 544-545(Me., 2000)(on appeal the 
accused expressly asserted that the trial judge abused its 
discretion by failing to apply the proper balancing test required 
by the state's evidence rule, and by failing to recognize that the 
admission of all fourteen convictions(nine of them for forgery and 
five of them for unsworn falsification) significantly compounded 
the unfair prejudice.  State supreme court held that the 
convictions were not so similar to the current charge as to be 
unfairly prejudicial.  The court concluded that there was no abuse 
of discretion, even if the error was properly preserved for normal 
appellate review.  Without reference to empirical or any other 
evidential basis, the court implied that the only unfair prejudice 
it was willing to recognize as a significant danger when prior 
convictions are admitted to impeach, was when the conviction was 
"similar" to the current charge(s).  This view is not provided for 
in the language of the state's rule.  The court implicitedly found 
in this case that the potential admission of fourteen convictions 
would not cumulatively cause any significant unfair prejudice to 
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the defendant had he chosen to testify.  This view contradicts 
evidence available to the court, and is not provided for in the 
language or in the policy underlying the state's rule); State v. 
Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn., 1999); State v. Setien, 795 A.2d 
1135, 1137(Vt., 2002)(Accused convicted after jury trial of three 
crimes, larceny from the person, attempted assault, and robbery.  
Vermont Supreme Court agreed with trial judge conclusion at end of 
required balancing that the probative value to prove propensity to 
lie of two conviction, one for attempted fraud and one for false 
pretense, was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
The Court's assessment re probative value of these convictions as 
proof of propensity to lie was conclusionary only.  Court's unfair 
prejudice assessment was also purely speculative, since it did not 
know the nature of the testimony of the accused, or provide 
criteria for evaluating how the jury was to assess that testimony 
or the accused guilt in light of the admission of these two 
criminal convictions.  Court made no reference to pertinent 
empirical research on the likely magnitude of unfair prejudice that 
would result from admission of two prior criminal convictions) 
145.  State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn., 1999)(Accused 
decided not to testify.  But these policy considerations should 
have been evaluated by the state supreme court, especially since 
the court proceeded to make a harmless error evaluation that failed 
to take into account these policy considerations.) 
146.  These six states were Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington 
147.  Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(its 1992 
opinion expressly cited with approval for proposition that 
"dishonesty" means the act or practice of cheating, deceiving, 
defrauding, lying, or stealing). 
148.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 
S.W.3d 20, 28(Ark. 2002)(court asserted that crime of check kiting 
is "clearly" crime of dishonesty.  Court defined crime by reference 
to definition in Black's Law Dictionary, but made no reference to 
felony theft elements of the offense as they appeared in the 
Arkansas Penal Code that was the actual basis for the conviction.  
That dictionary definition contained no culpability concept.  That 
definition included reference to concept of "hoping".  That 
definition ties "hoping" to a mind set of the accused at the time 
of the submission of the check that it was possible that funds will 
be deposited before the check is "deposited". Hence court failed 
to recognize that by its own definition, it is not clear that such 
a person "knows" that there will be inadequate funds in the bank, 
but only he is aware of that risk(recklessness).  Court used
conclusionary language "clearly" without even attempting an element 
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analysis to demonstrate that crime is one involving "dishonesty".  
Most crucially court made no attempt to identify the appropriate 
culpable mental state for the crucial objective element of 
"inadequate funds".  Hence there is a conceptual flaw in the 
court's implication that the accused is aware his conduct was 
dishonest);  Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 452, 461 (Del., 1995)(the 
Delaware Supreme Court, without an explanation, has defined crimes
of dishonesty to include misdemeanor shoplifting, and ruled that 
the crime's admission was mandatory to impeach a prosecution 
witness: Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 
1994)(characterization of misdemeanor theft as crime of dishonesty 
sanctioned by state supreme court); Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 
310(Pa., 1999)(theft and theft by deception.  Court holding was in 
the context of an appeal in a case in which the trial had occurred 
prior to the 1998 adoption of the current evidence rule regulating
the admission of convictions to impeach.  The court made no 
reference to the rule.  Court did make reference to its own 
standard as modified in its 1987 decision in Com. v. Randall, 528 
P.2d 1326(Pa., 1987).  In that case, the supreme court purported to 
adopt the federal rule standard with regard to the accused in a 
criminal case, requiring automatic admission of crimes of 
"dishonesty" and "false statement".  In apparent ignorance, 
however, of the restrictive definition of those concepts in the 
commentary to the federal rule, the court found the admission of a 
burglary conviction to impeach the accused was justified.); State 
v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(State supreme court 
cited its own precedent to conclusionarily assert, apparently as a 
settled matter, that all crimes that involve theft, such as the 
robbery and attempted robbery convictions in this case, per se 
involve "dishonesty", and therefore are per se admissible to 
impeach any witness.); State v. Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 
1991)(State supreme court reaffirmed position established in its 
precedent which held that crimes of theft per se involve dishonesty 
and are therefore under its evidence rule per se admissible to 
impeach.  Court then held that theft related crimes such as receipt 
of stolen property were also crimes of dishonesty, and therefore 
per se admissible to impeach any witness. 
149.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Department, 69 
S.W.3d 20, 28(Ark. 2002)(check kiting); Webb v. State, 663 A.2d 
452, 461 (Del., 1995)(misdemeanor shoplifting); Desmond v. State, 
654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994)(misdemeanor theft); Com. v. Pursell, 
724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(theft and theft by deception); State 
v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 498-499(Wa., 1996)(all crimes that involve 
theft, such as the robbery and attempted robbery); State v. 
Mckinsey, 810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(theft and theft related 
crimes such as receipt of stolen property)
150. See Holley supra note 1 at 192 - 199, and accompanying text.
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151.  Com. v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 310(Pa., 1999)(capital murder 
conviction affirmed.  Among appeals issues raised by accused and 
rejected by Pennsylvania Supreme Court was claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective for "drawing the sting" strategy of asking accused 
about prior convictions for theft(a bike) and for theft by 
deception.  Supreme Court ruled that the strategy was not 
ineffective because both convictions were for crimes falsi, and 
therefore could have been introduced by the prosecution to impeach. 
 State Supreme Court cited to its own 1973 decision as authority 
for this proposition.  No reference by the court to the 1998 
evidence rule.  Hence court apparently assumed that since rule had 
no definitions of "dishonesty" or "false statement" its prior 
decisions interpreting these concepts remained good law.  No policy 
analysis by the court on this issue)
152.  Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(expressly 
quoting its 1992 decision in Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 
1204(Del., 1992) for the proposition that "dishonesty" encompasses 
five distinct concepts, and one of those concepts was stealing);  
State v. Mitchell, 817 P.2d 398, 406(Wa., 1991); State v. Mckinsey, 
810 P.2d 907, 908(Wa., 1991)(State supreme court reaffirmed 
position established in its precedent which held that crimes of 
theft per se involve dishonesty and are therefore under its 
evidence rule per se admissible to impeach.  Court then held that 
theft related crimes such as receipt of stolen property were also 
crimes of dishonesty, and therefore per se admissible to impeach 
any witness. The dissent in the case noted that the impact of the 
court's broad definition of crimes of dishonesty to include all 
theft and theft related crimes was a defacto and per se 
impermissible amendment of the rule, and thereby made the 
Washington rule in fact one of the most liberal rules in the 
country for admitting prior convictions to impeach, Id. at 908-910) 
153.  Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 665 (Del. 2002)(Delaware 
Supreme Court concluded without any policy analysis, but with 
approving text reference to an Iowa Supreme Court decision which 
had held that kidnapping was not a crime involving dishonesty); 
Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 42-43(Del., 1997)(court held in the 
context of a trial judge's exclusion of multiple convictions of 
three prosecution witnesses, that convictions for misdemeanor 
criminal mischief, two felony juvenile adjudications, and two 
felony drug trafficking offenses were not offenses involving 
"dishonesty" and "false statement"); State v. Davis, 874 P.2d 1156, 
1162(Kan., 1994)(court affirmed trial court decision that a 
conviction for the felony of possession of cocaine was not a 
conviction for a crime of dishonesty or false statement, and was 
therefore inadmissible to impeach any witness including the 
accused); Com. v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102(Pa., 2000)(two drug 
trafficking convictions and two possession of weapons convictions); 
88
State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,240(Wa., 1997)(possession of a 
controlled substance); and State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1181(Wa., 
1997)(felony drug conviction) 
154.  State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235,237(Wa., 1997)(court expressly 
rejected government's proffered junk science surrogate for 
relevance of a crime to prove propensity to lie, that convictions 
equate to criminal personality, and all criminal personalities have 
a greater propensity to lie, Id. at 238); State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 
1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(Court went on to apply standards to 
conviction it was reviewing, and reconfirmed its repudiation of the 
reality hypotheses that all persons convicted of drugs are 
secretive and sneaky. Instead, the court ruled that such 
convictions have little to do with veracity.)
155.  These eighteen states were Arizona; Arkansas; Connecticut; 
Delaware; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Indiana; Kansas; Maine; Maryland; 
Minnesota; Montana; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Texas; Vermont; and 
Washington.  The two states whose standards for "felonies" was no 
more restrictive than that of the federal rule were Illinois and 
Tennessee; See Holley supra note 1 at notes 96-97, 105-110, 121, 
and accompanying text. 
156.  See Holley supra note 1, at notes 41-125, and accompanying 
text. 
157.  See supra notes 84 and 91 - 92, and accompanying text. 
158.  See supra notes 84, 91 - 92, and 119, and accompanying text. 
159.  See supra notes 85 and 90 , and accompanying text.  See 
further discussion of this discrepancy infra note 175, and 
accompanying text. 
160.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)(court 
acknowledged that attending doctor testified that he found no 
evidence of injury or rape.  Court sanctioned admission, of a prior 
rape felony conviction, as well as two other felony convictions to 
impeach the accused.  Accused did not testify to his version of the 
alleged rape); State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1111(Me. 1995); 
State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993) ]
161.  State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 663, and 674-675(Tenn., 1999) 
162.  Id.
163.  Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881(Tx. Cr. App., 1993)(court 
relied on fatuous fact that relevance is not mentioned in its 
impeachment with convictions rule and therefore does not apply.  
Irrelevant evidence is by logic and evidence code basic structure 
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inadmissible and nothing in passage of federal rule or state rules 
mimicking federal rule supports conclusion that and legislature 
sought to declare a variant on the world is flat fiction, by 
displacing that basic admissions requirement, otherwise applicable 
to all other evidence offered for admission.  See also Norris v. 
State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)(Court adopted 
prosecution red herring argument that convictions are relevant to 
prove likelihood of lying because a capital murder defendant who 
testifies has a "motive to lie".  A person on trial for capital 
murder has a motive to lie to avoid death penalty when such a 
person testifies at guilt stage of trial.  But every criminal 
defendant, and every party, and even other witnesses often have the 
very same motive to lie when they testify because the outcome of 
the trial is personally significant.   The jury knows every person 
with an interests in the outcome has a motive to lie, and the 
introduction of a prior conviction is unnecessary to bring home 
that point.  Besides this "motive to lie" factor does not add an 
iota of relevance to the prior conviction as proof of propensity to 
lie-the standard required by the rule). 
164.  Pryor v. State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993)(Accused 
prosecuted for drug dealing); Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 
626(Del. 1997).  See also discussion supra note 133, and 
accompanying text in which the Illinois Supreme Court took the same 
unjustifiable position.  See also Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 
880(Tx. Cr. App., 1993) in which court fell into the trap of 
converting credibility issue outcome importance into heightened 
relevance for any conviction offered to impeach any witness whose 
testimony was important.  This illogical conclusion includes two 
conceptual errors-false attribution of heightened probative value 
of the conviction to impeach, and failure to recognize that in such 
circumstance the only policy concern that is strengthened is the 
exclusion policy of increased unfair prejudice; See also discussion 
supra notes 76 - 77, and accompanying text.
165.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)
166.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004); Pryor v. 
State, 861 S.W.2d 544, 547(Ark., 1993); Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 
405, 408(Del., 2004)(perfunctory and conclusionary reference to 
balancing evaluation. Sanctioned exclusion of all felony improper 
sexual conduct felonies of a prosecution witness); Walker v. State, 
790 A.2d 1214, 1217(n.2)(Del., 2002)(court reviewed record and 
found that trial judge decided to allow the state to impeach the 
accused with two of five felony convictions.  The two convictions 
the trial judge admitted were the two oldest convictions, 
approximately ten years old, and both indicated that the accused 
was a drug dealer); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 
1994); State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 2001); State v. 
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Thompson, 977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999); State v. Lobozzo, 719 
A.2d 108, 110(Me., 1998)(State supreme court, without reference to 
standards of its rule or application of those standards to the 
facts of this case, in a highly conclusionary fashion, merely 
asserted that all three convictions for theft, escape, and 
possession of a firearm, were relevant to the credibility of the 
accused.  This conclusion of the court is not justified by 
evidence, policy, or reason, and is a clear example of a state 
supreme court failing to follow the admissibility standards of its 
own rule with regard to use of convictions solely to impeach.   
Further the state supreme court completely omitted any reference to 
the rule's requirement that the trial judge, even if she found that 
the conviction had relevance to prove propensity to lie, was 
required to balance, using a balanced scale, that probative value 
against the possibility of unfair prejudice to the accused); State 
v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1111(Me. 1995)(all such serious crime 
convictions are relevant and admissible to prove propensity to 
lie); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994); State v. 
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603(Minn., 1993); State v. Ihnot, 575 
N.W.2d 581, 583, and 586(Minn. 1998); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 
40(S.D., 1991); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 
1995)
167.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004)(state 
supreme court asserted that despite its rule, its practice was to 
admit any felony conviction, including similar crime convictions to 
impeach an accused who testified at his trial.  Court made no 
reference to and no attempt to evaluate the quality and quantity of 
unfair prejudice that resulted from the admission of such 
convictions); Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 825(Del., 1994);
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 664-665(Del. 2002)(court failed to 
evaluate, admissibility under what it acknowledged was a balancing 
evaluation which should have considered the quantity and quality of 
unfair prejudice, of the accused past conviction for assault,  
despite facts that one of the crimes for which the accused was 
presently charged was assault, and the court had decided to remand 
the case for a new trial);  State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890, 894(Idaho, 
2001)(Accused was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed.
Trial judge admitted and supreme court upheld admission of 
conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery to impeach the testimony 
of the accused.  Court erroneously asserted that robbery is 
relevant to prove propensity to lie, and completely ignored 
considerable unfair prejudice the admission would cause because of 
the implication of use of force re robbery.); State v. Thompson,
977 P.2d 890, 893(Idaho, 1999)(Supreme court upheld trial judge's 
admission to impeach the accused of the fact of a felony 
conviction, but prohibited prosecution from making reference to the 
nature of the crime.  The Idaho rule expressly sanctioned this 
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compromise.  Idaho Supreme Court failed to evaluate unfair 
prejudice and jury confusion that was likely to result when only 
the fact of conviction of a felony is admitted.); State v. Muraco, 
968 P.2d 225(Idaho, 1998); State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 
1994); State v. Wright, 662 A.2d 198, 200(Me., 1995)(court 
sanctioned trial court's justification to admit two convictions to 
impeach the accused that the underlying crimes were not crimes of 
violence.  In the very same year, the Maine Supreme Court 
sanctioned admission of convictions of crimes of violence to 
impeach the accused, without comment or evaluation of the likely 
unfair prejudice that would result from the admission of such 
convictions. See State v. Warren, 661 A.2d 1108, 1110-1111(Me. 
1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon and armed robbery convictions 
admitted by trial court to impeach the accused, and that decision 
affirmed by the state supreme court); State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 
581, 583, and 586(Minn. 1998)(court sanctioned admission ostensibly 
only to impeach of a prior felony conviction for a sexual offense 
against a minor.  This was also the charge in the current case.  
The court, despite expressly making reference to Minnesota evidence 
rule's Advisory Committee's assessment that there is inherent 
prejudice in admitting felony convictions theoretically to impeach 
which are not probative on propensity to lie, and that the 
prejudice in such situations is heightened if the potential witness 
is the accused.  Court proceeded to ignore the stated policy 
evaluation of the committee.); State v. Fender, 504 N.W.2d 858, 
860-861(S.D., 1993)(trial judge in granting the prosecution's day 
of trial motion to use convictions to impeach the accused should he 
testify, conclusinarily stated that he thought the name of the 
convictions of aggravated assault and escape should be admitted if 
the accused testified because he felt that the convictions are more 
probative than they are prejudicial); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 
40(S.D., 1991)(two sexual contact with a minor convictions admitted 
in current prosecution for same offense.)
168.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341; 344(Ark., 2004); State v. 
Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 875(Md., 1994)(court upheld admission to 
impeach the accused, charged with assault, of a conviction for 
distribution of cocaine, even after going through steps in 
sequential analysis required by the rule, and completing a policy 
analysis of the first step - relevance of the conviction to prove 
propensity to lie.  The trial judge relied on historical common law 
heuristic-devoid of a scintilla of evidential support, that if a 
crime can be characterized as infamous it therefore can be 
secondarily characterized as vile and it therefore follows that it 
is contrary to acceptable conduct, and it therefore follows that a 
person convicted of such a crime is more likely to commit perjury 
it called as a witness.  The majority opinion of the supreme court 
asserted  that it had in an earlier decisions embraced meritless 
common law position that all violations of the law involve some 
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element of dishonesty, and that this principle applied to sale but 
not possession of drugs.); State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 
603(Minn., 1993)(Accused convicted of first degree murder for rape 
and strangulation death of a fourteen year old girl.  Trial judge 
admitted a conviction for criminal sexual assault to impeach the 
accused, who testified, denying guilt.  Trial judge admitted the 
conviction in part because he chose to ignore the text and policy 
underlying the Minnesota evidence rule, unilaterally reinstated the 
historical rule that without policy support admitted all prior 
felony convictions, and thereby asserted that the conviction was 
admissible to impeach because it gave the jury a basis to make a 
determination of the appellant's credibility.  State supreme court 
sanctioned this decision by asserting that its precedent recognizes 
that the evidence rule by implication must be premised on accepting 
the meritless proposition that any felony conviction is relevant to 
prove propensity to lie); State v. Loop, 477 N.W.2d 40(S.D., 1991); 
Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 440(Tx.Cr.App., 1995)
169.  See supra note 96  and accompanying text.
170.  State v. Green, 29 P.3d 271, 273-276(Ariz., 2001)(court began 
by making the same conceptual error made by so many of these state 
supreme courts---the substitution of a heuristic for real evidence. 
 Here the court began by assuming that felonies were major crimes, 
and all persons convicted of such offenses, even as in this case 
those considerably more than ten years old, were, based on a third 
level inference, more likely to lie.  The court, however, did 
continue its analysis and evaluated other   considerations.  The 
court held that the importance of the testimony and therefore the 
credibility of the accused's testimony was not an adequate 
justification for admitting an old and identical conviction which 
otherwise based on sound policy evaluation should be excluded 
because of its potential for causing unfair prejudice); State v. 
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 674(Tenn., 1999)(State supreme court next 
reviewed record to substantively evaluate whether the trial judge 
adhered to the evaluation protocol it had just outlined.  It 
concluded that the trial judge had failed at each step of the 
protocol.  The trial judge had failed to evaluate and place that 
evaluation on the record of the relevance/probative value of the 
sexual battery conviction to attach the accused/witness' 
credibility.  The court found in the record evidence to warrant 
concluding that the trial judge simply assumed that any felony 
conviction could be used to impeach any witness, including the 
accused in a criminal trial.  Nor did the trial judge evaluate the 
substantial similarity(here identity) of the crime that was the 
basis of the conviction and the charged crimes and the resulting 
unfair prejudice.); State v. Calegar, 947 P.2d 235(Wa., 1997)(court 
reviewed record to find the basis for the trial judge's decision to 
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deny accused motion to exclude his conviction.  Trial judge, 
without any basis in the standards of the state rule, held that the 
conviction was relevant to impeach because a prior conviction could 
provide incentive to lie because if the accused was convicted at 
this trial it could influence the severity of the sentence he 
received.  Of course this reasoning substitutes for an actual 
evaluation of logical nexus as proof of propensity to lie a 
heuristic which would make "relevant" to lying all convictions.  
State supreme court rejected this reasoning); State v. Hardy, 946 
P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997)(Court began its analysis for 
example, by focusing on standard for evaluating if the proffered 
felony conviction, which was not for a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement, was relevant for its only legitimate purpose under the 
rule --- to cast doubt on the likelihood that the witness was 
telling the truth.  The court placed the burden on the proponent of 
the conviction to prove it had probative value to prove propensity 
to lie, because the court took the presumptive policy position that 
few such crimes are probative of veracity.  Court went on to apply 
standards to conviction it was reviewing, and reconfirmed its
repudiation of the reality hypotheses that all persons convicted of 
drugs are secretive and sneaky. Instead, the court ruled that such 
convictions have little to do with veracity.) 
171.  State v. Hardy, 946 P.2d 1175, 1177-1178(Wa., 1997) ]
 (state supreme court took policy position that the admission of 
prior conviction evidence was inherently prejudicial when the 
witness is a defendant in a criminal case because the jury will 
focus on the inappropriate substantive issue of the accused 
propensity for criminality.  The state supreme court supported its 
policy position by reference to two of the empirical studies.  See 
Holley, supra note 1 at 36, 38, 204 - 218, and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 109 - 113, and 121 - 134, and accompanying 
text. 
173.  See supra notes 91 - 92, and accompanying text. 
174.  See supra note 96, and accompanying text. 
175. In Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002), the 
court blamed the accused for not testifying to properly preserve 
his claim that the trial judge had driven him from the stand and 
thereby unfairly prejudiced the merits by authorizing the 
prosecution to impeach his potential trial testimony with two 
decade old drug trafficking convictions.  The court made no 
reference to the fact that just five years earlier it had 
sanctioned the trial judges exclusion of prior convictions to 
impeach three prosecution witnesses, including two offenses for 
felony drug trafficking; Harris v. State, 695 A.2d 34, 42-43(Del., 
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1997); State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995), 
compared to State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998); State 
v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993).  But see State v. Askew, 
716 A.2d 36, 37(Con., 1998)(Connecticut Supreme Court gave some 
significance to fact that the trial judge decided to admit a felony 
robbery conviction of the accused while at the same time excluding 
a felony larceny conviction of the victim, which allowed the 
prosecutor to characterize the accused as an admitted convicted 
felon, while at the same time maintaining that the jury had no 
reason to question the character and therefore the credibility of 
the victim)
176.   State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998); State v. 
Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593(Minn., 1993). Compare and contrasts with 
State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995)
177.  State v. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639(Minn., 1995)
178.  Id.
179.  State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586(Minn. 1998)
180.  Id.
181.  State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.3d 191,197(n.4) (Minn., 1995)
182. See supra notes 91 - 92, 96, 121 - 134, 163 - 166, and 168
and accompanying text.  See infra text accompanying note 333; 
identifying the ten states.
183.  These seventeen states were: California; Colorado; Florida; 
Kentucky; Louisiana; Massachusetts; Missouri; Nebraska; Nevada; New 
Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; Oregon; Rhode 
Island; Virginia; and Wisconsin.  For the explanations of why these 
states's rules overall more liberally admitted convictions to 
impeach see  Holley, supra note 1, at notes 127 - 163, and 
accompanying text. 
184. The state supreme court which did not make a pertinent 
decision with regard to determining the admissibility of a 
conviction to impeach during the period 1990-2004 was Missouri.
185.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002); People v. 
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999); People v. Barnett, 954
P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 
1994); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal., 1992); People v. 
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 
1273, 1292(Cal., 1991); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 
971(Cal., 1991); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 1993); 
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Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990); Miller ex rel. 
Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 125 S.W.3d 
274,(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 
144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000); 
Com. v. Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); Com. v. Smith, 
686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 
314(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass.,
1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993); Com. v. 
Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Com. v. Feroli, 553 
N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 
1236(Nev., 1998); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 
1996); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993); State v. 
Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085,1087(N.J., 1993); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 
483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 
1990); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002); People 
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 
472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 
1192(N.Y., 1990); State v. Brown, 584 S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 
2002); State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994); State v. 
Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991); Castellucci v. Batista, 847 
A.2d 243(R.I., 2004); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 
2003); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000); State v. 
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731 
A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 
696,699(R.I. 1999); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670(R.I., 1999);
State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996); State v. Martinez, 
652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 
223(R.I., 1994); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 
1992); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 
1992); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990); State v. 
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 
290, 296(R.I., 1990); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475(Wis., 
2004); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991)
186.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224(Cal., 2002); People v. Clair, 
828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992); Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455(Fla., 
1993); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879(Kent., 1992); Brown v. Com., 
812 S.W.2d 502(Kent., 1991); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589(N.H., 
2003){N.H.); State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996); 
State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992); State v. Pratt, 
853 P.2d 827(Or., 1993); State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183(R.I., 2003); 
Williams v. Comm., 450 S.E.2d 365(Va., 1994)
187.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002)(accused 
did testify, Id. at 605); People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 
635(Cal., 1999)(accused did testify, Id. at 634); People v. Turner, 
878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(accused did testify, Id. at 557); People 
v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(accused did not 
testify(inference), Id. at 874); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 
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1292(Cal., 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 1291); People v. 
Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal., 1991)(accused did testify, 
Id. at 959); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 
1993)(accused did not testify, Id. at 1366); Cummings v. People, 
785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990)(accused did not testify, Id. at 922-923); 
Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(accused 
did testify, Id. at 138); Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 
2000)(not clear if accused did testify, Id. at 695); Com. v. 
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999)(accused did testify, Id.);
Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(not clear if 
accused did testify, Id..  Small basis for inference that he did 
not testify); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 
1996)(accused did testify, Id.); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 
257(Mass., 1996)(accused did not testify, Id.); Com. v. Whitman, 
617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993)(accused did testify, Id. at 627); 
Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(accused did 
testify, Id. at 84); Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 
1990)(accused did not testify, Id.); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 
1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(accused did not testify, Id.); Wesley v. 
State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 1996)(accused did not testify, 
Id. at 798); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(accused 
did testify, Id. at 1105); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085(N.J., 
1993)(accused did not testify, Id. 1087); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 
483, 495(N.J., 1990)(not clear if accused did testify, Id., but by 
implication because important appellate issue was did accused have 
the requisite culpable mental state, provides a basis for inferring 
that accused did not testify); State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 
837(N.J., 1990)(not clear if accused did testify, Id., but by 
implication based on complexity of the appellate record and because 
important appellate issue was did accused have the requisite 
culpable mental state, provides a basis for inferring that accused 
did not testify); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 
2002)(accused did not testify, Id. at 964); People v. Gray, 646 
N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995)(accused did not testify, Id. at 445); People 
v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(accused did not 
testify, Id. at 473); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 
1192(N.Y., 1990)(accused did not testify, Id.); State v. Brown, 584 
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(not clear if accused did testify); 
State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994)(accused did not 
testify, Id. at 799{by implication}); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 
898(Or., 1991)(accused did not testify, Id.); State v. Rocha, 834 
A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(accused did not testify, Id. at
1266); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000)(accused 
did testify, Id. at 450); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 
1056(R.I., 2000)(not clear if accused did testify, Id.); State v. 
Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(accused did testify, 
Id. at 728); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)
(not clear if accused did testify, Id.); State v. Lombardi, 727 
A.2d 670(R.I., 1999)(not clear if accused did testify, Id. at 676);
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State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996)(accused did 
testify, Id. at 1350); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 
1995)(accused did testify, Id.); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 
223(R.I., 1994)(accused did testify, Id. at 224); State v. Simpson, 
606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 1992)(accused did not testify, Id. at 
679); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 
1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 1104}; State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 
1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(accused did testify, Id. at 1038); State v. 
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(not clear if accused did 
testify, Id.); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 296(R.I., 1990)(not 
clear if accused did testify, Id. at 295); State v. Gary M.B., 676 
N.W.2d 475(Wis., 2004)(accused did testify, Id. at 479); State v. 
Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 534}
188.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(accused did 
not testify, Id. at 260.  Accused was convicted of first degree 
murder.  He was sentenced to death.  His death sentence meant the 
case was heard on automatic appeal by the state supreme court.  
That court held that the trial judge abused its discretion in 
admitting to impeach the accused if he had testified at trial his 
prior rape and murder convictions.  Court, however, found that the 
error were harmless); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 
1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 886.  The court held trial judge 
abused discretion by authorizing prosecution to impeach the accused 
with eighteen year old burglary conviction.  Court had already held 
that the conviction should be reversed on other grounds); Brown v. 
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502(Kent., 1991)(accused did testify, Id. at 503. 
 The court held, without explanation, that it was reversible error 
to admit the accused's twenty-two year old felony conviction for 
storehouse breaking at his current trial for rape and incest to 
impeach him, because it was extremely prejudicial); State v. Ross, 
405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992)(accused did testify, Id. at 160.
The court held that the trial judge had made an uncorrected, but 
harmless error in authorizing the prosecution to impeach the 
accused's trial testimony with his nineteen year old sodomy 
conviction) 
189.  People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999)(two theft 
convictions); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(receipt of 
stolen property and burglary convictions); People v. Morris, 807 
P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal., 1991)(assault with intent to commit
rape, attempted rape, kidnapping, and car theft); People v. Lesney, 
856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 1993)(affirming use of multiple 
convictions to impeach the accused should he have testified); Com. 
v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(assault and 
battery, assault with a dangerous weapon-a hanDgun, two assaults 
with a dangerous weapon-a knife, possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 
983, 988(Mass., 1997)(robbery, assault with intent to rob, and 
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larceny of a motor vehicle); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 
314(Mass., 1996)(unlawful possession of a firearm, defacing a 
firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition); Com. v. Gallagher, 
562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(breaking and entry and larceny, and 
receipt of stolen property); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 
1236(Nev., 1998)(state supreme court affirmed admission against the 
accused of two murder convictions at the accused current murder 
trial); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 1996)(robbery 
and assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 
1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine, possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, and theft); State v. Harvey, 581 
A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990);(rape and three other convictions); 
People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(four felony 
convictions); People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 
1995){misdemeanor trespass and cocaine trafficking); People v. 
Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(One of the two felony 
convictions "involved" narcotics, and the other was a robbery 
convictions.  The seventeen misdemeanor convictions were entered 
over the course of a dozen years.  Trial judge ruled that the 
prosecution could allude to the number, dates, and apparently names 
of all of the convictions, but not to the underlying facts.); 
People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990){two personal 
and two corporate pollution related convictions); State v. Garcia, 
743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(misdemeanor convictions for 
possession of stolen property and for possession of a contraband 
substance); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 
1999)(five convictions); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 
1999)(four convictions); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 676(R.I., 
1999)(three convictions); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 
960(R.I., 1995)(six convictions); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 
680-681(R.I., 1992)(four convictions-possession of marijuana, 
conspiracy to murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault 
with intent to kill); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 
and 1116(R.I. 1992)(seven convictions); State v. Gary M.B., 676 
N.W.2d 475, 478-479(Wis., 2004)(five convictions admitted by 
generic reference in the direct testimony of the accused to five 
convictions.  No mention of names of underlying crimes, or of fact 
that all of them were at least a decade old, and the three 
contested convictions were entered almost a quarter century prior 
to the trial.  These three convictions were for relatively minor 
offenses including uttering a check, disorderly conduct, and 
assault) 
190.  People v. Barnett, 954 P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998)(court 
sanctioned admission of two felony escape convictions to impeach a 
defense witness); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal., 
1992)(misdemeanor theft conviction to impeach a defense witness); 
Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center,  
25 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004)(civil plaintiff); Castellucci v. 
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Batista, 847 A.2d 243, 251(R.I., 2004)(civil defendant)
191.  People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(voluntary 
manslaughter conviction of a prosecution witness); Foster v. State, 
614 So.2d 455, 457 and 460(Fla., 1993)(prosecution "witness".  At 
his murder trial a state witness testified to her first hand 
knowledge of the circumstances leading to the killing, and that she 
saw the accused kill the victim.  Over a decade and one-half later 
accused received a re-sentencing hearing.  At that hearing he 
sought to impeach the 1975 testimony of that witness, who by the 
time of the rehearing was deemed unavailable, by her 1989 
convictions.  The trial judge excluded that conviction.  State 
supreme court affirmed the exclusion of admission of these 
convictions without significant policy analysis);  Zola v. Kelley, 
826 A.2d 589, 596(N.H., 2003)(plaintiff in civil case.  Court 
sanctioned exclusion of her drug conviction ); State v. Newell, 679 
A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(misdemeanor convictions for reckless 
conduct and simple assault of prosecution witness); State v. Pratt, 
853 P.2d 827, 834(Or., 1993)(additional theft conviction of a 
prosecution witness); State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 205(R.I., 
2003)(prosecution witnesses' convictions for disorderly conduct, 
driving while intoxicated, filing a false police report, malicious 
damage, possession of marijuana, operating on a suspended license, 
reckless driving, and resisting arrest); Williams v. Comm., 450 
S.E.2d 365,375(Va., 1994)(prosecution witness and alleged co-
perpetrator, with that person's conviction for assault and battery) 
192.  See Holley, supra note 1, 142 - 144, and accompanying text. 
193.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002); People v. 
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999); People v. Barnett, 954 
P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 
1994);People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,946(Cal., 1992); People v. 
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 
1273, 1292(Cal., 1991); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 
971(Cal., 1991); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 1364,1367(Col., 1993); 
Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 1990); Miller ex rel. 
Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 25 S.W.3d 274, 
285(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002); 
Com. v. Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000); Com. v. Smith, 686 
N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 
257(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 
1993); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Leonard 
v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 
1102, 1109(N.J., 1993); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085(N.J., 
1993); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v. 
Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990); People v. Hayes, 764 
N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002); People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 
444(N.Y., 1995); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 
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1994); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990); State 
v. Brown, 584 S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002); State v. Sidberry, 
448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 
898(Or., 1991); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 
2003); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 449-50(R.I., 2000); State v. 
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731 
A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 
696,699(R.I. 1999); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670,676(R.I., 
1999);  State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 1996); State v. 
Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 
219, 223(R.I., 1994); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 
1992); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 
1992); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990); State v. 
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 
290, 296(R.I., 1990); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 478-
479(Wis., 2004); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 1991) ]
194.  Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. 
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 
1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(state supreme court acknowledged that by 
element analysis the misdemeanor of obstructing a police officer 
was irrelevant to prove propensity to lie.  The court thereby 
ignored the fact that if specific conduct underlying a crime is the 
only basis for finding that it is relevant to prove propensity to 
lie, there is no logical basis to justify authorizing reference to 
the fact or the name of the resulting conviction, and the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court also ignored the majority rule that bars the 
use of extrinsic evidence to prove an individual act(s) relevant to 
prove propensity to lie.  See FRE 608.
195.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,584 (Cal., 2002(Assault 
with a deadly weapon on a police officer); People v. Carpenter, 988 
P.2d 531, 557(Cal., 1999)(two theft convictions); People v. 
Barnett, 954 P.2d 384,437(Cal, 1998)(felony escape convictions); 
People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521(Cal., 1994)(receipt of stolen 
property and burglary convictions); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 
938,946(Cal., 1992)(misdemeanor theft conviction); People v. 
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(assault with intent to 
commit murder); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal., 
1991)(burglary); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 959 and 971(Cal., 
1991)(assault with intent to commit rape, attempted rape, 
kidnapping, and car theft); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 
1364,1367(Col., 1993); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 
1990)(aggravated assault); Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. 
Marymount Medical Center, 25 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004)(attempted 
burglary); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 
2002)(assault and battery, assault with a dangerous weapon-a 
handgun, two assaults with a dangerous weapon-a knife, possession 
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of a controlled substance with intent to distribute; Com. v. 
Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000)(armed burglary); Com. v. 
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999)(possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute in a school zone); Com. v. 
Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(robbery, assault with 
intent to rob, and larceny of a motor vehicle); Com. v. Drumgold, 
666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 1996)(unlawful possession of a firearm, 
defacing a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition); Com. v. 
Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996)(thirty year old 
conviction for illegal possession of a sawed off shotgun); Com. v. 
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993)(assault with intent to 
rape); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990)(breaking 
and entry and larceny, and receipt of stolen property); Com. v. 
Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990)(armed robbery conviction); 
Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(two murder 
convictions); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798-799(Nev., 
1996)(robbery and assault with a deadly weapon); State v. Mann, 625 
A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(sexual assault); State v. Brunson, 625 
A.2d 1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine, possession 
of cocaine with intent to distribute, and theft); State v. Harvey, 
581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990)(rape and three other convictions); 
State v. Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990(murder); People 
v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(assault, sexual 
abuse, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping; People 
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444(N.Y., 1995){misdemeanor trespass and 
cocaine trafficking); People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-
474(N.Y. 1994)(One of the two felony convictions "involved" 
narcotics, and the other was a robbery conviction. Seventeen 
unspecified misdemeanor convictions); People v. Mattiace, 568 
N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(two personal and two corporate 
pollution related convictions could be admitted against the accused 
to impeach him should he testify at trial.); State v. Brown, 584 
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(malicious wounding); State v. 
Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800(N.C., 1994(State supreme court upheld 
trial judge's admission to impeach the accused, charged with 
murder, of unrelated guilty pleas for sale and delivery of 
cocaine); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(sexual 
abuse); State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 
2003)(obstructing a police officer); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448, 
449-50(R.I., 2000)(possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 
2000)(possession of stolen property a contraband substance); State 
v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(breaking and 
entering a home with a knife with the intent to commit armed-
robbery, assault with intent to rob, assault with a deadly weapon-a 
knife, assault with a dangerous weapon-a sharp instrument, and 
assault with intent to commit murder with a sharp instrument); 
State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)(larceny, entry into a 
building with the intent to commit a felony, possession of a 
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controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance.); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670,676(R.I., 
1999)(possession of burglary tools, breaking and entering, and 
possession of marijuana); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357(R.I., 
1996)(kidnapping); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 
1995)(assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to rob, 
delivery of a controlled substance, entering a building with 
felonious intent, larceny, and possession of a controlled 
substance); State v. Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 223(R.I., 1994)(receipt 
of stolen property with a value of less than $500.); State v. 
Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680-681(R.I., 1992)(four convictions-
possession of marijuana, conspiracy to murder, assault with a 
deadly weapon, and assault with intent to kill); State v. 
Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 1992)(criminal 
contempt, driving to endanger, death resulting, driving under the 
influence, leaving the scene of an accident, threatening phone 
calls, and the assault with a dangerous weapon conviction); State 
v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering); 
State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(misdemeanor 
conviction for illegal possession of a knife admitted in current 
prosecution for murder by stabbing victim with a knife); State v. 
Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 296(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering 
conviction); State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 478-479(Wis., 
2004)(assault, disorderly conduct, two domestic abuse-assaults, and 
uttering a bad check); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531(Wis, 
1991)(misdemeanor reckless use of a weapon)
196.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572, 584, 606(Cal., 
2002)(Accused on trial and eventually convicted of several crimes 
including murder and attempted murder of a police officer.  On 
appeal, an issue raised by the accused was that the trial judge 
erred in admitting, ostensibly to impeach his trial testimony, his 
four year old conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a 
police officer. Accused expressly argued on appeal that this 
conviction for a crime of moral turpitude should be excluded 
because its admission would cause significant unfair prejudice 
because it was similar to one of the charges for which he was 
currently being tried.  The California Supreme Court rejected the 
accused appeal on the independent ground that the accused trial 
attorney invited the error by questioning a witness related to the 
conviction and by expressly requesting the trial judge to rule that 
the conviction was admissible to impeach the accused.  The Court, 
however, went on for to assert that even if defense attorney had 
not invited the error, the conviction was admissible substantively 
because the court, simply conclusionary asserted, the conviction 
was admissible even if somewhat similar.  The court made no 
reference to any balancing of exclusionary evidential concerns, 
including the resulting unfair prejudice.); People v. Sandoval, 841 
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P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(Accused convicted by jury of four counts 
of first degree murder.  Court sanctioned the authorization to 
impeach his trial testimony his prior conviction for assault with 
intent to commit murder); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 
1990)(Accused on trial and eventually convicted of two counts of 
first degree murder.  Court sanctioned possible impeachment of the 
accused with his prior conviction for aggravated assault); Com. v. 
Leftwich, 724 N.E.2d 691(Mass., 2000)(Accused tried and convicted 
by jury of murder in the first degree.  State supreme court 
sanctioned trial judge's decision that the state could impeach the 
accused, should he testify, with a ten year old conviction for 
armed burglary); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 
1997)(Jury found accused guilty of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Court sanctioned trial 
judge's ruling that the accused should he have testified could have 
been impeached with three felony convictions, including a 
conviction for assault with intent to rob); Com. v. Stewart, 663 
N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996)(court sanctioned admission of thirty
year old conviction for illegal possession of a sawed off shotgun 
when the current trial charges against the accused included assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 
625, 629(Mass., 1993)(assault with intent to rape conviction 
admitted in a murder prosecution in which the prosecution's theory, 
as explained to the jury, was that the killing was motivated by an 
accompanying sexual assault of the victim); Leonard v. State, 958 
P.2d 1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(state supreme court affirmed admission 
against the accused of two murder convictions at the accused 
current murder trial); Wesley v. State, 916 P.2d 793,798(Nev., 
1996)(Accused on trial for and convicted by jury of robbery with a 
deadly weapon, and two counts of murder with a deadly weapon.  
Supreme Court sanctioned admission of accused convictions for 
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon) to impeach him should he 
testify); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993)(Accused on 
trial for and convicted of two counts of sexual assault and 
criminal sexual contact.  Court sanctioned admission on retrial of 
a prior conviction for sexual assault.  Court ordered that the 
identical conviction could be "sanitized" by only permitting the 
existence and date but not the name of the sexual assault 
conviction to be admitted on retrial); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 
1085,1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(possession of cocaine and possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute convictions authorized for 
admission by the court(although court ordered no reference to the 
name or nature of the convictions) in a prosecution in which the 
accused was charged and convicted for the same offenses); State v. 
Pennington, 575 A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990(murder is strongly 
probative of credibility, and therefore admissible against the 
accused in his current trial for murder); People v. Hayes, 764 
N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 2002)(Accused on trial on charges of 
rape, coercion in the first degree, burglary, and unlawful 
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imprisonment in the second degree, and assault in the third degree. 
 Court sanctioned trial judge's ruling that the prosecutor could 
make reference on the retrial to the existence and nature of 
convictions for assault, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, 
and aggravated kidnapping); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 
1192(N.Y., 1990)(Accused was convicted of one count of criminal 
possession of a forged instrument based on company personnel, 
including accused, preparing document attributing source of waste 
to a company who was not the waste provider(false hazardous waste 
manifest).  Court approved trial court's admission of two personal 
and two corporate pollution related convictions to impeach the 
accused should he testify at trial.) But see discussion infra note 
__-__ discussing the state supreme court created heuristic 
amelioration doctrine of "sanitization"); State v. Brown, 584 
S.E.2d 278, 282-283(N.C., 2002)(malicious wounding conviction 
admitted to impeach accused on trial for murder); State v. Busby, 
844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(accused was convicted by a jury of 
first degree sexual assault.  Court sanctioned decision of the 
trial judge to admit accused prior conviction for sexual abuse for 
purposes of impeachment if he should testify at trial); State v. 
Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(Accused charged and 
convicted by jury of possession of cocaine, disorderly conduct, 
obstruction of a police officer, and resisting arrest.  The State 
Supreme Court held that trial judge did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting a nolo plea to an identical charge of obstructing a 
police officer); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 
1999)(Accused was on trial for and eventually convicted of robbery, 
during the course of which he used a sharp instrument. State 
supreme court sanctioned the trial judge's admission of multiple 
conviction of the accused to impeach his trial testimony.  The 
convictions admitted included: fourteen  year old convictions for 
breaking and entering a home with a knife with the intent to commit 
armed-robbery and assault with intent to rob); State v. Walsh, 731 
A.2d 696,699(R.I. 1999)(Accused currently on trial for multiple 
charges was eventually convicted of those charges including 
possession of cocaine. The court sanctioned admission to impeach 
the accused with multiple convictions, including a conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance.); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 
670,676(R.I., 1999)(accused tried and convicted in current 
prosecution for possession of cocaine.  Court sanctioned admission 
of three convictions to impeach the accused, including a conviction 
for possession of marijuana); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 
960(R.I., 1995)(Accused was convicted by a jury of first degree 
murder and assault with a dangerous weapon.  State supreme court 
sanctioned trial judge's decision to authorize the prosecutor to 
use and the prosecutor asked accused by name about convictions for 
assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to rob); 
State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 and 1116(R.I. 1992)(A 
jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder in 1988.  On 
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appeal, the accused raised the issue that the trial judge erred in 
denying in part his motion in limine to exclude from use to impeach 
his trial testimony, a fifteen year old conviction for assault with 
a dangerous weapon); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 
1990)(conviction for illegal possession of a knife admitted in 
current prosecution for murder by stabbing victim with a knife)
197.  Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 594(N.H., 2003)(New Hampshire 
Supreme Court reviewed decision of the U.S.Supreme Court in Green 
v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 527(1989).  Court acknowledged that 
federal appellate courts' decisions on the federal evidence rule 
could be used for guidance in interpreting similar state rules, but 
that state supreme court was final authority of appropriate 
interpretation of state rules).  See also State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 
996, 999(n.5)(Fla., 1998)(employing as a policy reason for 
following a United States Supreme Court non-constitutional ruling 
interpreting the federal rule of evidence authorizing convictions 
to impeach, that the comparable Florida state rule was modeled upon 
and substantially similar to the federal standard) 
198.  State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1387, 1388(R.I., 1990)(state 
supreme court miscast its own 1987 evidence rule with regard to 
admitting convictions to impeach by asserting that the rule did not 
establish an admissibility standard, unlike the federal rule, but 
only established a new procedure for considering the admission of 
convictions to impeach); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696(R.I. 
1999)(court noted that the federal rule may have given decisive 
significance to the fact that three of the convictions were older 
than ten years old, but expressly decided that it would give no 
significance to the age of the convictions on their 
relevance/probative value to prove propensity to lie) 
199. People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(court did not 
reverse based on this error-harmless error doctrine employed); Com. 
v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992)(court reversed 
conviction primarily on other grounds); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 
502(Kent., 1991)(court reversed based on this error); Zola v. 
Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 596(N.H., 2003)(court reversed based on this 
error); State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 163(N.C., 1992)(court did 
not reverse based on this error-harmless error doctrine employed)  
200.  Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical 
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 286(Ky., 2004)(judge must have conducted 
appropriate balancing evaluation because he inquired about the 
nature of the underlying offense, and postponed his final ruling on 
admissibility until the target witness' testimony)  Com. v. 
Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002)(state supreme 
court implicitedly sanctioned the trial judge's decision which 
permitted the prosecutor to wait to trial to announce intention to 
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impeach the accused, with several convictions, should he testify ). 
  Even more importantly the court sanctioned the decision of the 
trial judge, without reference to the basis of his conclusion, to 
authorize the prosecution to impeach the accused with multiple 
convictions all of which were totally irrelevant to prove 
propensity to lie.); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 
1192(N.Y., 1990)(Court asserted without specific reference to the 
record of that hearing, that the trial judge considered multiple 
factors in reaching the admissibility conclusion.  Court did not 
identify what factors trial judge employed); State v. Garcia, 743 
A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(court, despite the balancing evaluation 
required by rule, asserted it lacked authority to reverse the trial 
judge's discretionary ruling, thereby effectively eliminating the 
balancing evaluation required by rule.  The court made no attempt 
to do what rule required - determine if the trial judge had a 
justifiable basis for first finding that the conviction was 
relevant to prove propensity to lie, and if it was relevant was its 
probative value substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice 
that would result); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 
1995)(court acquiesced in the trial judge's decision to admit six 
irrelevant convictions to impeach the accused, on the ground that 
the record proved the judge had performed the required balancing 
because in the record was that judge's conclusionary statement that 
he did not think that any of the convictions were too remote or too 
prejudicial to warrant exclusion.  Court cited to a precedent in 
which, as in this case, the defendant claimed that trial judge had 
failed to make the evaluation properly with regard to determining 
if each conviction is probative to prove propensity to lie, and 
even if it is, was its probative value substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice.  The court held that all a trial judge need do is 
state the conclusion that the unfair prejudice of such convictions 
as a whole and or individually does not outweigh their probative 
value.); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(Court 
apparently accepted as a substitute for the rule required balancing 
evaluation a conclusionary finding that the trial judge did the 
balancing without a single reference to indicate that the judge 
even attempted to assess the unfair prejudice that would result if 
the jury learned that the accused on trial for murder by stabbing 
the victim with a knife, had another conviction based on his 
illegal possession of a knife); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542 
and 543(Wis, 1991)(The court made reference to some of the factors 
that trial judges should employ in conducting the balancing 
evaluation, but failed to demonstrate that the trial judge used 
such factors, and did not specifically apply these guidelines to 
the facts of the current case).  See also cases discussed, infra 
note 209)
201.  See infra. notes 206, 208 - 211, 223 - 224, 265,  and 
accompanying text. 
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202.  See supra note 193, and accompanying text. 
203. Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a)(2005)
204.  Massachusetts, New York, and Missouri by rule authorized the 
per se admission of all such convictions, but the Missouri Supreme 
Court did not render a pertinent decision during the fifteen year 
study period.  North Carolina, authorized the per se admission of 
all such misdemeanor convictions if the maximum punishment exceeded 
sixty days.  The New Jersey Rule, authorized the admission of all 
such convictions, but only if they passed a general balancing 
evaluation which pitted their propensity re credibility against 
exclusionary concerns they implicated.   The Louisiana rule 
authorized per se admission of all such irrelevant misdemeanor 
convictions in criminal cases, and in civil cases all such 
convictions punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than six 
months, but only if they passed a evenly weighted balancing 
evaluation.   The Rhode Island and Wisconsin rules, which impose 
identical standards, authorize admission of all such irrelevant 
misdemeanor convictions but only if they pass a balancing 
evaluation tilted towards admission.  Oregon authorized the 
possible admission of such a conviction but only against the 
accused, and only if he was a recidivist, and only if the 
conviction and current charge related to assaultive behavior in a 
domestic setting.  Finally, Virginia authorized admission of such 
irrelevant misdemeanor convictions but only in civil cases against 
non-party witnesses.
205.  Three states, Florida, Nebraska, and New Hampshire had the 
same rule as the federal rule-excluding these misdemeanors), while 
four states's rules, California, Colorado, Kentucky, and Nevada 
banned use of all misdemeanor convictions to impeach.
206.  State v. Tolbert, 849 So.2d 32(La, 2003)(court held that its 
criminal rule, which authorized admission of any conviction, 
including any misdemeanor(case involved issue of whether the 
alleged victim's municipal misdemeanor convictions were admissible) 
conviction to impeach, was nevertheless subject to exclusion by 
application of the evidence code's general policy balancing rule.  
Hence, upon objection to admission, the probative value to prove 
propensity to lie must be assessed and the conviction could be 
excluded if that value was substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice and other exclusionary policy concerns.  The court 
expressly recited list of exclusionary policy concerns in its 
policy rule-in addition to unfair prejudice-misleading the jury, 
confusion of the issues, undue delay, and waste of time); People v. 
Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(two personal and two 
corporate pollution related misdemeanor convictions could be 
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admitted against the accused to impeach him should he testify at 
trial.  Court asserted without specific reference to the record of 
the pretrial hearing, that the trial judge considered multiple 
factors in reaching the admissibility conclusion.  Court did not 
identify what factors trial judge employed) 
207.  People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994) ]
208.  State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(State 
supreme court ruled that the trial judge did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting misdemeanor convictions for possession of 
stolen property and for possession of a contraband substance); 
State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483(Wis., 2004)(court 
sanctioned the admission of misdemeanor conviction for disorderly 
conduct, and probably misdemeanor uttering a check and assault. 
209.  State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483-488(Wis., 2004)(trial 
record proved trial judge uttered only a single sentence that could 
be fairly characterized as an evaluation of the admissibility of 
the convictions at issue.  No reference to balancing or to even the 
identification of a single implicated exclusionary concerns) ]
210.  Id. at 484.  Court further compounded reliance on junk 
science by endorsing as reality prosecutor's assertion that three, 
quarter of a century old convictions for minor offenses, were a 
part of a pattern of convictions because they happened over a span 
of three years and the accused was subsequently convicted twelve 
years latter of two domestic assault convictions, and this 
"pattern" was independent proof of a person more likely to lie.
211.  Id. at 486. With regard to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's 
ringing endorsement of this specious inference see infra note 259, 
and accompanying text. 
212. See supra note 205, and accompanying text. 
213.  State v. Porter, 455 N.W.2d 787,795(Neb., 1990)(The appeal 
theory of the defense by inference conceded that normally such a 
conviction was admissible to impeach.  The defense objection was 
based on an erroneous understanding of the use of an uncounseled 
guilty plea as a conviction) 
214.  State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(Accused was 
convicted by a jury of first degree assault.  At trial, his defense 
theory was self-defense.  On appeal, he claimed it was error for 
the trial judge to exclude two past misdemeanor convictions of the 
alleged victim for reckless conduct and simple assault, as well as 
the conduct underlying those offenses.  The state supreme court 
evaluated the two convictions and concluded that neither the 
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adjudications or the conduct underlying was relevant to prove 
propensity to lie) See also State v. Norgren, 618 A.2d 505, 
507(N.H., 1992)(supreme court acknowledged that misdemeanor 
criminal mischief, simple assault, and criminal threatening 
convictions did not qualify under its rule as crimes of 
"dishonesty" of "false statement".  Court did not restate or make 
any reference to a developed definition of these concepts) 
215.   People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 392(n. 11)(Cal., 1997), 
(misdemeanor convictions lack reliability as proof per se of the 
required conduct to prove the elements); People v. Wheeler, 841 
P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(Court expressly recognized that prior to 
1982 amendment misdemeanor convictions were per se excluded, and 
that the generic evidence policy rule, required that before a 
felony conviction could be admitted to impeach its probative value 
to prove propensity to lie had to be balanced against its potential 
for unfair prejudice, and if the latter substantially outweighed 
the former, the conviction must be excluded. State supreme court 
ruled that the effect of the constitutional amendment was to 
authorize the admission of relevant underlying conduct, but not the 
fact of, a misdemeanor conviction to impeach, i.e. relevant to 
prove propensity to lie.  
216.  People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,944(Cal., 1992) 
217.  Id. 
218.  See Holley supra note 1 at notes 127 - 163, and accompanying 
text. 
219.  Id..
220. See Holley supra note 1, at notes 133, 142 - 144, and 
accompanying text.  New Jersey's Supreme Court was interpreting a 
generic balancing standard, applicable to all witnesses, and the 
Rhode Island and Wisconsin Supreme Court were interpreting a 
standard titled towards admission for all witnesses, including the 
accused. 
221.  Compare supra notes 185 - 186 with "misdemeanor" conviction 
cases identified in 206 - 217, and accompanying text.  
222.  State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(State 
supreme court made reference to its 1976 decision in which it had 
held that its general evidence policy balancing rule applied to its 
rule on the admissions of convictions to impeach, and therefore 
convictions were not per se admissible for that purpose.  Instead, 
the court ruled in that case, that its policy rule required trial 
judges to make a balancing evaluation.  That rule the court held, 
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required that the evaluation focus upon whether the probative value 
of the conviction to prove propensity to lie, was substantially 
outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, 
or confusion of the issues.  The court expressly recognized that 
the overriding policy concern that warranted this balancing 
evaluation was to provide discretion to provide a fair trial and do 
justice.); State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384, 1387-1388(R.I., 1990); 
State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542 and 543(Wis, 1991)
223. These seven states were: California, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Oregon.  People v. 
Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 
862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal., 
1992)(Court expressly recognized that prior to 1982 amendment 
misdemeanor convictions were per se excluded, and that the generic 
evidence policy rule, required that before a felony conviction 
could be admitted to impeach its probative value to prove 
propensity to lie had to be balanced against its potential for 
unfair prejudice, and if the latter substantially outweighed the 
former, the conviction must be excluded); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 
705,719(Cal, 1992); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879, 886-887(Kent., 
1992); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); State v. 
Tolbert, 849 So.2d 32(La, 2003)(discussed supra note 5-22); Com. v. 
Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143(Mass., 2002); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 
589, 594-595(N.H., 2003); People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836, 
839(N.Y., 1992); State v. Pratt, 853 P.2d 827, 833-834(Or., 
1993)(Court reviewed history of its rule since its enactment in 
1981, noting that originally the rule required, but only with 
regard to the accused as witness, that trial judges balance the 
probative value of a felony conviction to prove propensity to lie 
against the unfair prejudice the admission would cause.  The court 
next noted that a 1986 ballot initiative amended the rule, by 
eliminating the balancing requirement.  Court asserted that the 
purpose of the amendment was to assure that any felony conviction 
of an accused would be admitted to impeach his testimony.  The 
court next ruled that such convictions were still subject to be 
excluded on the specific policy ground recognized in its pervasive 
policy balancing rule that the convictions probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the fact that it was cumulative.)
224. These six states were Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Carolina, and Virginia.  People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 
1364,1367(Col., 1993); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 921(Col., 
1990)(implication of opinion was that the only basis to bar accused 
impeachment with his prior conviction for aggravated assault was to 
timely prove the conviction was error, or as in this appeal to 
claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to make 
this claim.); McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209(Fla, 2000); State 
v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 741(Neb., 1999); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 
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1220, 1236(Nev., 1998)(Accused a racist prisoner, stabbed to death 
a black inmate.  Jury convicted him in 1989 of murder, and he was 
sentenced to death.  Accused filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief in 1992, which was not heard and denied until 1996. Trial 
judge indicated that it would sanction the admission of two prior 
murder convictions for purpose of impeachment, and possibly for 
substantive purpose.  On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld 
that decision as within the sound discretion of the trial judge.  
Court made no reference to a  balancing evaluation, and upheld 
admission of two same crime convictions.); State v. Brown, 584 
S.E.2d 278, 282(N.C., 2002)(court claimed it lacked the authority 
to give trial judges the right to evaluate if exclusionary concerns 
should result in exclusion of qualified convictions(crimes 
punishable by more than sixty days in jail.  Court expressly 
rejected accused argument that the pervasive evidence policy 
evaluation rule equivalent to federal rule 403, required that the 
admission of the conviction to impeach should depend upon whether 
its probative value to prove propensity to lie, was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  Court held that the North 
Carolina legislature had rejected adoption of a balancing 
evaluation as an express policy decision.  Court did not assert, 
however, that the legislature had decided to defy logic and 
eliminate the minimum admission requirement that the evidence must 
be relevant to the issue for which it is offered); Williams v. 
Com., 450 S.E.2d 365(Va., 1994).  But see infra note 5-79  and 
accompanying text in which three of these six courts adopted a 
mitigation doctrine of "sanitizing" the convictions admitted to 
impeach as a means of ameliorating the unfair prejudice that could 
result from the admission by name of such convictions)
225.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v. 
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841 
P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589,595(N.H., 
2003); State v. Newell, 679 A.2d 1142, 1146(N.H., 1996)(Accused was 
convicted by a jury of first degree assault.  At trial, his defense 
theory was self-defense.  On appeal, he claimed it was error for 
the trial judge to exclude two past misdemeanor convictions of the 
alleged victim for reckless conduct and simple assault, as well as 
the conduct underlying those offenses.  The state supreme court 
evaluated the two convictions and concluded that neither the 
adjudications or the conduct underlying was relevant to prove 
propensity to lie)  
226. People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862,873(Cal., 1992)(Accused 
convicted by jury of four counts of first degree murder.  Court 
without reference to any substantive evaluation merely endorsed the 
trial judge's illogical assumptions that such a conviction was not 
only relevant to prove propensity to lie, but that its probative 
value on that issue outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice.)
112
227.   Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589, 594-595(N.H., 2003)(The court 
relied on the "Reporter's Note" to its specific rule which made 
express reference to its general exclusionary policy balancing 
rule, implying the court concluded that the general rule would 
apply when the more specific and more exclusionary balancing rule 
favoring the accused did not apply)
228.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002); People v. 
Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992); People v. Wheeler, 841 
P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 
879,887(Kent., 1992); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 
1991); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143-144(Mass., 2002); Zola 
v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 589,595(N.H., 2003); People v. Dokes, 595 
N.E.2d 836, 839(N.Y., 1992); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542 and 
543(Wis, 1991)(The court made reference to some of the factors that 
trial judges should employ in conducting the balancing evaluation. 
 See also supra notes 71 - 76, 118, 125, 143 for identification of 
states whose rules mimicked the federal rule, and states whose 
rules were overall more liberal than the federal rule also 
resorting to their own guidelines.
229. People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(exclusionary 
concern laundry list); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 
1992)(age of the conviction); Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 
144(Mass., 2002)(how many times prosecutor made reference to the 
admitted conviction of the accused); Zola v. Kelley, 826 A.2d 
589,595(N.H., 2003)(The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied these 
heuristics to the plaintiff's drug conviction, and identified three 
of them, all of which, court concluded, pointed in the direction of 
exclusion which the court concluded was the appropriate decision.  
Court pointed to fact that conviction was almost ten years old, and 
reasoned that the conviction had minimal probative value to prove 
propensity to lie, and was likely to cause unfair prejudice because 
the jury could decide the merits in part because of disapproval of 
the plaintiff); People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836, 839(N.Y., 
1992)(similarity of the conviction to the current charge, the 
relevance of the conviction to the accused credibility, the age of 
the accused at the time of the conviction-"bad acts", and the 
disposition of the charges.  Court also acknowledged other factors 
could be used in the evaluation); State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 
531,543(Wis., 1991)(was the conviction one for a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement) 
230. See discussion supra notes 189, 193 - 196, and accompanying 
text.
231.  State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263,1266-1267(R.I., 2003)(identical 
crime conviction admitted); State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448(R.I., 
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2000); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999)(five 
similar crime convictions admitted to impeach the accused); State 
v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I. 1999)(two similar crime 
convictions admitted); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 672 and 
676(R.I., 1999)(Accused convicted by a jury of possession of a 
controlled substance-cocaine. Court sanctioned the admission, to 
impeach the defendant's trial testimony, of three fourteen year old 
convictions - breaking and entering, possession of burglary tools, 
and possession of marijuana); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 
960(R.I., 1995)(court sanctioned admission of six defendant 
convictions, including an identical conviction for assault with a 
dangerous weapon and a similar conviction for assault with intent 
to rob);  State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992)(court 
sanctioned the trial judge's admission of seven convictions to 
impeach the accused, including one similar crime conviction); State 
v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037,1040(R.I., 1990)(breaking and entering).
232.   State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993); State v. 
Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531, 542(Wis, 1991)
233.  People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 966(N.Y., 2002)(court 
credited itself for not creating per se rules that would bar the 
admission of convictions likely to cause substantial unfair 
prejudice including convictions for sex crimes, and crimes 
identical or similar to a crime or crimes currently being tried.  
); People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444,445(N.Y., 1995)(court lauded 
itself for failing to establish guidelines for the balancing 
evaluation it created.  While trial judges must balance, what and 
how they balance is up to each of hundreds of trial judges across 
the state, and it is the responsibility of intermediate appellate 
courts to review these decisions because they have authority to 
review factual findings) 
234.  Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991)(court did not 
list a comprehensive set of factors that trial judges could or 
should employ in performing the balancing evaluation) 
235.  See discussion of similar behavior by the New York Court of 
Appeals, discussed supra note 233, and see also infra notes 338 -
345 and accompanying text.
236.  Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992); Com. v. 
Rivera, 682 N.E.2d 636, 646(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 
N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 1996); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 
628(Mass., 1993); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 
1993); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 965-966(N.Y., 2002); People 
v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444,445(N.Y., 1995).  See also illustrating how 
state supreme courts who were true to their per se admission rule, 
justified that loyalty by resort to this same fiction, McFadden v. 
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State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1216(Fla, 2000)(Court also endorsed, again 
without reference to any evidence, a related and mitigating 
heuristic - that when a person is convicted of a felony but the 
trial judge withholds final adjudication, the judge has determined 
that the person for whom final adjudication is withheld is not 
likely again to commit crime, and is therefore no more likely to 
lie under oath.) 
237.  Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135,144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. 
Carter, 708 N.E.2d 943, 945(Mass., 1999); State v. Brunson, 625 
A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(Court added a third heuristic which 
further favored admission of convictions against an accused who 
sought to testify at his trial.  The court asserted that such a 
person has an added motive to lie to avoid another conviction.  The 
court did not explain why such a person had a greater motive to 
avoid a second or multiple conviction, as opposed to a person 
seeking to avoid a first conviction.  Risk of significant losses 
are also possible for parties in civil cases.  The court did not 
acknowledge this reality); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I. 
1999); State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 681(R.I., 1992)(The state 
supreme Court asserted that convictions can be admitted to impeach 
even if they do not relate to dishonesty or false statement.  The 
court did not explain on what basis such convictions would be even 
relevant to prove propensity to lie).  The court relied on pre-
rule historical precedent and statute to continue the view that 
unless the trial judge makes a specific finding that a conviction 
should be excluded, any conviction is admissible to impeach any 
witness); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992); State 
v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis, 1991) ]
238.  People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556 and 557(Cal., 
1999)(state supreme court endorsed multiple junk science heuristics 
in this opinion.  First the court asserted that the admission of 
convictions pierces a false aura of veracity. 
239.  See Holley supra note 1, at  notes 194-199 and accompanying 
text
240.  Id. at notes 210 - 218, and accompanying text.  
241.  State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1091(N.J., 1993); State v. 
Harvey, 581 A.2d 483, 495(N.J., 1990); State v. Pennington, 575 
A.2s 816, 837(N.J., 1990; State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 
1117(R.I. 1992)(State supreme court employed junk science heuristic 
that it is reasonable to assume that one who has been convicted of 
a serious crime has demonstrated anti-social tendencies and 
therefore a jury may properly place less credence in that person's 
testimony then that of a law abiding witness.
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242.   People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572,606(Cal., 2002)(accused 
convicted of five felonies including the attempted murder of a 
police officer.  State Supreme Court began by indicating that it 
was significant to the resolution of the issue of the admissibility 
of a conviction to impeach, that the attorney for the accused 
agreed that it was accurate to characterize the accused conviction 
for assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer as an offense 
of "moral turpitude".  The court did not explain at this point why 
this was significant); People v. Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,944(Cal., 
1992); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(The court 
reviewed that precedent which held that even after the 1982 
constitutional amendment via referendum which sought apparently to 
authorize per se the admission of any felony convictions to 
impeach, only felonies involving moral turpitude qualified for 
possible admission), People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949,972(Cal., 
1991)(court eyeballed four crimes, and justices asserted that the 
elements evidenced a general readiness to do evil, and based on 
this third level inference they were each therefore admissible with 
regard to impeachment.); Williams v. Comm., 450 S.E.2d 365,375(Va., 
1994)(court extended the  application of this heuristic to 
"misdemeanor" convictions, even though its rule seemingly barred 
admission of misdemeanors to impeach.  Court did rule that neither 
misdemeanor assaults nor batteries were crimes of moral turpitude 
for purpose of impeachment.)
243.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 260(Cal., 2002); People v. 
Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999); and People v. Clair, 828 
P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(court identified as one of the most crucial 
factors in the balancing evaluation, a heuristic surrogate for the 
appropriate logical relevance inquiry, in a criminal case when the 
witness is not the accused - is the conviction relevant as proof of 
dishonesty); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal., 
1991)(state supreme court endorsed, without evaluation, the trial 
judge's list of balancing factors favoring admission of convictions 
against the accused, including a finding that the burglary 
conviction was theft related and therefore bore on dishonesty). 
244.  Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical 
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274,285(Ky., 2004)
245.   Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993)(Court 
equated the probative value of violent crimes to disprove 
credibility with that of convictions for crimes of dishonesty)   
246.  See Holley, supra note 1 at notes 192 - 199, and accompanying 
text. 
247.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 259(Cal., 2002)(court 
endorsed two related junk science heuristics - the age of the 
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conviction and whether the accused has led a crime free blameless 
life since the conviction as factors in the balancing evaluation); 
People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999)(state supreme 
court held that because the accused spent most of fifteen years 
since the two felony theft related convictions in prison, they were 
not too remote to demonstrate to be  used for impeachment.  
Apparently California Supreme Court simply piled another junk 
science heuristic upon the others employed in its premise.  Accused 
must have opportunity as free citizen to commit another crime or 
his prior crimes continue to have the same relevance as the day 
they were committed with regard to proving he has a propensity to 
lie.  Court lost focus completely on its previous point as to issue 
to which their admission must be at least relevant - propensity to 
lie, and how lapse of time could lessen whatever relevance-
probative value these particular convictions had to prove 
likelihood of lying); People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521, 557(Cal., 
1994)(state supreme court evaluated as a factor in determining the 
admission of the conviction to impeach the age of the conviction.  
It concluded a thirteen and eleven year old convictions for receipt 
of stolen property and burglary  were not too old to be used to 
impeach the testimony of the accused because the accused had spent 
most of the intervening years in prison); People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 
705,719(Cal, 1992); People v. Webster, 814 P.2d 1273, 1292(Cal., 
1991)(court approved the age of the conviction as a factor and 
concluded that the burglary conviction was not too remote to be 
used to impeach because the accused had not thereafter led a 
blameless life); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949,972(Cal., 
1991)(state supreme court affirmed the trial judge's decision to 
admit all of accused prior felony convictions ostensibly only to 
impeach his trial testimony.  The court held that convictions of 
seven and nine years of age at the time of the current trial were 
not too remote.); Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879,887(Kent., 1992);
Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991)(Court cited to 
federal rule and presumptive ten year rule as guidance. Court did 
not expressly adopt that presumption.  Court cited with approval, 
but without explanation or reference to their rationale, two 
decisions, one admitting a thirteen year old conviction and one 
excluding a seventeen year old conviction); State v. Brunson, 625 
A.2d 1085, 1088(N.J., 1993)(The court did not specify what passage 
of time would even presumptively begin to dissipate the probative 
value of a conviction, but did indicate that the aging of the 
conviction could be tempered by subsequent convictions, and service 
of jail time) 
248.  Com. v. Sommers, 843 S.W.2d 879, 887(Kent., 1992)
249.  Id. 
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250.  See Holley supra note 1 at notes 208 - 218, and accompanying 
text. 
251.  People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556(Cal., 1999)(state 
supreme court sanctioned trial judge's decision to allow 
prosecution to impeach the accused with two fifteen year old felony 
theft related convictions); People v. Lesney, 856 P.2d 
1364,1367(Col., 1993)(affirming use by the co-defendant of multiple 
convictions to impeach the accused should he have testified.  All 
of convictions were over ten years old.  Court still sanctioned 
apparent per se admission of all of these convictions); Miller ex 
rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical Center, 125 S.W.3d 
274(Kent., 2004)(court sanctioned anonymous admission of twelve 
year old attempted burglary conviction to impeach one of the 
plaintiffs in a civil case); Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 
502,503(Kent., 1991)(Court cited with approval, but without 
explanation, its precedent admitting a thirteen year old 
conviction); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 
1996)(Court sanctioned admission to impeach the accused of a thirty 
year old possession of a sawed off shotgun conviction); People v. 
Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 473-474(N.Y. 1994)(Court sanctioned the 
trial judge's admission of seventeen misdemeanor convictions which 
were entered over the course of a dozen years); State v. Rodriquez, 
731 A.2d 726, 731-732(R.I., 1999)(court sanctioned admission of 
fourteen  year old convictions for breaking and entering a home 
with a knife with the intent to commit armed-robbery, assault with 
intent to rob, and assault with a deadly weapon-a knife; as well as 
two ten year old convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon-a 
sharp instrument, and assault with intent to commit murder with a 
sharp instrument); State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696,699(R.I. 
1999)(court sanctioned the admission to impeach the accused with an 
eleven year old conviction for possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1104-05 
and 1116(R.I. 1992){court sanctioned the admission to impeach the 
accused with a thirteen year old conviction)]
252.  State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 699(R.I. 1999); State v. 
Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1117(R.I. 1992)(state supreme court 
employed junk science heuristic that multiple conviction 
demonstrates disdain for the law, and therefore makes all/almost 
all conviction in the sequence, no matter how old, arguably 
relevant to attack credibility.  The court expressly endorsed 
heuristic that continued disobdience to the law is a logical basis 
for inferring that the person is more likely to disregard his oath 
and more likely to lie on the stand)  
253.  Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 143 and 144(Mass., 2002); 
Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 85(Mass., 1990); Com. v. Smith, 
686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 
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964(N.Y., 2002)(trial judge had admitted four irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial convictions, but court pointed to fact that the trial 
judge had excluded an attempted assault conviction and a twenty 
year old trespass conviction); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 
1192(N.Y., 1990)(Following, what the state supreme court 
characterized as a lengthy pre-trial hearing, the trial judge 
concluded that three of seven of accused and corporation prior 
convictions could not be used by prosecution to impeach him, but 
that two personal and two corporate pollution related convictions 
could be admitted for this purpose.  Accused did not testify).    
254.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3rd 224, 260(Cal., 2002)(Current 
murder trial resulted in a conviction and death sentence.  Court 
ruled that the improper admissions to impeach the accused with his 
convictions for murder and rape were harmless, in part because 
another  conviction was admissible)  Few other supreme courts had 
relied on this  heuristic, and the court did not cite to any 
evidence to support this novel notion.
255.  Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical 
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 285(Ky., 2004); Com. v. Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 
625, 629(Mass., 1993); People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964(N.Y., 
2002); People v. Mattiace, 568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990); 
Castellucci v. Batista, 847 A.2d 243, 251(R.I., 2004); State v. 
Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384,1388(R.I., 1990)(Trial judge found and state 
supreme court concurred that credibility was a significant issue at 
trial, and it then resorted to the anti-science/junk science 
heuristic inference that this factor favored admission of any 
conviction, including this misdemeanor conviction, to impeach the 
accused). 
256.  See discussion supra notes 76 - 77 explaining why these 
factors logically favor exclusion and not admission. 
257.   See e.g. People v. Hayes, 764 N.E.2d 963, 964-965(N.Y., 
2002)(Accused, on trial for multiple offenses, including sexual 
assault, at a pre-trial hearing argued that the admission, 
ostensibly only to impeach, of his convictions, many of them 
similar to the current charges, would impair his right to a fair 
trial because of the unfair prejudice that would result.  The trial 
judge ruled that the accused could be impeached with four 
convictions, all four similar to at least one of the current 
charges.  The judge ruled that the prosecutor could make reference 
to the existence and nature of convictions for assault, sexual 
abuse, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping.  The 
judge excluded an attempted assault conviction and a twenty year 
old trespass conviction. Accused did not testify at trial, and was 
convicted of all charges except assault.  The intermediate 
appellate court reversed the trial judge, and held that the trial 
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judge had abused his discretion, because of the danger of unfair 
prejudice which resulted when the similar convictions were 
authorized to impeach the accused.  That court focused on the risk 
of such unfair prejudice particularly caused by the trial judge 
authorizing reference by the prosecution to the nature of the 
conviction as opposed to the mere existence of convictions.  The 
appellate court had also reversed because the trial judge's 
decision had contributed to keeping accused from testifying, and 
therefore denied him the only witness who could substantiate his 
consent theory.  Despite these detailed findings, the New York 
Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court, an 
action it never took when the appellate court affirmed the 
admission of any conviction to impeach the accused during the 
entire decade and one-half period of this study) 
258.  Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135, 144(Mass., 2002);(Court also 
employed in its evaluation whether and the number of prosecution 
references to the admitted conviction[s]); Com. v. Whitman, 617 
N.E.2d 625, 629(Mass., 1993); Com. v. Gallagher, 562 N.E.2d 80, 
85(Mass., 1990); State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999); 
State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347,1357(R.I., 1996), and State v. 
Aponte, 649 A.2 219, 223(R.I., 1994)
259.  State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726,732(R.I., 1999)(court 
expressly acknowledged that the trial judge did not undertake the 
balancing evaluation that the state supreme court expressly 
acknowledged was the standard of its rule) 
260.  See Holley supra note 1 at note 219, and accompanying text. 
261.  People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 873(Cal., 1992)(the court 
acknowledged that a 1982 constitutional amendment had obliterated 
some of its detailed working rules developed to guide the balancing 
evaluation.  The court did not specify which working rules in its 
view were obliterated by the constitutional amendment); People v. 
Wheeler, 841 P.2d 938,941(Cal., 1992)(Court cited with approval 
McCormick's and Wigmore's treatise for a laundry list, of which it 
did not specify each element, of policy reasons supporting limiting 
use of convictions to impeach any witness, including the special 
substantive propensity conviction concern when the witness is the 
accused).  
262.  People v. Carpenter, 988 P.2d 531, 556 and 557(Cal., 1999)
263.  With regard to the widespread admission of similar 
convictions see supra notes 52, 96, and 196, and accompanying text. 
Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); Com. v. Pauling, 
777 N.E.2d 135, 143-144(Mass., 2002); Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 
983,988(Mass., 1997); Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 314(Mass., 
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1996); Com. v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257(Mass., 1996); Com. v. 
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993); Com. v. Feroli, 553 
N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 
1088(N.J., 1993); State v. Mann, 625 A.2d 1102, 1109(N.J., 1993); 
State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis, 1991)
264.  Brown v. Com., 812 S.W.2d 502,503(Kent., 1991); Com. v. 
Whitman, 617 N.E.2d 625, 628(Mass., 1993)
265.  McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1217(Fla, 2000)(court's 
holding was that the trial judge committed reversible error by 
treating as a conviction for purpose of the state's impeachment 
rule, an unadjudicated guilty plea.  The court went on to note that 
the trial judge committed further error by allowing the prosecutor 
to identify the nature of the underlying offense which was the same 
as the current charge, as well as the fact that the victim was the 
same)  The court, however, was not always faithful to this 
heuristic, see e.g. Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 790(Fla., 
1992); State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 741, 748(Neb., 1999); State v. 
Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 158, 165(N.C., 1992)
266.  Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 143,145(Fla., 1991);  Brown v. 
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502, 503(Kent., 1991); State v. Jackson, 601 
N.W.2d 741, 748(Neb., 1999); State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088 
and 1090 and 1092-1093.(N.J., 1993)l; State v. Ross, 405 S.E. 2d 
158, 165(N.C., 1992);  State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-543(Wis, 
1991)) 
267.   Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 143,145(Fla., 1991); Brown v. 
Com., 812 S.W.2d 502, 503(Kent., 1991)(prohibited  identification 
of the specific felony for which the person was convicted, unless 
the witness denied the conviction; State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 
741, 748(Neb., 1999)(interprets rule to authorize admission only of 
the fact of conviction for a felony and the number of such 
convictions, but to exclude reference to the name, nature, 
sentence, and details of the crime and conviction); State v. 
Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1092-1093(N.J., 1993)(The court found that 
the prosecution's interests in attacking the credibility of an 
accused who testified with a felony conviction was adequately 
vindicated by admission of the grade and date of such convictions. 
 Court added guideline that when the accused was also convicted of 
non-similar convictions the prosecution options were to seek to 
admit by name those convictions only, or to seek to admit 
"sanitized" statements of all of the convictions; State v. Ross, 
405 S.E. 2d 158, 165(N.C., 1992)(court, which did not adopt a 
balancing standard, recognized both the propriety of sanitizing a 
conviction and employing as a balancing factor which favored and in 
this case should have resulted in exclusion of the convictions to 
impeach - the policy consideration that the jury was likely to use 
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such convictions for the impermissible substantive purpose of 
convicting the accused}; State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 
487(Wis., 2004)(court majority found significant fact that judge 
did not authorize reference to names or date of entry of three 
decades old convictions);  State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531,542-
543(Wis, 1991)(the court did not make express reference to 
"sanitized", but did assert that the proper procedure was to limit 
the inquiry only to the facts that the witness was convicted of a 
crime, and the number of convictions)
268.  State v. Brunson, 625 A.2d 1085, 1088-1089(N.J., 1993)(Court 
first cited an empirical study to note that criminal defendants 
with criminal records are less likely to testify than those without 
such records.  Subsequent to that reference, the court cited to an 
empirical study, first for the proposition that the study findings 
included a finding that jurors stated that a prior conviction did 
not affect their view of the credibility of the accused.  Second, 
court cited to a finding of that study that the highest conviction 
rate by these same sampled jurors occurred when the prior 
conviction was for a crime identical or similar to the current 
crime being tried.  Court noted that other empirical studies had 
reported similar findings.  State supreme court failed to recognize 
the significance of its first finding-jurors do not view any 
particular conviction as a logical reason to believe that a witness 
is more likely to lie.  The state supreme court also cited to 
several commentators for their consensus conclusion that the 
admission of prior convictions including their admission only to 
impeach, would unfairly prejudice the accused, if he was the 
witness, and that such unfair prejudice would occur even if the 
judge gave a limiting instruction) 
269.  Miller ex rel. Monticello Baking Co. v. Marymount Medical 
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 285-286(Ky., 2004)(court sanctioned 
anonymous admission of twelve year old attempted burglary 
conviction to impeach one of the plaintiffs in a civil case)
270.  Id.(apparently the court had never contemplated the 
significance of the outcome and aftermath of Green v. Bock Laundry, 
490 U.S. 527(1989).  See also Holley, supra note 1, at note 38, and 
accompanying text. Referring to evidence that the quantum and 
quality of unfair prejudice has to be evaluated on a specific 
witness type, and that unfair prejudice is likely to rank second 
for civil party witnesses right after the potential for unfair 
prejudice when the accused is the witness impeached with a prior 
conviction. 
271.  People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3rd 572, 584, 606(Cal., 
2002)(accused on trial and eventually convicted of several crimes 
including murder and attempted murder of a police officer, and 
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sentenced to death.  Trial judge admitted his four year old 
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer.
The court conclusionarily asserted that the conviction was 
admissible even if somewhat similar) 
272.  State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d 958, 960(R.I., 1995)(court 
acquiesced in the trial judge's decision to admit six irrelevant 
convictions to impeach the accused, on the ground that the record 
proved the judge had performed the required balancing because in 
the record was that judge's conclusionary statement that he did not 
think that any of the convictions were too remote or too 
prejudicial to warrant exclusion); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037, 
1039-1040(R.I., 1990)
273.  People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705,719(Cal, 1992)(court found that 
it was reasonable, hence no abuse of discretion, for the trial 
judge to conclude that the admission of the voluntary manslaughter 
conviction would have been highly prejudicial, and so remote that 
it diminished the relevance of the conviction, apparently one the 
court conceded was for a crime of moral turpitude, to prove 
propensity to lie.  Court did not identify a basis to justify the 
highly prejudicial finding, or more importantly why no trial judge 
during the approximately decade and one-half of this study had ever 
made and it had never confirmed such a finding when a range of 
felony convictions were admitted to impeach the accused.); State v. 
Werner, 831 A.2d 183, at 204 & 205(R.I., 2003)(court referred to 
its precedent for principle that age of convictions can mitigate 
unfair prejudice that could result from their admission, and 
subsequently sanctioned exclusion in this case on the grounds 
employed by the trial judge - the convictions were "stale" and the 
nature of the offenses were not strongly probative of lying.  Hence 
court accepted at face value trial judge's balancing evaluation, 
and most egregiously failed to reconcile, despite having the issue 
expressly raised on appeal, that in recent decisions it had 
rejected the same reasoning relied upon by this trial judge, when 
it was asserted by the defendant to exclude one or more of his 
convictions)
274. See supra notes 207 - 210, 223, 230 - 234, 252, 259, 272, and 
accompanying text.
275.  See supra notes 208 - 211, 231, 252, and 259, and 
accompanying text.  
276.  Com. v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 988(Mass., 1997)(Jury found 
accused guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Accused did not testify after the 
trial judge ruled that the prosecution could impeach him with his 
convictions for robbery, assault with intent to rob, and larceny of 
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a motor vehicle); Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 
1990)(Accused convicted at his second(first ended in mistrial 
because of hung jury) by a jury of two counts of first degree 
murder by reason of deliberate premeditation and felony murder.  
Accused made a pretrial motion to exclude his conviction from use 
by the prosecution should he testify at trial, and took the 
position, which he in fact followed, that unless the convictions 
were excluded he would not testify at trial); People v. Hayes, 764 
N.E.2d 963, 964(N.Y., 2002)(Accused did not testify at trial, and 
was convicted of all charges except assault); People v. Mattiace, 
568 N.E.2d 1189, 1192(N.Y., 1990)(Following what the state supreme 
court characterized as a lengthy pre-trial hearing the trial judge 
concluded that three of seven of accused and corporation prior 
convictions could not be used by prosecution to impeach him, but 
that two personal and two corporate pollution related convictions 
could be admitted for this purpose.  Accused did not testify.
277.  Com. v. Feroli, 553 N.E.2d 934, 936(Mass., 1990)(Accused 
convicted at his second(first ended in mistrial because of hung 
jury) by a jury of two counts of first degree murder by reason of 
deliberate premeditation and felony murder. 
278.  Com. v. Pauling, 777 N.E.2d 135,143(Mass., 2002)(highly 
conclusionary analysis); State v. Sidberry, 448 S.E.2d 798, 799-
800(N.C., 1994)(no analysis of the constitutional issue); State v. 
Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 898(Or., 1991)(Accused was convicted by a jury 
of first degree sexual assault.  Accused did not testify during the 
trial.  State supreme court ruled that in order to have his 
constitutional claim that the admission of a prior sexual abuse 
conviction denied him his constitutional right to an impartial jury 
trial.  State supreme court ruled on appeal the accused was 
required to make an offer of proof at trial, describing what he 
would have testified to had his convictions been excluded.  Accused 
failed to make the offer of proof, and therefore state supreme 
court refused to evaluate the merits of his constitutional claims)
279.  See supra notes 43 - 44, and accompanying text. Seventy-two 
percent of these decisions involved impeaching the accused in a 
criminal case. 
280. See supra notes 83 - 84, and accompanying text.  Sixty-three 
percent of these decisions involved impeaching the accused in a 
criminal case. 
281.  See supra notes 185 - 186, and accompanying text. 
282.  See infra note 294, and accompanying text. 
283.  See supra notes 45 - 46, and accompanying text.
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284.  See supra notes 85 - 86, and accompanying text.   
285.  See supra notes 187 - 188, and accompanying text.   
286.  See supra notes 48 - 49, 89 - 90, and 190 - 191, and 
accompanying text.   
287.  See supra notes 48 - 49, 89 - 90, and 190 - 191, and 
accompanying text. 
288.  See Holley, supra note 1 at notes 25, 26, and 39, and 
accompanying text. 
289.  Id., at notes  44, 52, 102, and 105, and accompanying text. 
290.  Id., at notes  140, and 148 - 150, and accompanying text. 
291.  Id., at notes  148 - 150, and accompanying text. ]
292.  See supra notes 175 - 181, and accompanying text.   
293.  See supra note 160 and 277, and accompanying text.
294.  See supra notes 50 - 51, 91 - 92, and accompanying text.   
295.  See supra notes 50 and 91, and accompanying text.
296.  See supra notes 192 - 195, and accompanying text.   
297.  See Holley, supra note 1, at note 216, and accompanying text. 
298.  See supra notes 52, 96-97, 188, and 196, and accompanying 
text.
299.  See supra notes 52, 58, 80, 144 - 145,  and 206 and 223, and 
accompanying text.  See also infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
300.  See supra notes 73 - 74, 76, 94, text following note 124, 127 
- 128, text immediately proceeding and accompanying note 132, 133 -
134, 145, 167 - 169, 230, 240, 258 - 260, 266, 270, text proceeding 
and accompanying 271, 272, 275, and accompanying text or note 
respectively.  But see contra notes 108, 161 - 162, 171, and 264, 
and accompanying text. 
301.  See supra notes 53 - 56, 103 - 107, 197 - 198, and 
accompanying text. 
302.  See supra notes 53, 103, and 197, and accompanying text. 
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303.  See supra notes 56, and 107, and accompanying text. 
304.  See supra notes 56, 107, and accompanying text.
305.  See Holley, supra note 1, at note 1,  and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 57 - 60, 108 - 134, and 199 - 200, and 
accompanying text.
307.  See supra notes 42, 57, 86, 108, and 199, and accompanying 
text. 
308.  James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2030(2000); Note: 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 
17(n.73)(1995)(Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 
Statistical Tables 1993 Tables at 6 tbl. B-5. Interpreted as 
containing state and federal statistics on direct appeals, and 
reporting ultimate overall reversal rate of 7.4%, while capital 
appeals rate was 50%); Note: Courting Reversal: The Supervisory 
Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 Yale L.J. 1191(1978)(1870-1970 
overall reversal rate of 38.5%)
309.  See supra notes 57, 108, and 199, and accompanying text.
310.  See supra notes 46, 48, 57, 86, 89, 90, 108, 188, and 199, 
and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 58, 109, 118, 200, and accompanying text.  
312.  See supra notes 58, 110, 201, and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 50 - 51, 91 - 92, 111, 193, 202, and 
accompanying text. 
314.  See supra notes 50 - 51, 91, 111, 193, 202, and accompanying 
text. 
315.  See supra notes 62 - 63, 137, 140 - 141, and 212, and 
accompanying text.  
316.  See discussion supra notes 54 - 56, 64, 105 - 107, 143, 148 -
149, 151 - 153, and 212 - 214, and accompanying text. 
317.  See supra. notes 64, 143, and 148 - 151,  But see 153, and 
213 - 214, and accompanying text.  
318.  See supra notes 144 and 145, and accompanying text.  
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319.   68, 157, and 221 and accompanying text. 
320.   See supra notes 69 - 70, 158, 231, 236 - 256, and 
accompanying text. 
321.  See supra notes, 70 - 79, 166 - 167, and 259 - 272, and 
accompanying text.  
322.  See supra notes 52, 169, 196, and 298 and accompanying text. 
323.  See supra notes 98 - 99, 276 - 277, and accompanying text. 
324. See supra notes 45 - 46, 85 - 86, and 187 - 188, and 
accompanying text.   
325.   In all thirteen decisions from state supreme courts whose 
rules mimicked the federal rule and in which the issue was the 
propriety of impeaching the accused, the accused testified in all 
13 cases - see supra notes 45 - 46. In eleven of the forty-five 
decisions(25%) made by state supreme courts interpreting rules more 
restrictive than the federal rule in admitting convictions to 
impeach, the accused did not testify - see supra notes 85 - 86. In 
as many as twenty-eight(56%), and as few as nineteen(38%) decisions 
made by state supreme courts interpreting rules that were more 
liberal overall than the federal rule in admitting convictions to 
impeach, the accused did not testify - see supra notes 187 - 188. 
In nine of the cases from these supreme courts, it was not clear 
from the opinions if the accused had testified. 
326.  Benson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 341, 344(Ark., 2004)(accused 
expressly asserted that the trial judge's decision to permit the 
prosecution to impeach him with three felony convictions, all of 
which were irrelevant to prove propensity to lie, but which 
included a conviction for a crime, rape, identical to a current 
charge, kept him from testifying at trial.  The justices of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court deemed that contention unworthy of analysis, 
but instead responded by noting the accused was given right to 
choose to testify or to decline to testify); Walker v. State, 790 
A.2d 1214, 1217(Del., 2002)(the court dismissed the accused express 
constitutional claim that the trial judge's decision to admit 
multiple convictions to impeach his potential trial testimony drove 
him from the stand, thereby denying him his express constitutional 
right to testify on his own behalf.  Instead, the state supreme 
court blamed the accused for not testifying to properly preserve 
this claim); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 901(n.7)(Or., 
1991)(Accused was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual 
assault.  Accused did not testify during the trial.  On appeal
accused alleged that he did not testify because the trial judge had 
ruled he could be impeached with his conviction for sexual assault 
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should he testify, and that the ruling violated both his 
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf and his right to 
an impartial jury.  Oregon Supreme Court did make an evaluation of 
whether the accused right under the state's constitutional 
provision assuring a right to an impartial jury was violated.  The 
court concluded that the jury did not hear about the conviction for 
the same offense since the accused did not testify.  Therefore, of 
course, it could not have been prejudiced by that information.  The 
court asserted that the accused theory was that anytime that a jury 
heard that the defendant was previously convicted of sexual abuse 
and he was currently charged with sexual abuse it would convict the 
accused.  The court expressly declined to assume that the accused 
was denied an impartial jury.  
327.  469 U.S. 38(1984).  The standards of the federal rule and 
those of most states on admitting convictions to impeach makes no 
reference to the accused having to testify, and the substantive 
focus of those standards provide no basis for implying that whether 
the accused testifies impacts the merits of the evaluation of
whether a conviction should be admitted to impeach.  Procedural 
justifications suggested by the United States Supreme Court in 
Luce, such as the judge might have changed his mind about the 
admissibility of the conviction to impeach, when stripped of any 
nexus to the actual standards of the rule, are so easily overcome 
and specious that it is difficult to understand what ever prompted 
their identification.  See discussion infra., notes 346 - 349, and 
accompanying text. 
328.  See supra notes 102, 123, and 134, and accompanying text.  
See also Fennell v. State, 691 A.2d 624, 625(Del. 1997)(accused 
failure to testify moots appeal of decision of trial judge to admit 
a same crime conviction); State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996,1001(Fla., 
1998)(state supreme court held that accused must take stand and 
testify to preserve appellate review of claim of error with regard 
to trial judge's authorizing use by prosecution of prior 
convictions for burglary and petty larceny.  The accused did not 
testify at trial); State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897,900(n.6)(Or., 
1991)(state supreme court expressly acknowledged that had the 
accused testified he would still have the right to claim on appeal 
that his two constitutional rights identified in this appeal were 
violated.  Failure to testify, coupled with failure to make an 
offer of proof, court concluded made it impossible to determine if 
accused constitutional right to testify was impaired.
329. Com. v. Drumgold, 666 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Mass., 1996)(Jury 
found accused guilty of murder in the first degree with deliberate 
premeditation.  During the cross-examination of the accused at 
trial, the prosecution offered and the judge approved the admission 
to impeach the accused of his prior convictions for unlawful 
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possession of a firearm, defacing a firearm, and unlawful 
possession of ammunition.  Accused lawyer failed to object to the 
admission of any of these convictions); State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 
82, 93(Ohio, 1997)(the attorney for an accused in a capital murder 
trial assumed that the trial judge had previously ruled that the 
accused could be impeached with a murder conviction); State v. 
Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1056(R.I., 2000)(lawyer for defendant 
erroneously conceded that misdemeanor convictions for possession of 
a contraband substance, and possession of stolen property had some 
relevance to prove that the accused wasn't trustworthy); Miller v. 
State, 67 P.3d 1191,1192(Wyo., 2003)(prosecuting attorney failed to 
argue that the victim's prior cocaine possession conviction was 
irrelevant to issue on only issue for which it was offered - as 
proof of propensity to lie.  State rule required balancing 
evaluation.  No reference made to that balancing evaluation); 
Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 972-973(Wyo., 2000)(court reviewed 
record which demonstrated that the defense attorney on direct 
examination of his client, the accused, charged with aggravated 
assault(with a knife), asked and the trial judge allowed him to ask 
the accused to admit to prior convictions to burglary, involuntary 
manslaughter, and armed robbery convictions.  The state supreme 
court sanctioned this "strategic" decision.  All of the convictions 
were entered twenty years before the trial.  None of these 
convictions were even arguably relevant to prove propensity to lie)
330.  State v. Raydo, 713 So.2d 996, 1001(Fla., 1998)(prosecutor 
asserted and trial judge authorized admission of two prior nolo 
pleas to impeach the accused during his robbery trial.  Accused did 
not take the stand, and was convicted.  The state supreme court 
refused to reverse the conviction despite the fact, by its own 
admission, the trial judge had made an obvious legal error in his 
ruling, because an express provision of the evidence code forbade 
use of nolo pleas in a subsequent criminal proceeding.   Trial 
judge and defense counsel apparently were both ignorant of this 
specific provision); State v. Cole, 703 A.2d 658, (N.H., 
1997)(state supreme court did not evaluate if two court martial 
convictions for similar sexual offenses qualified as felonies. 
Court ruled that the judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to make a pre-trial ruling.  Court failed to acknowledge obvious 
prejudice that would result if these convictions were admitted.  
Court relied in part on a finding that the accused attorney failed 
to specify that prejudice would result, and the quantity or quality 
of resulting prejudice.  Accused attorney only made reference to 
the impact on the trial if these convictions were admitted as a 
basis for needing to know prior to trial if the convictions would 
be admitted.) 
331.  See supra notes 70 - 77, 182, 223, 232, 234 - 235, 241, 259, 
and 267, and accompanying text.   
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332. See supra notes 70 - 77, and accompanying text.   
333.  See supra notes 91 - 92, 96, 121 - 134, 163 - 166, and 168, 
182, and accompanying text. 
334.  See supra notes 163 - 166, 168, and accompanying text. 
335. See supra note 166, and accompanying text. 
336.  See supra notes 208 - 211, 231, and, and accompanying text.
337.   See summary findings supra notes 283 - 292, 300 - 305, 313, 
315 - 316, 318 - 321, and accompanying text.  But see supra 309 
finding that the result of most of findings of error by these state 
supreme courts did benefit the accused. 
338.  See infra notes 333 - 343, and accompanying text. 
339.  See e.g. McFadden v. State, 772 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Fla, 2000);
 Label Systems, Inc. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 718(Con. 
2004)(legislature apparently delegated authority to the judges of 
the superior courts to adopt a comprehensive evidence code.  In 
1999, when these judges exercised this authority, with regard to 
the standard for determining the admissibility of convictions to 
impeach, they adopted the common law standard developed by the 
state supreme court); Sphect v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240(Ind., 
2000)("Confinement" identified in the Indiana rule as one of eight 
crimes conviction for which was admissible to impeach any witness. 
 The Indiana Supreme Court did not explain why "confinement" was 
identified as a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement 
which nevertheless should be used as a basis for impeachment.  The 
court subsequently did make reference, however, to the policy 
decision that its 1994 adoption of the current impeachment with 
convictions evidence rule as part of a comprehensive adoption of an 
evidence code, rejected adoption of the federal rule, and preserved 
the evolved state common law version of the rule.  The court did 
not explain why it chose to retain the common law, rather than 
adopt the federal rule or other more recent approaches to this 
issue); State v. Ashley, 623 A.2d 984, 986(Vt. 1993)(The court then 
resorted to its own guidelines developed prior to the adoption of 
the current substantive rule as the basis for determining the 
admissibility of convictions to impeach).  See also supra note 116 
with regard to the Illinois Supreme Court as "creator" of Illinois 
Rule-Standards in its case decisions; and 222 supra with regard to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court as author of the impeachment with 
convictions balancing evaluation standards.
340.  See supra notes 72 - 78, 116, 118, 124 - 128, 222, 226, and 
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228 - 229, and 232, and accompanying text.    
341. See supra notes 72, 76 - 77, 125 - 128, 177 - 178, 216 - 217, 
230, 232, 236 - 238, 241 - 243.
342.  See supra notes  50, 72, 76 - 77, 80, 91, 94 - 95, 124 - 128, 
133 - 134, 208, 216 - 217, 220, 230, 232, 265 - 269, 241 - 245, 247 
- 250, 252 - 256, 258 - 259, 265 - 269, and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 46 - 47, 86, 94 - 95, 126 - 127, 133 - 134, 
208, 210, 216 - 217, 230, 232, 239 - 240, text following note 241, 
246, 250, 252 - 254, 256, and 260, and accompanying text.
344.  See supra notes 307, 311, and 313, and accompanying text. 
345.  State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1356(R.I., 1996)(court 
reiterated, without explanation, its deference to the trial judge's 
decision with regard to this issue. In truth, the court could not 
offer a plausible explanation, because neither it nor any other 
state supreme court asserting this great deference standard can 
justify such deference on this issue.  The articulation of the 
correct rule standards, and how to lawyer on that standard is a 
matter of law, and the job of the top court in the state to 
articulate and determine that state judges are adhering to the 
court's rule protocol.  The conviction to impeach rule standards 
are at their core free of current case specific fact sensitivity.  
No deference to the trial judge's decisions, unless and until 
viable standards are stated in the rule as interpreted by the state 
supreme court, and the state supreme court does a minimally 
competent monitoring to assure there is a systematic good faith 
effort to apply those standards,is therefore justified.  
346.  A North Dakota Supreme Court decision is illustrative of why 
the minimum protection should extend to decisions to admit 
convictions against any party witness, including those in civil 
cases.  The court cited as authority the federal Advisory Committee 
Notes to the 1990 amendments to the federal rule and a secondary 
authority, that because it is unlikely that the jury will use prior 
convictions of a prosecution witness as propensity evidence, the 
trial courts should only rarely exclude any and every felony 
convictions of such witnesses when offered by the accused for 
impeachment purposes; State v. Randall, 639 N.W.2d 439, 446(N.D. 
2002).  The court's position ignored, however, as do the 
authorities referred to by the court, that such convictions, which 
are irrelevant to prove propensity to lie, are likely to distract 
the jury, and when as in this case, the prosecution witness is the 
victim of the crime, admission is likely, as in Green v. Bock 
Laundry, 490 U.S. 527(1989)(civil plaintiff), to result in unfair 
prejudice thereby creating the risk that the jury will acquit the 
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accused or find for the defendant in a civil case because the 
victim or the plaintiff is cast by the jury as a bad person  But 
Id. at 448, the court recognized this possible danger, but asserted 
that the government failed to argue that this danger was present in 
this case. The state supreme court failed to review the record to 
determine that the trial judge had identified these concerns which 
by rule were supposed to be considered, or why the state supreme 
court in its own evaluation failed to evaluate and condemn a 
decision which authorized the admission of seventeen irrelevant to 
prove propensity to lie convictions to impeach the alleged victim 
of an attempted murder) 
347. See cases discussed supra note 118.   FRE 609(b)(2005) also 
requires an on the record specific fact finding of the basis to 
admit a conviction to impeach when it is over ten years old. 
348.  See supra notes 321, and accompanying text. 
349. See e.g. Idaho Supreme Court decisions making reference to 
its rule standard which expressly required a de-novo appellate 
review of the issue of whether the conviction is relevant to prove 
a propensity to lie; State v. Page, 16 P.3d 890(Idaho, 2001)
350. See e.g. Wilson v. Sisco, 713 A.2d 923, 924(Del. 1998)(State 
supreme court held that the correct standard of review of the trial 
judge's interpretation of the meaning of an element of the evidence 
rule regulating admission of convictions to impeach is a de-novo 
review of a matter of law.  The assertion and use of  this standard 
by the Delaware Supreme Court can be contrasted with its 
inappropriate use several times of the abuse of discretion  
standard in cases decided within a few years of Wilson. 
351. See e.g. State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692, 696(N.D., 
1995)(sanctioned admission of similar crime convictions(here drug 
possession and an escape conviction).  The dissenting judge, Id. at 
697, strongly argued that harmless error rule should be used very 
sparingly when the trial judge has erroneously admitted felony 
convictions to impeach the accused.  He asserted that such 
admissions are intrinsically prejudicial.  Judge noted in only two 
prior decisions had the court used harmless error doctrine as basis 
to refuse to reverse a conviction when such prior convictions were 
erroneously admitted ostensibly solely for purpose of impeaching 
the accused); and State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 33, 35(Tenn., 
1999)(despite ruling trial judge had erroneously authorized the 
prosecution to impeach the accused's potential trial testimony with 
seven felonies for crimes of dishonesty, the court  conclusionarily 
asserted that the facts in the trial record demonstrated that the 
error was harmless.  Accused did not testify  at trial)
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352.  See supra notes 98, 278, and 326 - 327, and accompanying 
text. 
